Novi bombastični podaci o podrijetlu virusa: Ipak je 'pobjegao' iz laboratorija

ma niiiijee 

Treba vjerovati kinezima, treba vjerovati farmaceutima i vladama da imamo sigurna i ucinkovita cjepiva, te nasem stozeru.

Tko ne vjeruje u Gulag s njim.

Ako ne želiš da se zazna istina samo šibaj nove teorije pa od inflacije teorija istina izgubi na vridnosti.
Ono što je istina i što ne spada pod teorije urote:
-Fauci je povezan s laboratorijem u wuhanu gdje se eksperimentiralo s korona virusom da bi bio zarazniji za ljude.
-Iz nekog neobjašnjivog razloga nisu rađenene autopsije, a trebale su.
-Zabranjene su bilo kakve rane terapije i liječenja
-Cenzurirano je sve što je kontra štabski priopćenja
-ukinuta je rasprava i proglašena dogma
-cijepiva su opasna, ne spriječavaju bolest ni transmisiju.
-Kenwood Kenon je ispa među top 5 EU lidera, nebitno jel' se radi o manjku tolerancije na fašizam ili strahu od biračkog tijela.
-pederi su svi cijepljeni
-itd

Yesterday news. Pa jebemu boga čitate li vi moje postove ili čitate samo svoje i one na rvackom? Tko ovdje zna engleski neka stavi točkicu.

ja tvrdim od prvog dana da je najvjerojatnije uteka iz laba. od prvog jebenog dana. dok se onaj luđak ero cereka i opet po 100put falio.

eto vidimo uteka je iz laba, već se zna ima par mjeseci, samo izlaze detalji

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:ja tvrdim od prvog dana da je najvjerojatnije uteka iz laba. od prvog jebenog dana. dok se onaj luđak ero cereka i opet po 100put falio.

eto vidimo uteka je iz laba, već se zna ima par mjeseci, samo izlaze detalji

Na nije uteka. Posijali su ga namjerno. Naravno u rvackim sjebanim režimskim medijima ta se vijest neće nikada pojaviti ali jebiga hrvati ne vjeruju ništa ako nije objavljeno u rvackim režimskim medijima. Da napomenem da su hrvati totalno ignoranti kad treba potražiti na netu alternativne izvore informacija.

Ako sotonska ekipa forumskih imbecila ne zaspama i ovu temu budem stavio ovdje.

Gnječ wrote:Yesterday news. Pa jebemu boga čitate li vi moje postove ili čitate samo svoje i one na rvackom? Tko ovdje zna engleski neka stavi točkicu.

.

sve čitam što staviš

Čitamo te Esco, ali znaš nas...uostalom, a ča mi i moremo sad...a nismo po defaultu skloni  

A i draže nam trolati, nego onu stvar viditi, zato nam i je natalitet takav kakav je...:)

Esko, koja je agenda onda na kraju priče?

DARPA PROJECT DEFUSE CREATES 180 STRAINS OF CORONAVIRUS BIOWEAPONS

23 September 2021



These leaked documents published by DRASTIC describe bat research proposed by EcoHealth Alliance.

It confirms that Daszak and Fauci, working via the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) were able to create 180 strains of coronavirus bioweapons and put them under the control of the communist Chinese.

‘We now know from other sources that CCP-run bioweapons deployment teams have crossed the US border, carrying MERS-augmented biological weapons with at least a 30% fatality rate, with plans to release them in major US cities when commanded to.’

Project DEFUSE
DARPA - PREEMPT (HR001118S0017)

FINDINGS

1. ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE (EHA) TRIED TO BYPASS THE P3CO/DURC FRAMEWORKS
EHA confidently assessed in its proposal that the work to be carried was neither subject to P3CO
(GoF) nor DURC (Dual Use Research of Concern) restrictions:
“These QSo strain viral spike glycoproteins will be synthesized, and those binding to human
cell receptor ACE2 will be inserted into SARSr-CoV backbones (non-DURC, non-GoF).” (D1,
p.6)
The paragraph above actually contains the only mentions of GoF and DURC in the whole DEFUSE
project proposal - and it dismisses them.
Nevertheless the DARPA review of the DEFUSE project concluded that the project potentially
involved GoF. This was part of the reasons for the rejection of the project as such, and of a
qualification for any partial funding:
“Given the team's approach does potentially involve GoF/DURC research (they aim to
synthesize spike glycoproteins that may bind to human cell receptors and insert them into
SARSr-CoV backbones to assess capacity to cause SARS-like disease), if selected for
funding an appropriate DURC risk mitigation plan should be incorporated into contracting
language that includes a responsible communications plan”
Effectively EHA unsuccessfully proposed the use of bat-SARSr-CoV backbones and not the human
evolved SARS-CoV in what looks like a deliberate attempt at circumnavigating the restrictions of the
P3CO framework and related DURC restrictions.
“An enhanced PPP is a PPP resulting from the enhancement of a pathogen’s transmissibility
and/or virulence. Wild-type pathogens that are circulating in or have January 9, 2017 2 been
recovered from nature are not enhanced PPPs, regardless of their pandemic potential.
Source: https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/P3CO-FinalGuidanceStatement.pdf

4. EHA ‘HAD’ 3 KEY CAVE SITES IN YUNNAN FOR SARS-R COV COLLECTION
Three caves in Yunnan Province are specified as of particular importance:
“Our strategy begins by a complete inventory of bats and their SARSr-CoVs at our
intervention test site cave complex in Yunnan, China that harbours bats with high-risk
SARSr-CoVs. We will collect data from three caves in that system (one is our intervention
test site and two control sites) on: monthly bat abundance and diversity, viral prevalence and
diversity, individual bat viral load and host physiological markers; and genomic
characterization of low- and high-risk SARSr-CoV strains among bat species, sexes, and age
classes; satellite telemetry and mark-recapture data on bat home range and inter-cave
movement; and monitoring of daily, weekly and seasonal changes in bat populations.” (D1,
p.5)
“However, our test cave site in Yunnan Province, harbours a quasispecies (QS)
population assemblage that contains all the genetic components of epidemic SARS-CoV34
,
We have isolated three strains there (WIV1, WIV16 and SHCO14) that unlike other
SARSr-CoVs, do not contain two deletions in the receptor-binding domain (RBD) of the
spike, have far higher sequence identity to SARS-CoV (Fig. 1), use human ACE2 receptor
for cell entry, as SARS-CoV does (Fig. 2), and replicate efficiently in various animal and
human cells.” (D1, p.7-8)

5. EHA PLANNED TO INOCULATE WILD BATS WITH AEROSOLIZED VACCINES
The proposal for wide scale inoculation of bats in the wild using aerosolized inoculum delivery
has never been publicly released or opened to the wider scientific community for discussion as to
potential risks associated with this plan.
This is a specialist area of research of Dr Rocke, Dr. Ainslie and Dr. Unidad (PARC) who have
previously researched and developed the technological solutions necessary to make this possible:

“These vaccine candidates use a viral vector (attenuated raccoon poxvirus, RCN) genetically
modified to express highly-conserved fungal and specific Pd antigens. While these vaccines
and other potential treatments continue to be developed, there is a need for safe and
effective methods of treatment delivery” (USFWS, 2019).
Another similar project:
“We recently developed a new recombinant rabies vaccine specifically for bats with available
sequences from the rabies Phylogroup I glycoprotein. This sequence was cloned into
raccoon pox virus (RCN) and the efficacy of this novel RCN-MoG vaccine was tested in big
brown bats. Field studies are currently being conducted in Peru and Mexico to test the
feasibility of oral and topical delivery of vaccine and transfer rates between vampire bats
using biomarker-labelled jelly (without vaccine)” EEFMVZ (2021)

7. EHA WANTED TO OVERSEE ALL WORK IN CHINA
The PREEMPT proposal to DARPA relied on trusting EHA (a private NGO) for oversight of high risk
pathogen research:
“The lead organisation, EcoHealth, Alliance will oversee all work.” (D1, p.3)
“Dr. Shi, Wuhan Institute of Virology will conduct viral testing on all collected samples,
binding assays and some humanized mouse work.” (D1, p.3)

8. LIVE BATS WERE MEANT TO BE USED AT THE WIV AND VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL
LABS FOR INFECTION EXPERIMENTS, OFTEN USING CAPTIVE BAT COLONIES
WIV (Shi) was to work on Rhinolophus bats:
“At WIV, 20 adult wild Rhinolophus spp. bats (10 of each sex) will be captured at our test
cave site, housed within ABSL3, ACE2 receptor genes sequenced and used to pre-screen
spikes as above, then bats will be tested using PCR and serology for current and prior
exposure to SARSr-CoVs, and inoculated with WIV1, WIV16 or SHC014.” (D1, p.20).
“to Dr. Shi, Wuhan Inst. Virol., to conduct PCR testing, viral discovery and isolation from bat
samples collected in China, spike protein binding.assays, humanized mouse work, and
experimental trials on Rhinolophus bats.” (D1, p.25)

The WIV was not the only institution meant to work with live bats for infection experiments within its
labs. As the proposal explains:
“Experimental work using bats and or transgenic mice will be conducted at the BSL-3 lab in
WIV, Duke-NUS, UNC, or NWHC. Each partner institute will apply for and procure animal
research approval from its respective IACUC. All anima! work conducted by EcoHealth
Alliance in China will be overseen by both the IACUC at WIV and the IACUC at Tufts” (D1,
p.35).


Duke-NUS (Linfa Wang) has an Asian cave bat (Eonycteris spelaea) breeding colony:
“Our E. spelaea colony has now reached a sustainable population for infection experiments
and the ABSL3 facility has been outfitted with bat-specific cages.” (D1, p.20).
“We will use the unique Duke-NUS Asian cave bat (Eonycteris spelaea) breeding colony to
conduct initial proof-of-concept tests, extended to small groups of wild-caught Rhinolophus
sinicus bats at WIV.” (D1, p.6-7)
“Subtask 7.4.Test immune modulation in ‘captive Eonycteris sp. colony, using Malaka virus
and SARSr-CoV infections. (Duke-NUS).” (D1, p.30)

NWHC (Rocke) has a captive bat colony colony:
“We will use the NWHC captive bat colony and wild bats in US caves to trial delivery vehicles
using the biomarker rhodamine B (which fluorescently marks hair on consumption) to assess
uptake.” (D1, p.7)


CSIRO (Australia, with Linfa Wang at the time) and University of Queensland were already using
or are planning to be using live bats for experiments
“Previous infection studies were completed in Pteropus and Rhinolophus bats in Australia
by L-F Wang at CSIRO, AAHL and an additional Pteropus infection trial is currently planned
through the University of Queensland in Australia.” (D1, p.20)

9. EHA PROPOSED MULTIPLE, REGULAR VISITS TO 3 YUNNAN CAVE SITES
“In phase I will sample 60 bats each of R. sinicus, R. ferrumequinum, and R. affinis, (180
bats per cave) every three months non-destructively for 18 months from our three cave
sites.“ (D1, p.9)
“We will conduct pre- and post-intervention sampling (biweekly faecal pellet sampling for 4
months, and 10 male and 10 female bats per species tested every 2 weeks post-intervention
for 4 months, prior to- and post-deployment) to monitor SARSr-CoV QS and bat immune
status changes in test and control site bats during Phase I (TA2).” (D1, p.9)


10. EHA PLANNED TO SEND SAMPLES TO DUKE UNIVERSITY (SINGAPORE) AND UNC
CHAPEL HILL
The proposal states that:
“Samples will be preserved in viral transport medium, immediately frozen in liquid nitrogen
dry shippers, and transported to partner laboratories with a maintained cold chain and under
strict biosafety protocols.” (D1, p.9)
This is further confirmed by items 37 and 38 on page 5 of D2 (Budget)

Incidentally we also know from the recently released documents for the NIH R01Al110964 grant
(‘‘Understanding the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Emergence’’) that EHA has plenty of experience
shipping samples from and to China.


11. THE PROPOSAL SET A CLEAR PATHWAY FOR CHIMERIC VIRUS CONSTRUCTION
The use of known backbones is specified in the proposal:
“Synthesis of Chimeric Novel SARSr-CoV QS: We will commercially synthesize SARSr-CoV 2
S glycoprotein genes, designed for insertion into SHC014 or WIV16 molecular clone
backbones (88% and 97% S-protein identity to epidemic SARS-Urbani). These are BSL-3,
not select agents or subject to P3CO (they use bat SARSr-CoV backbones which are
exempt) and are pathogenic to hACE2 transgenic mice.” (D1, p.9)
However we do not know what additional, unpublished SARS-r CoV and MERS-r CoV research was
conducted by the WIV, Wuhan University and other Chinese institutions. Indeed, using analysis of
raw metagenomic datasets, unpublished MERS-r CoV infectious clone research in Wuhan has
recently been documented (Zhang et al. 2021).


12.EHA HAS 180 UNPUBLISHED SARSr-CoV STRAINS
“This will be supplemented by characterization of isolated viruses under DEFUSE (at WIV),
approximately 15-20 bat SARSr-CoV spike proteins/year (at UNC, WIV), and >180 bat
SARSr-CoV strains sequenced in our prior work and not yet examined for spillover potential.”
(D1, p.12)
Very little of this planned work has been published.


13. ALL CORONAVIRUSES WERE TO BE SCREENED AT THE WIV
“We will conduct in vitro pseudovirus binding assays, using established techniques2
, and live
virus binding assays (at WIV to prevent delays and unnecessary dissemination of viral
cultures) for isolated strains.” (D1, p.12)

14. THREE TO FIVE CHIMERIC CORONAVIRUSES WERE TO BE CREATED PER YEAR
“We will validate results from chimeric viruses by re-characterizing full-length genome
versions, testing whether backbone genome sequence alters full length SARSr-CoV spillover
potential. QS for full-genome characterization will be selected to reflect strain differences in
antigenicity, receptor usage, growth in human cells and pathogenesis.” (D1, p.13)
“We will test growth in primary HAE cultures and in vivo in hACE2 transgenic mice. We
anticipate recovering ~3-5 full length genome viruses/year.” (D1, p.13)


15. THE PROPOSAL PLANNED TO IDENTIFY “KEY MINOR DELETIONS” IN THE
RECEPTOR BINDING DOMAIN (RBD) TO ALTER HUMAN PATHOGENICITY
“Testing Synthetic Modifications:
“We will synthesize QS with novel combinations of mutations to determine the effects of
specific genetic traits and the jump potential of future and unknown recombinants.
RBD deletions:
Small deletions at specific sites in the SARSr-CoV RBD alter risk of human infection. We will
analyze the functional consequences of these RBD deletions on SARSr-CoV hACE2
receptor usage, growth in HAE cultures and in vivo pathogenesis.”
(D1, p.13)

16. THE PROPOSAL INCLUDES THE INTRODUCTION OF “HUMAN-SPECIFIC CLEAVAGE
SITES”
Human protease-specific site insertion was proposed. The proposal does not specify exactly which
protease, but does discuss Furin in the preceding text.
“We will analyze all SARSr-CoV S gene sequences for appropriately conserved proteolytic
cleavage sites in S2 and for the presence of potential Furin cleavage sites74,75”
.
SARSr-CoV S with mismatches in proteolytic cleavage sites can be activated by exogenous
Trypsin or Cathepsin L.
Where clear mismatches occur, we will introduce appropriate human-specific cleavage sites
and evaluate growth potential in Vero cells and HAE cultures.”
(D1, p.13)

Furin recognition cleavage motifs are widely used in laboratory research. Furin is an endoprotease
which cleaves proteins at a specific motif (RxxR|x) which for virus envelope glycoproteins, can
enhance viral fusion with host cell membranes (Coutard et al., 2020).
For SARS-CoV-2 the Furin cleavage site (FCS) has been shown to be key for pathogenicity (Bestle
et al. 2020; Hoffmann et al. 2020; Johnson et al., 2021).

No other sarbecovirus subgenus CoV including SARS-CoV possesses a Furin cleavage site, and as
Furin cleavage sites have previously be inserted into coronaviruses in laboratories to increase tropism and pathogenicity (Cheng et al. 2019), the origin of the FCS has been widely debated (Wade
2021). Wu and Zhao (2021) propose the FCS arose through natural insertion.

17. THE PROPOSAL PLANNED TO “INTRODUCE” NATURALLY OCCURRING
PROTEOLYTIC CLEAVAGE SITES TO CREATE NOVEL CORONAVIRUSES
The proposal planned to introduce ‘wild type’ proteolytic cleavage sites from high risk strains into
more abundant low risk strains, presumably to increase the pathogenicity of the low risk strains:
“We will also review deep sequence data for low abundant high risk SARSr-CoV that encode
functional proteolytic cleavage sites, and if so, introduce these changes into the appropriate
high abundant, low risk parental strain.” (D1, p.13)

18. THE PROPOSAL PLANNED TO RESEARCH ALTERNATE RECEPTORS TO ACE2
“To evaluate this, we will sequentially introduce clade 2 disrupting residues of SARS-CoV
and SHCO14 and evaluate virus growth in Vero cells, non-permissive cells ectopically
expressing DC-SIGN, and in human monocytes and macrophages anticipating reduced virus
growth efficiency.“ (D1, p.13)
We note that while SARS-CoV was documented to use DC-SIGN as an attachment receptor (Marzi
et al. 2004), L-SIGN and DC-SIGN act as entry receptors for SARS-CoV-2 (Amraei et al. 2020;
Thépaut et al. 2021).

19. THE PROPOSAL PLANNED TO INTRODUCE “KEY RBD RESIDUES” INTO LOW RISK
STRAINS TO TEST PATHOGENICITY IN HUMAN AIRWAY-CELLS AND IN hACE2 MICE
“Low abundance micro-variations:
We will structurally model and identify highly variable residue changes in the SARSr-CoV S
RBD, use commercial gene blocks to introduce these changes singly and in combination into
the S glycoprotein gene of the low risk, parental strain and test ACE2 receptor usage, growth
in HAE and in-vivo pathogenesis”.
(D1, p.13)


19. THE PROPOSAL PLANNED TO INTRODUCE “KEY RBD RESIDUES” INTO LOW RISK
STRAINS TO TEST PATHOGENICITY IN HUMAN AIRWAY-CELLS AND IN hACE2 MICE
“Low abundance micro-variations:
We will structurally model and identify highly variable residue changes in the SARSr-CoV S
RBD, use commercial gene blocks to introduce these changes singly and in combination into
the S glycoprotein gene of the low risk, parental strain and test ACE2 receptor usage, growth
in HAE and in-vivo pathogenesis”.
(D1, p.13)


21. A POTENTIALLY HIGHLY IMPORTANT “SPIKE PROTEIN DATASET” WAS NOT PUBLIC
It is not clear what that ‘dataset of S protein sequences from prior work’ refers to and whether EHA
has ever made it public (as is generally required under its grant conditions).
“We will use a large dataset of S protein sequences and full-length genomes generated from
prior work and DEFUSE fieldwork to estimate SARSr-CoV substitution rate and its
genome-wide variation.” (D1, p.15)

22. EHA PROPOSED MERS-CORONAVIRUS EXPERIMENTS AND HAD ALREADY
INTRODUCED SARS AND MERS INTO BAT CELL LINES
“First, we will take wing punch biopsies from 3 individuals to sequence their ACE2 receptor
gene. This will be inserted into human cell lines to pre-screen viral strains for binding. Those
that bind will be used for in vivo experiments. We will use two coronaviruses (SARSr-CoV
WIV1 and MERS-CoV) in ABSL3. SARS and MERS infection studies are already underway
in Eonycteris and Pteropus cell lines and primary immune cells .“ (D1, p.20)

24. ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL SCALE BAT SAMPLING
“Sub-Task 1.2
Collect monthly specimens from bats at cave sites in Yunnan, China for SARSr-CoV
screening and sequencing. Oral, fecal, and blood sample collected from 360 Rhinolophus
spp. bats per month using live- capture and non-invasive sampling. Specimens shipped to
laboratory for analysis. Associated morphological, demographic, and physiological data for
individual bats collected (EHA, consultant Zhu).” (D1, p.25)
“Deliverables:
Specimens from 3,240 bats and fecal pellets collected from high-risk reservoir
populations which have been obtained with all proper permits and permissions and shipped
to WIV for analysis; real-time telemetry and mark-recapture data uploaded and made
available to DARPA collaborators; completed database maintained.” (D1, p.25)

25. ECOHEALTH ALLIANCE MISLED DARPA ABOUT RISKS TO GENERAL PUBLIC

EHA writes about ‘Risks to general public’ section:
“Risks to general public:
The proposed work has minimal risk to the general public, as sampling will be done near the
cave sites and not in populous areas. Our team has extensive experience. ”
(D1, p.35)
That EHA could propose the identification and selection of highest risk SARS-r CoV’s, chimeric CoV
construction, serial passage using transgenic hACE2 mice and insertion of human adapted cleavage
sites (presumably furin cleavage sites), yet totally ignore the risks of laboratory escape is
inconceivable and shows a total lack of understanding of the risks of SARS-r CoV (and MERS-r
CoV) laboratory research (Demaneuf 2020).


26. EHA PROPOSED TO GENERATE “BATIFIED MOUSE MODELS”
“We have shown efficient reconstitution of irradiated mice using bat bone marrow from
multiple species, including E. spelaea (Fig. 10), including reconstitution of bat PBMC’s in
the mouse, presence of circulating bat cells and generation of bat-specific antibodies in mice
incapable of producing an antibody response.
This ‘batified’ mouse model can be utilized for both circulating infection of SARS-CoV (in
the immune compartment only) and as a model for generating bat-specific antibodies against
CoV proteins.”
(D1, p.18)
“PI-TA-02 Task 7: Experimental testing. of ‘Broadscale Immune Boosting’ using-batified
mice and captive bat colonies (Duke-NUS).”
(D1, p.30)

https://proyectoveritas.net/darpa-project-defuse-creates-180-strains-of-coronavirus-bioweapons/

Going to the Source to Prevent Viral Disease Outbreaks
PREEMPT aims to predict and contain viral mutations to prevent cross-species transmission of disease from animals and insects to humans
OUTREACH@DARPA.MIL
1/4/2018

https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2018-01-04

VIEW GRANT OPPORTUNITY

HR001118S0017
PREventing EMerging Pathogenic Threats
Department of Defense
DARPA - Biological Technologies Office

https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=300198

NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6935295/NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements.pdf


Updated MERS agreement -- the same day NIH and Moderna finalized the sequence for mRNA-1273. p. 85
"Jointly-owned by NIAID and Moderna" p. 105

https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6935295/NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements.pdf

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6935295-NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6935295-NIH-Moderna-Confidential-Agreements#document/p85/a569053

Framework for
Guiding Funding Decisions
about Proposed Research
Involving Enhanced Potential
Pandemic Pathogens
2017

Department of Health and Human Services Framework for Guiding Funding
Decisions about Proposed Research Involving Enhanced Potential Pandemic
Pathogens

https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/p3co.pdf

Copies of some of the main Grant Opportunity files

DARPA

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1E07GIRJSiHsQEuT88bfXmQNtoFT3lDv9

A New Layer of Medical Preparedness to Combat Emerging Infectious Disease
Researchers supporting PREEMPT program will model viral evolution in animal populations, quantify the probability of human pathogen emergence, and pursue proof-of-concept interventions to prevent viral spread to humans
OUTREACH@DARPA.MIL
2/19/2019

https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-02-19

$9M to Preempt Zoonotic Spillover Threats, Protect Military and Local Communities
Strategies Include a Novel Animal Vaccine
by UC Davis News and Media Relations February 19, 2019


https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/9m-preempt-zoonotic-spillover-threats-protect-military-and-local-communities

Highly significant Peter Daszak applied in 2018 for USG funding to genetically engineer a furin cleavage site into bat coronaviruses, which was rejected by
DARPA
. How could Peter call the lab origin hypothesis a "conspiracy theory" knowing this?

US lifts ban on lethal virus experiments despite security risks
Published20 December 2017

The US government has lifted a three-year ban on making lethal viruses in the lab, saying the potential benefits of disease preparedness outweigh the risks.

Labs will now be able to manufacture strains of influenza, Sars and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (Mers).

The ban was imposed following safety breaches at federal institutions involving anthrax and avian flu.

Now a scientific review panel will have to green-light each research proposal.

It will only be allowed to go ahead if the panel determines there is no safer way to conduct the research and that the benefits it will provide justify the risk.

Critics say such "gain-of-function" research still risks creating an accidental pandemic.

But supporters of removing the ban say many US states are poorly prepared for an almost-inevitable outbreak of a deadly virus.

"I believe nature is the ultimate bioterrorist and we need to do all we can to stay one step ahead," said Samuel Stanley, chairman of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, which provided guidance on the new policy.

"Basic research on these agents by laboratories that have shown they can do this work safely is key to global security."

The ban was imposed in 2014 after embarrassing safety lapses including:

Dozens of workers at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) being exposed to anthrax bacteria
Long forgotten vials of smallpox left in a cardboard box being discovered at a research centre near Washington
In addition, there was concern that research into transmissible pathogens, which is published, could be used to deliberately engineer a mutant virus.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42426548