A možda ipak ...

Gnječ wrote:

znaš kaj?
paranoik sam po defaultu. marc i njegova supruga nisu bilivili kaj sve cukam u ruksaku stalno, svaki dan kada izađem iz kuće, sada sam pridodao i praćku.
no, i meni se sve više čini da je to "pobjeglo" ali po američkom kontriranju, stalnim demantijima, nekako mi se čini da je krenulo iz amerike i da se krug zatvorio.
onako, laički.

Odlicno..uvijek dobre i kvalitetne stvari od gnječoa


malo sam desktop uneredio brzim duvnloadanjima i sejvanjem pedefova i tekstova..

Gnječo ,sto TO znaci ,ako sporije mutira za NAS..vecu prijemcivost,vecu cinkovitost,vece kumulativno djelovanje?

Legendovich wrote:Odlicno..uvijek dobre i kvalitetne stvari od gnječoa


malo sam desktop uneredio brzim duvnloadanjima i sejvanjem pedefova i tekstova..

Gnječo ,sto TO znaci ,ako sporije mutira za NAS..vecu prijemcivost,vecu cinkovitost,vece kumulativno djelovanje?

inžinjer, manager, snajperist, poznavatelj računala za put na mjesec, zakrči desktop.
aupičkumaterinu.

Legendovich wrote:Odlicno..uvijek dobre i kvalitetne stvari od gnječoa


malo sam desktop uneredio brzim duvnloadanjima i sejvanjem pedefova i tekstova..

Gnječo ,sto TO znaci ,ako sporije mutira za NAS..vecu prijemcivost,vecu cinkovitost,vece kumulativno djelovanje?

imaš link pa čitaj na stranici imaš još linkova pa čitaj još više


When the SARS-Cov-2 coronavirus first emerged in China, it was already starting to mutate at a very fast rate and many evolutionary branches were already developing and exhibiting distinct characteristics.

Sadly many experts were in denial and worst some virologist and genomic specialist basing their judgments on redundant past principles, were claiming that the virus was not mutating or that it was likely to become milder and might die off naturally.

The National Geographic however supported our views and even talked to other research entities that revealed the virus was mutating at a rate of about every 15 days.


Bedford’s lab has been using genetics to track the new coronavirus, known as SARS-CoV-2, since the first U.S. cases started to multiply in Washington State in February and March. Back then, public health officials focused on tracking patients’ travel histories and connecting the dots back to potentially infected people they’d met along the way.

Meanwhile, Bedford and his team turned to unlocking the virus’s genetic code by analyzing nasal samples collected from about two dozen patients. Their discovery was illuminating: By tracing how and where the virus had changed over time, Bedford showed that SARS-CoV-2 had been quietly incubating within the community for weeks since the first documented case in Seattle on January 21. The patient was a 35-year-old who had recently visited the outbreak’s original epicenter in Wuhan, China.

In other words, Bedford had scientific proof that people could unknowingly be spreading the coronavirus if they had a mild case and didn’t seek care, or if they had been missed by traditional surveillance because they weren’t tested. That revelation has fueled the frantic lockdowns, closures, and social distancing recommendations around the world in an attempt to slow the spread.

https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/03/how-coronavirus-mutations-can-track-its-spread-and-disprove-conspiracies/#close

veber wrote:

Gnječ wrote:

znaš kaj?
paranoik sam po defaultu. marc i njegova supruga nisu bilivili kaj sve cukam u ruksaku stalno, svaki dan kada izađem iz kuće, sada sam pridodao i praćku.
no, i meni se sve više čini da je to "pobjeglo" ali po američkom kontriranju, stalnim demantijima, nekako mi se čini da je krenulo iz amerike i da se krug zatvorio.
onako, laički.

godina je 2015

virolog Ralph Baric napravi prvi SARS nCov virus u laboratoriju. sintetički virus.

Using the SARS-CoV reverse genetics system2, we generated and characterized a chimeric virus expressing the spike of bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone. The results indicate that group 2b viruses encoding the SHC014 spike in a wild-type backbone can efficiently use multiple orthologs of the SARS receptor human angiotensin converting enzyme II (ACE2), replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells and achieve in vitro titers equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV. Additionally, in vivo experiments demonstrate replication of the chimeric virus in mouse lung with notable pathogenesis.

Evaluation of available SARS-based immune-therapeutic and prophylactic modalities revealed poor efficacy; both monoclonal antibody and vaccine approaches failed to neutralize and protect from infection with CoVs using the novel spike protein.

On the basis of these findings, we synthetically re-derived an infectious full-length SHC014 recombinant virus and demonstrate robust viral replication both in vitro and in vivo. Our work suggests a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence from viruses currently circulating in bat populations.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4797993/

uffff,prava materija..trcim po kofi...tHX na odgovoru..

Nash Gnječo nese zlatna jaja..ybt...odlicno...

Chimera mi je zapala za oko.....

A chimera virus is defined by the Center for Veterinary Biologics (part of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) as a "new hybrid microorganism created by joining nucleic acid fragments from two or more different microorganisms in which each of at least two of the fragments contain essential genes necessary for replication."^[1] The term chimera already referred to an individual organism whose body contained cell populations from different zygotes or an organism that developed from portions of different embryos. In mythology, a chimera is a creature such as a hippogriff or a gryphon formed from parts of different animals, thus the name for these viruses. Chimeric flaviviruses have been created in an attempt to make novel live attenuated vaccines.^[2]

daaaavno sam josh pisao o gentskim sekvencerima,kojima mozes kreirati,sto pozelis..jedino je znanje granica...mnogi su se smijali...tudej,i dansas mnogi misle,kako se viruzi "mućkaju" u epruvetama..


https://www.illumina.com/systems/sequencing-platforms/hiseq-2500.html 

onda će te zanimati i ovo:

GAIN OF FUNCTION

The type of research in question involves engineering viruses to give them capabilities not found in nature in order to facilitate research. This can be as simple as producing a higher yield for a certain vaccine strain, but has also involved giving viruses potentially dangerous traits.

One of the most popular examples of the potential dangers of gain-of-function research is two 2011 studies that gave a variant of avian flu in ferrets the ability to spread through the air where it previously couldn't.

The pause was announced in 2014, and shut off funding for 21 studies involving gain-of-function research. The move came as some scientists criticized such research for being unacceptably dangerous and followed revelations of safety concerns at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) labs involving the transport of anthrax and other virulent pathogens. The pause specifically targeted research into influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses. Now, the NIH has reversed the decision and says it will allow such studies to go forward, after completing a new review process. Some studies into influenza and MERS are still being held up, though, Science reports, and the rest will need to resubmit their proposals. For some, the decision may come too late, as their research is outdated by now. Others will simply have to update their proposals.


Gain-of-function studies have long been controversial, as they involve giving potentially dangerous viruses new capabilities. There are good reasons for doing so, in many cases, but each situation must be individually assessed to determine if the probable benefits outweigh the risks of doing the research, according to an ethical assessment commissioned by the NIH after the pause was announced. Ultimately, the assessment concludes that while some research projects may be either clearly necessary or too dangerous, most will fall in the middle, and decisions on whether to proceed will be difficult.

At it's most basic, the term applies to any research that gives a virus or microorganism an ability that it didn't have before, regardless of whether that ability has the potential to make it more dangerous.

https://www.discovermagazine.com/health/nih-to-resume-funding-controversial-gain-of-function-research


Biotechnology risk

Biotechnology risk is a form of existential risk that could come from biological sources, such as genetically engineered biological agents.[1][2] These can come either intentionally (in the form of bioterrorism/biological weapons) or unintentionally (through the accidental release of engineered viruses). A chapter in biotechnology and biosecurity was published in Nick Bostrom's Global Catastrophic Risks, which covered risks such as viral agents.[3] Since then, new technologies like CRISPR and gene drives have been introduced.

While the ability to deliberately engineer pathogens has been constrained to high-end labs run by top researchers, the technology to achieve this (and other astonishing feats of bioengineering) is rapidly becoming cheaper and more widespread. Such examples include the diminishing cost of sequencing the human genome (from $10M USD to $1000), the accumulation of large datasets of genetic information, the discovery of gene drives, and the discovery of CRISPR.[4] Biotechnology risk is therefore a credible explanation for the Fermi paradox.[5]

Pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change their characteristics, including virulence or toxicity.[2]

When intentional, these mutations can serve to adapt the pathogen to a laboratory setting, understand the mechanism of transmission or pathogenesis, or in the development of therapeutics. Such mutations have also been used in the development of biological weapons, and dual-use risk continues to be a concern in the research of pathogens.[6] The greatest concern is frequently associated with gain of function mutations, which confer novel or increased functionality, and the risk of their release.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biotechnology_risk

Gnječ wrote:

veber wrote:

Gnječ wrote:

znaš kaj?
paranoik sam po defaultu. marc i njegova supruga nisu bilivili kaj sve cukam u ruksaku stalno, svaki dan kada izađem iz kuće, sada sam pridodao i praćku.
no, i meni se sve više čini da je to "pobjeglo" ali po američkom kontriranju, stalnim demantijima, nekako mi se čini da je krenulo iz amerike i da se krug zatvorio.
onako, laički.

godina je 2015

virolog Ralph Baric napravi prvi SARS nCov virus u laboratoriju. sintetički virus.

Using the SARS-CoV reverse genetics system2, we generated and characterized a chimeric virus expressing the spike of bat coronavirus SHC014 in a mouse-adapted SARS-CoV backbone. The results indicate that group 2b viruses encoding the SHC014 spike in a wild-type backbone can efficiently use multiple orthologs of the SARS receptor human angiotensin converting enzyme II (ACE2), replicate efficiently in primary human airway cells and achieve in vitro titers equivalent to epidemic strains of SARS-CoV. Additionally, in vivo experiments demonstrate replication of the chimeric virus in mouse lung with notable pathogenesis.

Evaluation of available SARS-based immune-therapeutic and prophylactic modalities revealed poor efficacy; both monoclonal antibody and vaccine approaches failed to neutralize and protect from infection with CoVs using the novel spike protein.

On the basis of these findings, we synthetically re-derived an infectious full-length SHC014 recombinant virus and demonstrate robust viral replication both in vitro and in vivo. Our work suggests a potential risk of SARS-CoV re-emergence from viruses currently circulating in bat populations.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4797993/

mara mi je poslao dokument.
znam kako nijemci rade i žive, tako da mi nije bio nikakvo iznenađenje već odgovorno ponašanje.
malo sam preletio hrvatski, ali sam pogledao i izvornik.
nijemci su krvavo naučili lekciju.
realno imaju manje oboljelih, smrtno stradalih od hrvatske gledajući ukupan broj stanovnika.

Gnječ wrote:onda će te zanimati i ovo:

GAIN OF FUNCTION

The type of research in question involves engineering viruses to give them capabilities not found in nature in order to facilitate research. This can be as simple as producing a higher yield for a certain vaccine strain, but has also involved giving viruses potentially dangerous traits.

One of the most popular examples of the potential dangers of gain-of-function research is two 2011 studies that gave a variant of avian flu in ferrets the ability to spread through the air where it previously couldn't.

The pause was announced in 2014, and shut off funding for 21 studies involving gain-of-function research. The move came as some scientists criticized such research for being unacceptably dangerous and followed revelations of safety concerns at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) labs involving the transport of anthrax and other virulent pathogens. The pause specifically targeted research into influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses. Now, the NIH has reversed the decision and says it will allow such studies to go forward, after completing a new review process. Some studies into influenza and MERS are still being held up, though, Science reports, and the rest will need to resubmit their proposals. For some, the decision may come too late, as their research is outdated by now. Others will simply have to update their proposals.


Gain-of-function studies have long been controversial, as they involve giving potentially dangerous viruses new capabilities. There are good reasons for doing so, in many cases, but each situation must be individually assessed to determine if the probable benefits outweigh the risks of doing the research, according to an ethical assessment commissioned by the NIH after the pause was announced. Ultimately, the assessment concludes that while some research projects may be either clearly necessary or too dangerous, most will fall in the middle, and decisions on whether to proceed will be difficult.

At it's most basic, the term applies to any research that gives a virus or microorganism an ability that it didn't have before, regardless of whether that ability has the potential to make it more dangerous.

https://www.discovermagazine.com/health/nih-to-resume-funding-controversial-gain-of-function-research


Biotechnology risk

Biotechnology risk is a form of existential risk that could come from biological sources, such as genetically engineered biological agents.[1][2] These can come either intentionally (in the form of bioterrorism/biological weapons) or unintentionally (through the accidental release of engineered viruses). A chapter in biotechnology and biosecurity was published in Nick Bostrom's Global Catastrophic Risks, which covered risks such as viral agents.[3] Since then, new technologies like CRISPR and gene drives have been introduced.

While the ability to deliberately engineer pathogens has been constrained to high-end labs run by top researchers, the technology to achieve this (and other astonishing feats of bioengineering) is rapidly becoming cheaper and more widespread. Such examples include the diminishing cost of sequencing the human genome (from $10M USD to $1000), the accumulation of large datasets of genetic information, the discovery of gene drives, and the discovery of CRISPR.[4] Biotechnology risk is therefore a credible explanation for the Fermi paradox.[5]

Pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change their characteristics, including virulence or toxicity.[2]

When intentional, these mutations can serve to adapt the pathogen to a laboratory setting, understand the mechanism of transmission or pathogenesis, or in the development of therapeutics. Such mutations have also been used in the development of biological weapons, and dual-use risk continues to be a concern in the research of pathogens.[6] The greatest concern is frequently associated with gain of function mutations, which confer novel or increased functionality, and the risk of their release.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biotechnology_risk

zanimljivo..no ovdje vidimo samo jednu stranu svega,a to je civilna,dakle uglavnom korporacije,koje svoj razvoj projekata temelje iskljucivo na konto eventualnog profita..istrazivanja se rade,ali preliminarna,prvo se radi istrazivanje trzista i ostalog,da se procjeni interes...tako nekako mislim da je prije prava prica,u slucajevima korporaija sa direktim ugovorom sa Gavrmentom(vojno krilo) i vojnim ugovorima..tu mu je moguce da je sto izniklo...
imamo i USAMRIID koji ima neogranicene financije i briljantni proracun za najbolju mogucu tehniku..CDC je u usporedbi sa njima gotovo amaterski nivo..
no,platforme koje mislis,za razvoj i pracenje razvoja vektora,odavno postoje...tko i kakav je interes iza,bog bi ga znao

Legendovich wrote:daaaavno sam josh pisao o gentskim sekvencerima,kojima mozes kreirati,sto pozelis..jedino je znanje granica...mnogi su se smijali...tudej,i dansas mnogi misle,kako se viruzi "mućkaju" u epruvetama..


https://www.illumina.com/systems/sequencing-platforms/hiseq-2500.html 

daj se prestani blamirat.
virus je na kemijskoj bazi, genetika je slično, ali nema veze o čemu ti bulazniš.
otprilike kao liječenje virusa antibiotikom.
zato i je rezistencija. samo bakterije tretiraš antibiotikom.

Legendovich wrote:

Gnječ wrote:onda će te zanimati i ovo:

GAIN OF FUNCTION

The type of research in question involves engineering viruses to give them capabilities not found in nature in order to facilitate research. This can be as simple as producing a higher yield for a certain vaccine strain, but has also involved giving viruses potentially dangerous traits.

One of the most popular examples of the potential dangers of gain-of-function research is two 2011 studies that gave a variant of avian flu in ferrets the ability to spread through the air where it previously couldn't.

The pause was announced in 2014, and shut off funding for 21 studies involving gain-of-function research. The move came as some scientists criticized such research for being unacceptably dangerous and followed revelations of safety concerns at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) labs involving the transport of anthrax and other virulent pathogens. The pause specifically targeted research into influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses. Now, the NIH has reversed the decision and says it will allow such studies to go forward, after completing a new review process. Some studies into influenza and MERS are still being held up, though, Science reports, and the rest will need to resubmit their proposals. For some, the decision may come too late, as their research is outdated by now. Others will simply have to update their proposals.


Gain-of-function studies have long been controversial, as they involve giving potentially dangerous viruses new capabilities. There are good reasons for doing so, in many cases, but each situation must be individually assessed to determine if the probable benefits outweigh the risks of doing the research, according to an ethical assessment commissioned by the NIH after the pause was announced. Ultimately, the assessment concludes that while some research projects may be either clearly necessary or too dangerous, most will fall in the middle, and decisions on whether to proceed will be difficult.

At it's most basic, the term applies to any research that gives a virus or microorganism an ability that it didn't have before, regardless of whether that ability has the potential to make it more dangerous.

https://www.discovermagazine.com/health/nih-to-resume-funding-controversial-gain-of-function-research


Biotechnology risk

Biotechnology risk is a form of existential risk that could come from biological sources, such as genetically engineered biological agents.[1][2] These can come either intentionally (in the form of bioterrorism/biological weapons) or unintentionally (through the accidental release of engineered viruses). A chapter in biotechnology and biosecurity was published in Nick Bostrom's Global Catastrophic Risks, which covered risks such as viral agents.[3] Since then, new technologies like CRISPR and gene drives have been introduced.

While the ability to deliberately engineer pathogens has been constrained to high-end labs run by top researchers, the technology to achieve this (and other astonishing feats of bioengineering) is rapidly becoming cheaper and more widespread. Such examples include the diminishing cost of sequencing the human genome (from $10M USD to $1000), the accumulation of large datasets of genetic information, the discovery of gene drives, and the discovery of CRISPR.[4] Biotechnology risk is therefore a credible explanation for the Fermi paradox.[5]

Pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change their characteristics, including virulence or toxicity.[2]

When intentional, these mutations can serve to adapt the pathogen to a laboratory setting, understand the mechanism of transmission or pathogenesis, or in the development of therapeutics. Such mutations have also been used in the development of biological weapons, and dual-use risk continues to be a concern in the research of pathogens.[6] The greatest concern is frequently associated with gain of function mutations, which confer novel or increased functionality, and the risk of their release.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biotechnology_risk

zanimljivo..no ovdje vidimo samo jednu stranu svega,a to je civilna,dakle uglavnom korporacije,koje svoj razvoj projekata temelje iskljucivo na konto eventualnog profita..istrazivanja se rade,ali preliminarna,prvo se radi istrazivanje trzista i ostalog,da se procjeni interes...tako nekako mislim da je prije prava prica,u slucajevima korporaija sa direktim ugovorom sa Gavrmentom(vojno krilo) i vojnim ugovorima..tu mu je moguce da je sto izniklo...
imamo i USAMRIID koji ima neogranicene financije i briljantni proracun za najbolju mogucu tehniku..CDC je u usporedbi sa njima gotovo amaterski nivo..
no,platforme koje mislis,za razvoj i pracenje razvoja vektora,odavno postoje...tko i kakav je interes iza,bog bi ga znao

jedina korporacija u Kini zove se Komunistička Partija Kine.

ti ne shvaćaš šta se u tim labosima radi. uzme se neki virus iz prirode koji nije opasan niti zarazan za čovjeka pa se taj virus "naoruža" tj  sintetizira ga se da postane opasan za čovjeka tj. može zaraziti ljude. virus koji je prije bio bezopasan jer se nema čime uhvatiti za ljudske stanice oni mu nakaleme (cleavage) razne proteine pomoću kojih se virus veže za određene receptore na stanici. virus je kao čičak ako se nema za šta uhvatiti onda ništa ako ima uhvatit će se. oni šiljci (spikes) na virusu su kao one hvataljke na čičku.

problem sa ovim SARS-CoV-2 virusom (a tu se svi stručnjaci kad to otkriju zabiju u zid i nemogu dalje) je ta da virus u tim šiljcima ima nakalemljen protein furin i to ne bilo koji nego h-furin (human furin) i sad kvaka 22 je pitanje kako je virus nakalemio ljudski protein furin koji se nalazi samo u ljudskoj stanici? to je pitanje od milijardu dolara. jer da bi virus nakalemio furin na šiljke (spikes) mora ući u ljudsku stanicu tu se rekombinirati i klonirati više klonova pokupiti furin i izaći iz stanice van. ali virus nemože ući u stanicu ako nema taj h-furin. dakle kako ga je dobio? na koji način? od šišmiša nije jer šišmiši nemaju h-furin. jedino ga je mogao dobiti umjetno u laboratoriju kemijanjem i nikako drukčije.

nemoj svetoju uzet za zlo. spada u stariju populaciju, parcijalno percipira podatke i onda nateže rukom.
sve više mislim da je "pobjegao". 

a, kada čujem izjave da od prvog maja sve bu pet, dezifinciram susjede.

Gnječ wrote:

Legendovich wrote:

Gnječ wrote:onda će te zanimati i ovo:

GAIN OF FUNCTION

The type of research in question involves engineering viruses to give them capabilities not found in nature in order to facilitate research. This can be as simple as producing a higher yield for a certain vaccine strain, but has also involved giving viruses potentially dangerous traits.

One of the most popular examples of the potential dangers of gain-of-function research is two 2011 studies that gave a variant of avian flu in ferrets the ability to spread through the air where it previously couldn't.

The pause was announced in 2014, and shut off funding for 21 studies involving gain-of-function research. The move came as some scientists criticized such research for being unacceptably dangerous and followed revelations of safety concerns at Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) labs involving the transport of anthrax and other virulent pathogens. The pause specifically targeted research into influenza, Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and severe acute respiratory syndrome viruses. Now, the NIH has reversed the decision and says it will allow such studies to go forward, after completing a new review process. Some studies into influenza and MERS are still being held up, though, Science reports, and the rest will need to resubmit their proposals. For some, the decision may come too late, as their research is outdated by now. Others will simply have to update their proposals.


Gain-of-function studies have long been controversial, as they involve giving potentially dangerous viruses new capabilities. There are good reasons for doing so, in many cases, but each situation must be individually assessed to determine if the probable benefits outweigh the risks of doing the research, according to an ethical assessment commissioned by the NIH after the pause was announced. Ultimately, the assessment concludes that while some research projects may be either clearly necessary or too dangerous, most will fall in the middle, and decisions on whether to proceed will be difficult.

At it's most basic, the term applies to any research that gives a virus or microorganism an ability that it didn't have before, regardless of whether that ability has the potential to make it more dangerous.

https://www.discovermagazine.com/health/nih-to-resume-funding-controversial-gain-of-function-research


Biotechnology risk

Biotechnology risk is a form of existential risk that could come from biological sources, such as genetically engineered biological agents.[1][2] These can come either intentionally (in the form of bioterrorism/biological weapons) or unintentionally (through the accidental release of engineered viruses). A chapter in biotechnology and biosecurity was published in Nick Bostrom's Global Catastrophic Risks, which covered risks such as viral agents.[3] Since then, new technologies like CRISPR and gene drives have been introduced.

While the ability to deliberately engineer pathogens has been constrained to high-end labs run by top researchers, the technology to achieve this (and other astonishing feats of bioengineering) is rapidly becoming cheaper and more widespread. Such examples include the diminishing cost of sequencing the human genome (from $10M USD to $1000), the accumulation of large datasets of genetic information, the discovery of gene drives, and the discovery of CRISPR.[4] Biotechnology risk is therefore a credible explanation for the Fermi paradox.[5]

Pathogens may be intentionally or unintentionally genetically modified to change their characteristics, including virulence or toxicity.[2]

When intentional, these mutations can serve to adapt the pathogen to a laboratory setting, understand the mechanism of transmission or pathogenesis, or in the development of therapeutics. Such mutations have also been used in the development of biological weapons, and dual-use risk continues to be a concern in the research of pathogens.[6] The greatest concern is frequently associated with gain of function mutations, which confer novel or increased functionality, and the risk of their release.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biotechnology_risk

zanimljivo..no ovdje vidimo samo jednu stranu svega,a to je civilna,dakle uglavnom korporacije,koje svoj razvoj projekata temelje iskljucivo na konto eventualnog profita..istrazivanja se rade,ali preliminarna,prvo se radi istrazivanje trzista i ostalog,da se procjeni interes...tako nekako mislim da je prije prava prica,u slucajevima korporaija sa direktim ugovorom sa Gavrmentom(vojno krilo) i vojnim ugovorima..tu mu je moguce da je sto izniklo...
imamo i USAMRIID koji ima neogranicene financije i briljantni proracun za najbolju mogucu tehniku..CDC je u usporedbi sa njima gotovo amaterski nivo..
no,platforme koje mislis,za razvoj i pracenje razvoja vektora,odavno postoje...tko i kakav je interes iza,bog bi ga znao

jedina korporacija u Kini zove se Komunistička Partija Kine.

ti ne shvaćaš šta se u tim labosima radi. uzme se neki virus iz prirode koji nije opasan niti zarazan za čovjeka pa se taj virus "naoruža" tj  sintetizira ga se da postane opasan za čovjeka tj. može zaraziti ljude. virus koji je prije bio bezopasan jer se nema čime uhvatiti za ljudske stanice oni mu nakaleme (cleavage) razne proteine pomoću kojih se virus veže za određene receptore na stanici. virus je kao čičak ako se nema za šta uhvatiti onda ništa ako ima uhvatit će se. oni šiljci (spikes) na virusu su kao one hvataljke na čičku.

problem sa ovim SARS-CoV-2 virusom (a tu se svi stručnjaci kad to otkriju zabiju u zid i nemogu dalje) je ta da virus u tim šiljcima ima nakalemljen protein furin i to ne bilo koji nego h-furin (human furin) i sad kvaka 22 je pitanje kako je virus nakalemio ljudski protein furin koji se nalazi samo u ljudskoj stanici? to je pitanje od milijardu dolara. jer da bi virus nakalemio furin na šiljke (spikes) mora ući u ljudsku stanicu tu se rekombinirati i klonirati više klonova pokupiti furin i izaći iz stanice van. ali virus nemože ući u stanicu ako nema taj h-furin. dakle kako ga je dobio? na koji način? od šišmiša nije jer šišmiši nemaju h-furin. jedino ga je mogao dobiti umjetno u laboratoriju kemijanjem i nikako drukčije.

https://web.facebook.com/epochtimes/videos/482386169112371/

Researcher Discusses China’s Biological Warfare Program

jos niste pomrli?
jbte, nije me bilo cjeli dan i jos ste zivi
cudoooo
alahuekser

Leviathan2 wrote:jos niste pomrli?
jbte, nije me bilo cjeli dan i jos ste zivi
cudoooo
alahuekser

ako te tema ne zanima odi ća. odi ća nemoj me nervirat. jes čuo? nemoj da ti opletem po plemenu.

Leviathan2 wrote:jos niste pomrli?
jbte, nije me bilo cjeli dan i jos ste zivi
cudoooo
alahuekser

Pomrli smo, samo nam to još nisu rekli iz kriznog stožera...

Gnječ wrote:

Leviathan2 wrote:jos niste pomrli?
jbte, nije me bilo cjeli dan i jos ste zivi
cudoooo
alahuekser

ako te tema ne zanima odi ća. odi ća nemoj me nervirat. jes čuo? nemoj da ti opletem po plemenu.

s cim ces oplesti, sibom, kandzijom :Psuti i budi sretan da sam vas nasao zive, i ja sam sretan
vidis li kako je vakserica norka tiho
svaki dan pali svijece i moli 50 ocenasa da otkriju vakcinu :D  (mozda i zdravomarije)

T. wrote:

Leviathan2 wrote:jos niste pomrli?
jbte, nije me bilo cjeli dan i jos ste zivi
cudoooo
alahuekser

Pomrli smo, samo nam to još nisu rekli iz kriznog stožera...

miha, gnjec, svetac, ???