A možda ipak ...
Page 5 of 12
Page 5 of 12 • 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ... 10, 11, 12
Re: A možda ipak ...
ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
Re: A možda ipak ...
Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
drž se ti mješalice bogati...
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
Tiger at New York's Bronx Zoo tests positive for coronavirus as COVID-19 surges in US
Posted earlier today at 3:12am
A tiger at the Bronx Zoo has tested positive for the new coronavirus, in what is believed to be the first known infection in an animal in the US or a tiger anywhere, a zoo spokesman said.
The four-year-old Malayan tiger named Nadia — and six other tigers and lions that have also fallen ill — are believed to have been infected by a zoo employee who wasn't yet showing symptoms, the zoo said.
The first animal started showing symptoms on March 27, and all were doing well and expected to recover, said the zoo, which has been closed to the public since March 16 amid the surging coronavirus outbreak in New York.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-06/tiger-at-new-yorks-bronx-zoo-tests-positive-for-coronavirus/12124410
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
ovo ako je istina itekako bi moglo biti zabrinjavajuće... ne za mog prijatelja vebera koji printa dilda u pauzi dok razmišlja o finalnom izgledu glisera... ali za nekog stočara ili peradara ili uzgajivača bilo kakvih životinja itekako da...Gnječ wrote:Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
Tiger at New York's Bronx Zoo tests positive for coronavirus as COVID-19 surges in US
Posted earlier today at 3:12am
A tiger at the Bronx Zoo has tested positive for the new coronavirus, in what is believed to be the first known infection in an animal in the US or a tiger anywhere, a zoo spokesman said.
The four-year-old Malayan tiger named Nadia — and six other tigers and lions that have also fallen ill — are believed to have been infected by a zoo employee who wasn't yet showing symptoms, the zoo said.
The first animal started showing symptoms on March 27, and all were doing well and expected to recover, said the zoo, which has been closed to the public since March 16 amid the surging coronavirus outbreak in New York.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-04-06/tiger-at-new-yorks-bronx-zoo-tests-positive-for-coronavirus/12124410
michaellcmacha- Posts : 21325
2015-08-08
Re: A možda ipak ...
rekao sam ti u razgovoru, da me boli kiki. ne uzbuđujem se oko stvari na koje nemam nikakav utjecaj i da se ne znam kako angažiram ništa se promijeniti neće.
ti, vili gnječ, norka rukama i nogama pokušavate pojasnit neke stvari navodeći činjenice, dok s druge strane imamo ludog longija, kayicu, marca i epija koji bulazne o svibnju i turizmu.
i zašto da trošim vrijeme na prazna prepucavanja kada mogu završiti projekt koji sam započeo prije deset godina. onda samo kao 3D model na računalu, a sada ga mogu odprintati i otklanjati nedostatke na stvarnom modelu.
ova kriza će proći i taman ću do 2023će imati kompletno gotov model sa svim papirima.
a, da se zamaram koronom, nema smisla. pridržavam se izolacije kao i moji ukućani.
ti, vili gnječ, norka rukama i nogama pokušavate pojasnit neke stvari navodeći činjenice, dok s druge strane imamo ludog longija, kayicu, marca i epija koji bulazne o svibnju i turizmu.
i zašto da trošim vrijeme na prazna prepucavanja kada mogu završiti projekt koji sam započeo prije deset godina. onda samo kao 3D model na računalu, a sada ga mogu odprintati i otklanjati nedostatke na stvarnom modelu.
ova kriza će proći i taman ću do 2023će imati kompletno gotov model sa svim papirima.
a, da se zamaram koronom, nema smisla. pridržavam se izolacije kao i moji ukućani.
_________________
AfD
veber-
Posts : 53509
2014-12-30
Re: A možda ipak ...
rekao sam ti u razgovoru, da me boli kiki. ne uzbuđujem se oko stvari na koje nemam nikakav utjecaj i da se ne znam kako angažiram ništa se promijeniti neće.
ti, vili gnječ, norka rukama i nogama pokušavate pojasnit neke stvari navodeći činjenice, dok s druge strane imamo ludog longija, kayicu, marca i epija koji bulazne o svibnju i turizmu.
i zašto da trošim vrijeme na prazna prepucavanja kada mogu završiti projekt koji sam započeo prije deset godina. onda samo kao 3D model na računalu, a sada ga mogu odprintati i otklanjati nedostatke na stvarnom modelu.
ova kriza će proći i taman ću do 2023će imati kompletno gotov model sa svim papirima.
a, da se zamaram koronom, nema smisla. pridržavam se izolacije kao i moji ukućani.
ti, vili gnječ, norka rukama i nogama pokušavate pojasnit neke stvari navodeći činjenice, dok s druge strane imamo ludog longija, kayicu, marca i epija koji bulazne o svibnju i turizmu.
i zašto da trošim vrijeme na prazna prepucavanja kada mogu završiti projekt koji sam započeo prije deset godina. onda samo kao 3D model na računalu, a sada ga mogu odprintati i otklanjati nedostatke na stvarnom modelu.
ova kriza će proći i taman ću do 2023će imati kompletno gotov model sa svim papirima.
a, da se zamaram koronom, nema smisla. pridržavam se izolacije kao i moji ukućani.
_________________
AfD
veber-
Posts : 53509
2014-12-30
Re: A možda ipak ...
ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
_________________
https://i.servimg.com/u/f25/20/30/76/79/flag-k10.jpg
"Snažni su duhom, njihova je vojska ustrajna jer brani svoju DOMOVINU"
michaellcmacha- Posts : 21325
2015-08-08
Re: A možda ipak ...
nije problem u brojevima, već u lažnoj sigurnost-tipa nije to nikaj.michaellcmacha wrote:ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
prije sam već napisao; nitko normalan nakon potresa neće ići spavati u kuću u kojoj ti krov može isti tren pasti na glavu. jer to vidiš.
koronu ne vidiš, pa se niti ne događa, ali se događa.
_________________
AfD
veber-
Posts : 53509
2014-12-30
Re: A možda ipak ...
na videu Junhua Tian
Imagine if a bat attacked a researcher and, in the chaos, spilled its blood onto his bare skin. Or imagine if he got a bit too close and got bat urine on his body. Or imagine both of those things happened to the same person not long before the 2019-nCoV outbreak began.
That’s exactly what happened. According to a report by Chinese researchers Botao and Lei Xiao, a researcher named Junhua Tian described these exact experiences in an interview with the Changjiang Times.
Junhua Tian claims he quarantined himself to keep from spreading these disease — but even if he and his colleagues used every possible precaution, it’s possible that the virus still could have leaked out.
One thing we’ve learned since the outbreak is that people can show no symptoms at all and still be infected. And, according to a recent study out of Japan, people who have recovered can still carry the virus.
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
i drzim,nuGnječ wrote:Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
drž se ti mješalice bogati...
de mi ti virusolog objasni :D
_________________
Re: A možda ipak ...
jel sijes vrganje?michaellcmacha wrote:ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
_________________
Re: A možda ipak ...
Leviathan2 wrote:i drzim,nuGnječ wrote:Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
drž se ti mješalice bogati...
de mi ti virusolog objasni :D
čuj kompa ako ti misliš da je taj virus pičkin dim kojeg si ti već prebolio između dva zamaha lopatom i sve ovo što se dešava je najobičnija prehlada koji kurac napadaš i zajebavaš one koji ne misle kao ti?
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
US Army Colonel (Ret.): "Yes, The COVID-19 Pandemic Could Have Originated In A Chinese Lab..."
Let’s be clear, although there have been many attempts to do so by scientists worldwide, so far, no one knows the origin of CoVid-19, the coronavirus strain responsible for the global pandemic.
CoVid-19 has several unique features such as high-affinity human angiotensin-converting enzyme-2 (ACE2) receptor binding, a furin (polybasic) cleavage site and certain “open reading frame” derived proteins, all of which come together in a single organism to create an extremely contagious and often deadly virus.
CoVid-19 is the seventh member of the family of coronaviruses that infect humans. Although the SARS-CoV coronavirus, responsible for the 2002-2003 pandemic, also binds to the human ACE2 receptor, none of the previously-identified human-infecting coronavirus strains is sufficiently similar to CoVid-19 to be designated its immediate relative or “progenitor.”
Of the comparisons made between CoVid-19 and all of the other potential progenitors, including those identified in an article much-cited by the main stream media, none possess the furin (polybasic) cleavage site, which potentially makes it a marker in the search for the origin of CoVid-19, if other structural similarities are also present.
Much like the climate change debate, there appears to be a politically-motivated campaign to demonstrate that CoVid-19 occurred naturally as a species “jump” from animals to humans originating in the Wuhan wet market. Despite an extraordinary effort, mainly by the Chinese government, and a flood of publications, there is still little evidence that directly supports that contention.
An alternative interpretation is that CoVid-19 “leaked” out of a Wuhan laboratory, either as a yet undescribed or not fully sequenced natural coronavirus isolate e.g. bat coronavirus BtCoV/4991 (GenBank KP876546) or as one manufactured by combining the properties of multiple viruses and subjected to a sequential passage of the recombinant through live animal hosts.
It is important to note that deadly viruses have previously "leaked" out of Chinese virology labs in two separate incidents.
A 2004 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) in China involved two researchers who were working with the virus in a Beijing research lab, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on April 26, 2004 and confirmed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.
“We suspect two people, a 26-year-old female postgraduate student and a 31-year-old male postdoc, were both infected, apparently in two separate incidents,” said Bob Dietz, WHO spokesman in Beijing at the time.
Synthetic biology, that is, the engineering of biology to create biologically-based systems that do not exist in nature is now widely used in laboratories worldwide. It has a number of benefits including as a rapid response platform to provide treatments for emerging diseases.
If unregulated, however, such bioengineering can produce combined or “chimeric” novel human pathogenic microorganisms capable of circumventing therapeutics or vaccines and, if released in nature, could have dramatic and permanent effects on disease transmission among species via natural-occurring mutations of the new viral entity.
The technology to create a coronavirus chimera has been demonstrated.
In a 2015 collaborative study between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and American scientists, funded by the National Institutes of Health, properties of two different viruses, the SHC014-CoV coronavirus and a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV, the coronavirus responsible for the 2002 pandemic, were combined as a chimera. It produced a new viral entity, SHC014-MA15, which, according to the authors, "Despite predictions from both structure-based modeling and pseudotyping experiments" unexpectedly "was viable and replicated to high titers" [a lot] in cell culture (Vero cells) and was capable of infecting human airway epithelial (HAE) cultures [human lung surface cells] and "showed robust replication" comparable to the "epidemic SARS-CoV Urbani strain."
That is, with the appropriate starting coronavirus strains, it is theoretically possible to manufacture a CoVid-19-like chimera.
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-army-colonel-ret-yes-covid-19-pandemic-could-have-originated-chinese-lab
Let’s be clear, although there have been many attempts to do so by scientists worldwide, so far, no one knows the origin of CoVid-19, the coronavirus strain responsible for the global pandemic.
CoVid-19 has several unique features such as high-affinity human angiotensin-converting enzyme-2 (ACE2) receptor binding, a furin (polybasic) cleavage site and certain “open reading frame” derived proteins, all of which come together in a single organism to create an extremely contagious and often deadly virus.
CoVid-19 is the seventh member of the family of coronaviruses that infect humans. Although the SARS-CoV coronavirus, responsible for the 2002-2003 pandemic, also binds to the human ACE2 receptor, none of the previously-identified human-infecting coronavirus strains is sufficiently similar to CoVid-19 to be designated its immediate relative or “progenitor.”
Of the comparisons made between CoVid-19 and all of the other potential progenitors, including those identified in an article much-cited by the main stream media, none possess the furin (polybasic) cleavage site, which potentially makes it a marker in the search for the origin of CoVid-19, if other structural similarities are also present.
Much like the climate change debate, there appears to be a politically-motivated campaign to demonstrate that CoVid-19 occurred naturally as a species “jump” from animals to humans originating in the Wuhan wet market. Despite an extraordinary effort, mainly by the Chinese government, and a flood of publications, there is still little evidence that directly supports that contention.
An alternative interpretation is that CoVid-19 “leaked” out of a Wuhan laboratory, either as a yet undescribed or not fully sequenced natural coronavirus isolate e.g. bat coronavirus BtCoV/4991 (GenBank KP876546) or as one manufactured by combining the properties of multiple viruses and subjected to a sequential passage of the recombinant through live animal hosts.
It is important to note that deadly viruses have previously "leaked" out of Chinese virology labs in two separate incidents.
A 2004 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS-CoV) in China involved two researchers who were working with the virus in a Beijing research lab, the World Health Organization (WHO) said on April 26, 2004 and confirmed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control.
“We suspect two people, a 26-year-old female postgraduate student and a 31-year-old male postdoc, were both infected, apparently in two separate incidents,” said Bob Dietz, WHO spokesman in Beijing at the time.
Synthetic biology, that is, the engineering of biology to create biologically-based systems that do not exist in nature is now widely used in laboratories worldwide. It has a number of benefits including as a rapid response platform to provide treatments for emerging diseases.
If unregulated, however, such bioengineering can produce combined or “chimeric” novel human pathogenic microorganisms capable of circumventing therapeutics or vaccines and, if released in nature, could have dramatic and permanent effects on disease transmission among species via natural-occurring mutations of the new viral entity.
The technology to create a coronavirus chimera has been demonstrated.
In a 2015 collaborative study between the Wuhan Institute of Virology and American scientists, funded by the National Institutes of Health, properties of two different viruses, the SHC014-CoV coronavirus and a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV, the coronavirus responsible for the 2002 pandemic, were combined as a chimera. It produced a new viral entity, SHC014-MA15, which, according to the authors, "Despite predictions from both structure-based modeling and pseudotyping experiments" unexpectedly "was viable and replicated to high titers" [a lot] in cell culture (Vero cells) and was capable of infecting human airway epithelial (HAE) cultures [human lung surface cells] and "showed robust replication" comparable to the "epidemic SARS-CoV Urbani strain."
That is, with the appropriate starting coronavirus strains, it is theoretically possible to manufacture a CoVid-19-like chimera.
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/us-army-colonel-ret-yes-covid-19-pandemic-could-have-originated-chinese-lab
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
sadim toaletni papir za potrebite... ;)Leviathan2 wrote:jel sijes vrganje?michaellcmacha wrote:ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
michaellcmacha- Posts : 21325
2015-08-08
Re: A možda ipak ...
ne zajebavam te, jebote tito koji te ostavi :)michaellcmacha wrote:sadim toaletni papir za potrebite... ;)Leviathan2 wrote:jel sijes vrganje?michaellcmacha wrote:ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
_________________
Re: A možda ipak ...
kompa, jesam ga prebolio, ne izmedju zamaha lopatom jer sam vec bio dao otkaz, od 1.01 sam neuposlen jer radim na necem drugomGnječ wrote:Leviathan2 wrote:i drzim,nuGnječ wrote:Leviathan2 wrote:ja znam da su virusi korisni organizmi kao i bakterije
ako je ovaj umjetnjak onda je to zajeb, no kad pandemija projde taj se nece vise pojavit ma koliko mutirao
me postoji nista u prirodi sto nema svrhu
drž se ti mješalice bogati...
de mi ti virusolog objasni :D
čuj kompa ako ti misliš da je taj virus pičkin dim kojeg si ti već prebolio između dva zamaha lopatom i sve ovo što se dešava je najobičnija prehlada koji kurac napadaš i zajebavaš one koji ne misle kao ti?
al mislim da je ova cjeloukupna strka bar 50% pretjerana
_________________
Re: A možda ipak ...
al zato ja malo tebe :), nemam posla sa gljivama... iz ranijih upisa mogo si skopčat da uzgajam ponešto egzota i kvalitetnijeg povrća... međutim malo pomalo spala priča na 3 slova... ali s obzirom na okolnosti evo me opet u akciji... jedino imam problem što bez propusnice ne mogu do plastenika, oni su na petrinjskom području... tak da bih radije da se ovo smiri i da idem na brač gdje sam trebao biti od 01.04... mater mu jebem... pa kako je to moguće da me u roku od 4 godine dva puta sjebe za istu stvar na isti datum... 2016 sam sq 1. travnja trebao početi u forzheimu raditi, a sad na braču kod mariona dužića isto sa 1. travnja... onda me sjebo herc sad koronaLeviathan2 wrote:ne zajebavam te, jebote tito koji te ostavi :)michaellcmacha wrote:sadim toaletni papir za potrebite... ;)Leviathan2 wrote:jel sijes vrganje?michaellcmacha wrote:ne zamaram se ni ja, evo dopeljo opet 3 kubika crnice, sutra kreće dezinfekcija teglica i stiropora i za par dana rada od kutra do mraka priredit ću desetak tisuća sadnica svih i sakakvih... dio tog ću posaditi, nešto podijeliti a manji dio prodati....ako bude zainteresiranih... ali puno je lakše meni i gnječu podnijeti da smo pogriješili ako sve za kratko vrijeme bude dobro, nego ovima koji potpuno neosnovano šire optimizam na osnovu mizernih brojeva koji su statistički umotani u celofan, kad krenu još lošije vijesti i nastupe turobnija vremena....
michaellcmacha- Posts : 21325
2015-08-08
Re: A možda ipak ...
odi spat, a ne u gluho doba stavljati upise.
legneš u 1 i digneš se oko 5-6, a ne legneš oko 5-6, a digneš se oko 1-2.
legneš u 1 i digneš se oko 5-6, a ne legneš oko 5-6, a digneš se oko 1-2.
_________________
AfD
veber-
Posts : 53509
2014-12-30
Re: A možda ipak ...
Scientists Brace for Media Storm Around Controversial Flu Studies
By Martin EnserinkNov. 23, 2011 , 4:48 PM
ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS—Locked up in the bowels of the medical faculty building here and accessible to only a handful of scientists lies a man-made flu virus that could change world history if it were ever set free.
The virus is an H5N1 avian influenza strain that has been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets, the animals that most closely mimic the human response to flu. Scientists believe it's likely that the pathogen, if it emerged in nature or were released, would trigger an influenza pandemic, quite possibly with many millions of deaths.
In a 17th floor office in the same building, virologist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center calmly explains why his team created what he says is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make"—and why he wants to publish a paper describing how they did it. Fouchier is also bracing for a media storm. After he talked to ScienceInsider yesterday, he had an appointment with an institutional press officer to chart a communication strategy.
Fouchier's paper is one of two studies that have triggered an intense debate about the limits of scientific freedom and that could portend changes in the way U.S. researchers handle so-called dual-use research: studies that have a potential public health benefit but could also be useful for nefarious purposes like biowarfare or bioterrorism.
The other study—also on H5N1, and with comparable results—was done by a team led by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the University of Tokyo, several scientists told ScienceInsider. (Kawaoka did not respond to interview requests.) Both studies have been submitted for publication, and both are currently under review by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which on a few previous occasions has been asked by scientists or journals to review papers that caused worries.
NSABB chair Paul Keim, a microbial geneticist, says he cannot discuss specific studies but confirms that the board has "worked very hard and very intensely for several weeks on studies about H5N1 transmissibility in mammals." The group plans to issue a public statement soon, says Keim, and is likely to issue additional recommendations about this type of research. "We'll have a lot to say," he says.
"I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one," adds Keim, who has worked on anthrax for many years. "I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
Some scientists say that's reason enough not to do such research. The virus could escape from the lab, or bioterrorists or rogue nations could use the published results to fashion a bioweapon with the potential for mass destruction, they say. "This work should never have been done," says Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute who has a strong interest in biosecurity issues.
The research by the Kawaoka and Fouchier teams set out to answer a question that has long puzzled scientists: Does H5N1, which rarely causes human disease, have the potential to trigger a pandemic? The virus has decimated poultry flocks on three continents but has caused fewer than 600 known cases of flu in humans since it emerged in Asia in 1997, although those rare human cases are often fatal. Because the virus spreads very inefficiently between humans it has been unable to set off a chain reaction and circle the globe.
Some scientists think the virus is probably unable to trigger a pandemic, because adapting to a human host would likely make it unable to reproduce. Some also believe the virus would need to reshuffle its genes with a human strain, a process called reassortment, that some believe is most likely to occur in pigs, which host both human and avian strains. Based on past experience, some scientists have also argued that flu pandemics can only be caused by H1, H2, and H3 viruses, which have been replaced by each other in the human population every so many decades—but not by H5.
Fouchier says his study shows all of that to be wrong.
Although he declined to discuss details of the research because the paper is still under review, Fouchier confirmed the details given in news stories in New Scientist and Scientific American about a September meeting in Malta where he first presented the study. Those stories describe how Fouchier initially tried to make the virus more transmissible by making specific changes to its genome, using a process called reverse genetics; when that failed, he passed the virus from one ferret to another multiple times, a low-tech and time-honored method of making a pathogen adapt to a new host.
After 10 generations, the virus had become "airborne": Healthy ferrets became infected simply by being housed in a cage next to a sick one. The airborne strain had five mutations in two genes, each of which have already been found in nature, Fouchier says; just never all at once in the same strain.
Ferrets aren't humans, but in studies to date, any influenza strain that has been able to pass among ferrets has also been transmissible among humans, and vice versa, says Fouchier: "That could be different this time, but I wouldn't bet any money on it."
The specter of an H5N1 pandemic keeps flu scientists up at night because of the virus's power to kill. Of the known cases so far, more than half were fatal. The real case-fatality rate is probably lower because an unknown number of milder cases are never diagnosed and reported, but scientists agree that the virus is vicious. Based on Fouchier's talk in Malta, New Scientist reported that the strain created by the Rotterdam team is just as lethal to ferrets as the original one.
"These studies are very important," says biodefense and flu expert Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. The researchers "have the full support of the influenza community," Osterholm says, because there are potential benefits for public health. For instance, the results show that those downplaying the risks of an H5N1 pandemic should think again, he says.
Knowing the exact mutations that make the virus transmissible also enables scientists to look for them in the field and take more aggressive control measures when one or more show up, adds Fouchier. The study also enables researchers to test whether H5N1 vaccines and antiviral drugs would work against the new strain.
Fouchier says he consulted widely within the Netherlands before submitting his manuscript for publication. The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which funded the work, has agreed to the publication, says Fouchier, including officials at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. (NIH declined to answer questions for this story.) Now, Fouchier is eagerly waiting for NSABB's judgment.
Osterholm says he can't discuss details of the papers because he's an NSABB member. But he says it should be possible to omit certain key details from controversial papers and make them available to people who really need to know. "We don't want to give bad guys a road map on how to make bad bugs really bad," he says.
But some scientists say the board's debate comes far too late, because the studies have been done and the papers are written. "This is a good example of the need for a robust and independent system of PRIOR review and approval of potentially dangerous experiments," retired arms control researcher Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Davis, wrote to ScienceInsider in an e-mail. "Blocking publication may provide some small increment of safety, but it will be very modest compared to the benefits of not doing the work in the first place."
Scientists have long discussed whether to have mandatory reviews of dual-use studies before they begin, and given the global risks, some have even argued for some international risk assessment system for pandemic viruses. For instance, a proposal by four researchers from the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland would have classified Fouchier's work as an "activity of extreme concern" that would have required international pre-approval.
But NSABB advised against such mandatory systems in 2007, and most countries don't have formal mechanisms in place to review studies before they start. (In the United States, it's "recommended" that researchers ask an institutional review board for advice if they think a study raises concerns.) Fouchier's study was greenlighted in advance by the Dutch Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), but that only means the panel is satisfied with safety procedures at Fouchier's lab, explains chair Bastiaan Zoeteman; it's not COGEM's job to decide whether a study is desirable. NIH didn't give the funding proposal a special review either, says Fouchier.
"The creation of a pandemic virus has been the classical example of dual-use research of concern the past decade," says Ebright. "It's remarkable that the NSABB is discussing it in 2011."
Keim agrees about the need for reviews up front. "The process of identifying dual use of concern is something that should start at the very first glimmer of an experiment," he says. "You shouldn't wait until you have submitted a paper before you decide it's dangerous. Scientists and institutions and funding agencies should be looking at this. The journals and the journals' reviewers should be the last resort."
NSABB does not have the power to prevent the publication of papers, but it could ask journals not to publish. Even Ebright, however, says he's against efforts to ban the publication of the studies now that they have been done. "You cannot post hoc suppress work that was done and completed in a nonclassified context," he says. "The scientific community would not stand for that."
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/11/scientists-brace-media-storm-around-controversial-flu-studies
By Martin EnserinkNov. 23, 2011 , 4:48 PM
ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS—Locked up in the bowels of the medical faculty building here and accessible to only a handful of scientists lies a man-made flu virus that could change world history if it were ever set free.
The virus is an H5N1 avian influenza strain that has been genetically altered and is now easily transmissible between ferrets, the animals that most closely mimic the human response to flu. Scientists believe it's likely that the pathogen, if it emerged in nature or were released, would trigger an influenza pandemic, quite possibly with many millions of deaths.
In a 17th floor office in the same building, virologist Ron Fouchier of Erasmus Medical Center calmly explains why his team created what he says is "probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can make"—and why he wants to publish a paper describing how they did it. Fouchier is also bracing for a media storm. After he talked to ScienceInsider yesterday, he had an appointment with an institutional press officer to chart a communication strategy.
Fouchier's paper is one of two studies that have triggered an intense debate about the limits of scientific freedom and that could portend changes in the way U.S. researchers handle so-called dual-use research: studies that have a potential public health benefit but could also be useful for nefarious purposes like biowarfare or bioterrorism.
The other study—also on H5N1, and with comparable results—was done by a team led by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the University of Tokyo, several scientists told ScienceInsider. (Kawaoka did not respond to interview requests.) Both studies have been submitted for publication, and both are currently under review by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which on a few previous occasions has been asked by scientists or journals to review papers that caused worries.
NSABB chair Paul Keim, a microbial geneticist, says he cannot discuss specific studies but confirms that the board has "worked very hard and very intensely for several weeks on studies about H5N1 transmissibility in mammals." The group plans to issue a public statement soon, says Keim, and is likely to issue additional recommendations about this type of research. "We'll have a lot to say," he says.
"I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one," adds Keim, who has worked on anthrax for many years. "I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."
Some scientists say that's reason enough not to do such research. The virus could escape from the lab, or bioterrorists or rogue nations could use the published results to fashion a bioweapon with the potential for mass destruction, they say. "This work should never have been done," says Richard Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University in Piscataway, New Jersey, and the Howard Hughes Medical Institute who has a strong interest in biosecurity issues.
The research by the Kawaoka and Fouchier teams set out to answer a question that has long puzzled scientists: Does H5N1, which rarely causes human disease, have the potential to trigger a pandemic? The virus has decimated poultry flocks on three continents but has caused fewer than 600 known cases of flu in humans since it emerged in Asia in 1997, although those rare human cases are often fatal. Because the virus spreads very inefficiently between humans it has been unable to set off a chain reaction and circle the globe.
Some scientists think the virus is probably unable to trigger a pandemic, because adapting to a human host would likely make it unable to reproduce. Some also believe the virus would need to reshuffle its genes with a human strain, a process called reassortment, that some believe is most likely to occur in pigs, which host both human and avian strains. Based on past experience, some scientists have also argued that flu pandemics can only be caused by H1, H2, and H3 viruses, which have been replaced by each other in the human population every so many decades—but not by H5.
Fouchier says his study shows all of that to be wrong.
Although he declined to discuss details of the research because the paper is still under review, Fouchier confirmed the details given in news stories in New Scientist and Scientific American about a September meeting in Malta where he first presented the study. Those stories describe how Fouchier initially tried to make the virus more transmissible by making specific changes to its genome, using a process called reverse genetics; when that failed, he passed the virus from one ferret to another multiple times, a low-tech and time-honored method of making a pathogen adapt to a new host.
After 10 generations, the virus had become "airborne": Healthy ferrets became infected simply by being housed in a cage next to a sick one. The airborne strain had five mutations in two genes, each of which have already been found in nature, Fouchier says; just never all at once in the same strain.
Ferrets aren't humans, but in studies to date, any influenza strain that has been able to pass among ferrets has also been transmissible among humans, and vice versa, says Fouchier: "That could be different this time, but I wouldn't bet any money on it."
The specter of an H5N1 pandemic keeps flu scientists up at night because of the virus's power to kill. Of the known cases so far, more than half were fatal. The real case-fatality rate is probably lower because an unknown number of milder cases are never diagnosed and reported, but scientists agree that the virus is vicious. Based on Fouchier's talk in Malta, New Scientist reported that the strain created by the Rotterdam team is just as lethal to ferrets as the original one.
"These studies are very important," says biodefense and flu expert Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. The researchers "have the full support of the influenza community," Osterholm says, because there are potential benefits for public health. For instance, the results show that those downplaying the risks of an H5N1 pandemic should think again, he says.
Knowing the exact mutations that make the virus transmissible also enables scientists to look for them in the field and take more aggressive control measures when one or more show up, adds Fouchier. The study also enables researchers to test whether H5N1 vaccines and antiviral drugs would work against the new strain.
Fouchier says he consulted widely within the Netherlands before submitting his manuscript for publication. The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which funded the work, has agreed to the publication, says Fouchier, including officials at the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. (NIH declined to answer questions for this story.) Now, Fouchier is eagerly waiting for NSABB's judgment.
Osterholm says he can't discuss details of the papers because he's an NSABB member. But he says it should be possible to omit certain key details from controversial papers and make them available to people who really need to know. "We don't want to give bad guys a road map on how to make bad bugs really bad," he says.
But some scientists say the board's debate comes far too late, because the studies have been done and the papers are written. "This is a good example of the need for a robust and independent system of PRIOR review and approval of potentially dangerous experiments," retired arms control researcher Mark Wheelis of the University of California, Davis, wrote to ScienceInsider in an e-mail. "Blocking publication may provide some small increment of safety, but it will be very modest compared to the benefits of not doing the work in the first place."
Scientists have long discussed whether to have mandatory reviews of dual-use studies before they begin, and given the global risks, some have even argued for some international risk assessment system for pandemic viruses. For instance, a proposal by four researchers from the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland would have classified Fouchier's work as an "activity of extreme concern" that would have required international pre-approval.
But NSABB advised against such mandatory systems in 2007, and most countries don't have formal mechanisms in place to review studies before they start. (In the United States, it's "recommended" that researchers ask an institutional review board for advice if they think a study raises concerns.) Fouchier's study was greenlighted in advance by the Dutch Commission on Genetic Modification (COGEM), but that only means the panel is satisfied with safety procedures at Fouchier's lab, explains chair Bastiaan Zoeteman; it's not COGEM's job to decide whether a study is desirable. NIH didn't give the funding proposal a special review either, says Fouchier.
"The creation of a pandemic virus has been the classical example of dual-use research of concern the past decade," says Ebright. "It's remarkable that the NSABB is discussing it in 2011."
Keim agrees about the need for reviews up front. "The process of identifying dual use of concern is something that should start at the very first glimmer of an experiment," he says. "You shouldn't wait until you have submitted a paper before you decide it's dangerous. Scientists and institutions and funding agencies should be looking at this. The journals and the journals' reviewers should be the last resort."
NSABB does not have the power to prevent the publication of papers, but it could ask journals not to publish. Even Ebright, however, says he's against efforts to ban the publication of the studies now that they have been done. "You cannot post hoc suppress work that was done and completed in a nonclassified context," he says. "The scientific community would not stand for that."
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2011/11/scientists-brace-media-storm-around-controversial-flu-studies
Guest- Guest
Re: A možda ipak ...
bio u noćnoj hodnji, sad ujutro moram ženu odpeljat u banku, potom u kaufland strajsat nešto peneza, i onda domov sat dva odkunjati i u akciju... tko zna čega bude a čega ne za pol godine pa nek ja si priredim...veber wrote:odi spat, a ne u gluho doba stavljati upise.
legneš u 1 i digneš se oko 5-6, a ne legneš oko 5-6, a digneš se oko 1-2.
michaellcmacha- Posts : 21325
2015-08-08
Re: A možda ipak ...
Peter Daszak
e ovaj lik je premazan svim mastima. imam ga na nišanu već neko vrijeme i sve više i više mi je sumnjiv.
upišeš u google tražilicu Peter Daszak i odmah on na prvoj stranici njegov twitter profil i nakon toga njegovih zilion stranica u kojima apsolutno negira da je virus izletio iz labosa i obrušava se na sve one koji imaju drukčije mišljenje.
zanimljiv doktor:
Peter Daszak
@PeterDaszak
·
Mar 26
Absolutely spectacular. Dense, witty, deep...and just a little bit sick, if you don’t mind. Weirdly this brings a smile to my face as the plague rages quietly outside. I doff my cap to
@EcoHealthNYC
’s resident Pandemick Poet!
https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak/status/1243002682593488896
e ovaj lik je premazan svim mastima. imam ga na nišanu već neko vrijeme i sve više i više mi je sumnjiv.
upišeš u google tražilicu Peter Daszak i odmah on na prvoj stranici njegov twitter profil i nakon toga njegovih zilion stranica u kojima apsolutno negira da je virus izletio iz labosa i obrušava se na sve one koji imaju drukčije mišljenje.
zanimljiv doktor:
Peter Daszak
@PeterDaszak
·
Mar 26
Absolutely spectacular. Dense, witty, deep...and just a little bit sick, if you don’t mind. Weirdly this brings a smile to my face as the plague rages quietly outside. I doff my cap to
@EcoHealthNYC
’s resident Pandemick Poet!
https://twitter.com/PeterDaszak/status/1243002682593488896
Guest- Guest
Page 5 of 12 • 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ... 10, 11, 12
Similar topics
» možda europa ipak ima budućnost...
» New York Times: Možda je ipak narušen Iranski zračni prostor
» Berni iskreno Plenkiju koji mu se rugao na selfie sa kupusom:'Mozda sam glup,mozda sam anitalent za politiku ali bolje i to nego privatizacija,Fimi media,Agrokor...'
» Putin mozda zbog geostrategije i svoje politicke karizme mozda nece pasti ali bi mogao zbog - ekonomije
» KAŽETE IPAK JE ON ČETNIK, A VI STE IPAK IDIOTI!
» New York Times: Možda je ipak narušen Iranski zračni prostor
» Berni iskreno Plenkiju koji mu se rugao na selfie sa kupusom:'Mozda sam glup,mozda sam anitalent za politiku ali bolje i to nego privatizacija,Fimi media,Agrokor...'
» Putin mozda zbog geostrategije i svoje politicke karizme mozda nece pasti ali bi mogao zbog - ekonomije
» KAŽETE IPAK JE ON ČETNIK, A VI STE IPAK IDIOTI!
Page 5 of 12
Permissions in this forum:
You cannot reply to topics in this forum