Denkverbot
Page 21 of 50
Page 21 of 50 • 1 ... 12 ... 20, 21, 22 ... 35 ... 50
Re: Denkverbot
Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:na televiziji, u emisiji treti element, neki srbin je dove hrpu žena i sa svi zajeno plaču kako je ženami teško u znanosti.
osin uobičajenih pizdarija, spomenulo se kako se ne cijeni ( naravski, nika ikad se ne će reći ki je to entintet ki ne cijeni jer je to polak odgovra ki bi raskrinko adjendu) žene, pa unda ni područja koja su domonantno ženska upravo zbog i od trenutka kad su postala ženska.
tako je edukacija nekad bila muško i cijenjeno zanimanje, uz policijota i svećenika, učitelj je čini sveto trojstvo u selu i svi su in se klanjali. kako su položaje pomalo popunjavale žene, tako se srozalo na današnje razine.
teza je izvrnuta, istina je da se položaj srozavao pa su ga muški počeli napušćati, a okupitati žene.
ne slažem se s tobom. ja sam imao genijalne profesore i profesorice. to su bili genijalci ali su bili strogi i zahtjevni za popizdit nije bilo cile-mile ili znaš ili neznaš ajmo da capo. nisu te učili gradivo toliko nego kako učiti. gradivo si učio sam. ali takvih više nema.
oli sun jo ka napiso da ti nisi imo genijalne profesore, pa da se ne moreš složiti ismanun?
odgovorio sam ti na ovo boldano gdje ti obezvjeđuješ i vrijeđaš žene da su nesposobne biti profesorice. iz mog iskustva opovrgavam tvoju tvrdnju da nije točna. argumentiraj i dokaži da se obrazovni sustav urušio i postao loš zato jer su žene popunile mjesta koja su nekad vladali samo muški. ili je neki drugi razlog? možda su političari u ministarstvu zakurac ?
ne, ne,
to je njihova teza, ne moja. to sun opiso ča su oni rekli, parafrazirati ću ih ponovo preciznije;
"ne cijeni se žene, ni ženska područja. obrazovanje je nekad bilo cijenjeno, ali kako je pomalo postajo žensko zanimanje, prestajalo se cijeniti ga, jer se ne cijeni žene."
a jo tvrdin da je to izvrnuta teza; ni da se edukacija ne cijeni jer njome vlodaju žene, nego njome vladaju žene jer se edukacija ne cijeni.
aben- Posts : 35492
2014-04-16
Re: Denkverbot
aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:na televiziji, u emisiji treti element, neki srbin je dove hrpu žena i sa svi zajeno plaču kako je ženami teško u znanosti.
osin uobičajenih pizdarija, spomenulo se kako se ne cijeni ( naravski, nika ikad se ne će reći ki je to entintet ki ne cijeni jer je to polak odgovra ki bi raskrinko adjendu) žene, pa unda ni područja koja su domonantno ženska upravo zbog i od trenutka kad su postala ženska.
tako je edukacija nekad bila muško i cijenjeno zanimanje, uz policijota i svećenika, učitelj je čini sveto trojstvo u selu i svi su in se klanjali. kako su položaje pomalo popunjavale žene, tako se srozalo na današnje razine.
teza je izvrnuta, istina je da se položaj srozavao pa su ga muški počeli napušćati, a okupitati žene.
ne slažem se s tobom. ja sam imao genijalne profesore i profesorice. to su bili genijalci ali su bili strogi i zahtjevni za popizdit nije bilo cile-mile ili znaš ili neznaš ajmo da capo. nisu te učili gradivo toliko nego kako učiti. gradivo si učio sam. ali takvih više nema.
oli sun jo ka napiso da ti nisi imo genijalne profesore, pa da se ne moreš složiti ismanun?
odgovorio sam ti na ovo boldano gdje ti obezvjeđuješ i vrijeđaš žene da su nesposobne biti profesorice. iz mog iskustva opovrgavam tvoju tvrdnju da nije točna. argumentiraj i dokaži da se obrazovni sustav urušio i postao loš zato jer su žene popunile mjesta koja su nekad vladali samo muški. ili je neki drugi razlog? možda su političari u ministarstvu zakurac ?
ne, ne,
to je njihova teza, ne moja. to sun opiso ča su oni rekli, parafrazirati ću ih ponovo preciznije;
"ne cijeni se žene, ni ženska područja. obrazovanje je nekad bilo cijenjeno, ali kako je pomalo postajo žensko zanimanje, prestajalo se cijeniti ga, jer se ne cijeni žene."
a jo tvrdin da je to izvrnuta teza; ni da se edukacija ne cijeni jer njome vlodaju žene, nego njome vladaju žene jer se edukacija ne cijeni.
a to si ti njih citira? sad to ima sasvim drugo značenje. opet rvacka? rekoh da je rvacka specijalni slučaj nemožeš usorediti s ničime. caso a parte. rvacko obrazovanje je totalni kurac. kao prvo pope treba premlatiti i izbaciti iz svih škola vjeronauk tko hoće tamo mu je crikva i nek se jebe. vjeronauk u školama nema šta tražiti osim ako nisu vjerske škole. raspela i svu tu religijsku bižuteriju po školama pobacati u baju i na otpad. iz škola izbacii mobitele. u školi moraju biti svi obučeni isto nema iznimke. to je prvo. drugo je da iz škola treba izbaciti politiku i političare i njihovo guranje zilion raznih udžbenika koje mijenjaju kako se kom političaru na vlasti digne kurac.
treće, edukacija se ne cijeni jer svaka budala može kupiti i falsificirati diplomu a političari mladima svojim ponašanjem pokazuju da je edukacija obsolete bitno da imaš partijsku knjižicu i rođu u komitetu.
sad, zašto ima više žena nego muškaraca u obrazovnom sustavu? pa to je jednostavno objasniti. gdje su muškarci bili u 1. svjetskom ratu? gdje su muški bili u 2. svjetskom ratu? koliko je muških izginulo u oba rata? jel ti znaš da su u tvornicama u USA žene radile čisto do onda muške poslove dok su se muški igrali rata?
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
:D
_________________
Insofar as it is educational, it is not compulsory;
And insofar as it is compulsory, it is not educational
aben- Posts : 35492
2014-04-16
Re: Denkverbot
aben wrote::D
ča je tu smišno ki kurac? jebote uni munjeni Mussolini je u svaken selu u Istri uzida školu. u svaken.
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
Gnječ wrote:aben wrote::D
ča je tu smišno ki kurac? jebote uni munjeni Mussolini je u svaken selu u Istri uzida školu. u svaken.
a, izli sun 3 deca vina u tipkovnicu, pa ti trenutno ne morin reći zoč se smijin tipkajući mišen...ali provoj ponovo prečitati svoj post, možda ubereš iz druge
_________________
Insofar as it is educational, it is not compulsory;
And insofar as it is compulsory, it is not educational
aben- Posts : 35492
2014-04-16
Re: Denkverbot
aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote::D
ča je tu smišno ki kurac? jebote uni munjeni Mussolini je u svaken selu u Istri uzida školu. u svaken.
a, izli sun 3 deca vina u tipkovnicu, pa ti trenutno ne morin reći zoč se smijin tipkajući mišen...ali provoj ponovo prečitati svoj post, možda ubereš iz druge
san pročita tri put ča san falija? jeno slovo nis utipka pa sejeno se kapi ča me zajebavaš. po danu su me žene triskale sad biš ti po noći. ma hoj u kurac.
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
To arrive at the edge of the world's knowledge, seek out the most complex and sophisticated minds, put them in a room together, and have them ask each other the questions they are asking themselves.
THE THIRD CULTURE
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.
In the past few years, the playing field of American intellectual life has shifted, and the traditional intellectual has become increasingly marginalized. A 1950s education in Freud, Marx, and modernism is not a sufficient qualification for a thinking person in the 1990s. Indeed, the traditional American intellectuals are, in a sense, increasingly reactionary, and quite often proudly (and perversely) ignorant of many of the truly significant intellectual accomplishments of our time. Their culture, which dismisses science, is often nonempirical. It uses its own jargon and washes its own laundry. It is chiefly characterized by comment on comments, the swelling spiral of commentary eventually reaching the point where the real world gets lost.
In 1959 C.P. Snow published a book titled The Two Cultures. On the one hand, there were the literary intellectuals; on the other, the scientists. He noted with incredulity that during the 1930s the literary intellectuals, while no one was looking, took to referring to themselves as "the intellectuals," as though there were no others. This new definition by the "men of letters" excluded scientists such as the astronomer Edwin Hubble, the mathematician John von Neumann, the cyberneticist Norbert Wiener, and the physicists Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg.
How did the literary intellectuals get away with it? First, people in the sciences did not make an effective case for the implications of their work. Second, while many eminent scientists, notably Arthur Eddington and James Jeans, also wrote books for a general audience, their works were ignored by the self-proclaimed intellectuals, and the value and importance of the ideas presented remained invisible as an intellectual activity, because science was not a subject for the reigning journals and magazines.
In a second edition of The Two Cultures, published in 1963, Snow added a new essay, "The Two Cultures: A Second Look," in which he optimistically suggested that a new culture, a "third culture," would emerge and close the communications gap between the literary intellectuals and the scientists. In Snow's third culture, the literary intellectuals would be on speaking terms with the scientists. Although I borrow Snow's phrase, it does not describe the third culture he predicted. Literary intellectuals are not communicating with scientists. Scientists are communicating directly with the general public. Traditional intellectual media played a vertical game: journalists wrote up and professors wrote down. Today, third culture thinkers tend to avoid the middleman and endeavor to express their deepest thoughts in a manner accessible to the intelligent reading public.
The recent publishing successes of serious science books have surprised only the old-style intellectuals. Their view is that these books are anomalies — that they are bought but not read. I disagree. The emergence of this third-culture activity is evidence that many people have a great intellectual hunger for new and important ideas and are willing to make the effort to educate themselves.
The wide appeal of the third-culture thinkers is not due solely to their writing ability; what traditionally has been called "science" has today become "public culture." Stewart Brand writes that "Science is the only news. When you scan through a newspaper or magazine, all the human interest stuff is the same old he-said-she-said, the politics and economics the same sorry cyclic dramas, the fashions a pathetic illusion of newness, and even the technology is predictable if you know the science. Human nature doesn't change much; science does, and the change accrues, altering the world irreversibly." We now live in a world in which the rate of change is the biggest change. Science has thus become a big story.
Scientific topics receiving prominent play in newspapers and magazines over the past several years include molecular biology, artificial intelligence, artificial life, chaos theory, massive parallelism, neural nets, the inflationary universe, fractals, complex adaptive systems, superstrings, biodiversity, nanotechnology, the human genome, expert systems, punctuated equilibrium, cellular automata, fuzzy logic, space biospheres, the Gaia hypothesis, virtual reality, cyberspace, and teraflop machines. Among others. There is no canon or accredited list of acceptable ideas. The strength of the third culture is precisely that it can tolerate disagreements about which ideas are to be taken seriously. Unlike previous intellectual pursuits, the achievements of the third culture are not the marginal disputes of a quarrelsome mandarin class: they will affect the lives of everybody on the planet.
The role of the intellectual includes communicating. Intellectuals are not just people who know things but people who shape the thoughts of their generation. An intellectual is a synthesizer, a publicist, a communicator. In his 1987 book The Last Intellectuals, the cultural historian Russell Jacoby bemoaned the passing of a generation of public thinkers and their replacement by bloodless academicians. He was right, but also wrong. The third-culture thinkers are the new public intellectuals.
America now is the intellectual seedbed for Europe and Asia. This trend started with the prewar emigration of Albert Einstein and other European scientists and was further fueled by the post-Sputnik boom in scientific education in our universities. The emergence of the third culture introduces new modes of intellectual discourse and reaffirms the preeminence of America in the realm of important ideas. Throughout history, intellectual life has been marked by the fact that only a small number of people have done the serious thinking for everybody else. What we are witnessing is a passing of the torch from one group of thinkers, the traditional literary intellectuals, to a new group, the intellectuals of the emerging third culture.
—John Brockman
1991
https://www.edge.org/conversation/the-emerging
THE THIRD CULTURE
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.
In the past few years, the playing field of American intellectual life has shifted, and the traditional intellectual has become increasingly marginalized. A 1950s education in Freud, Marx, and modernism is not a sufficient qualification for a thinking person in the 1990s. Indeed, the traditional American intellectuals are, in a sense, increasingly reactionary, and quite often proudly (and perversely) ignorant of many of the truly significant intellectual accomplishments of our time. Their culture, which dismisses science, is often nonempirical. It uses its own jargon and washes its own laundry. It is chiefly characterized by comment on comments, the swelling spiral of commentary eventually reaching the point where the real world gets lost.
In 1959 C.P. Snow published a book titled The Two Cultures. On the one hand, there were the literary intellectuals; on the other, the scientists. He noted with incredulity that during the 1930s the literary intellectuals, while no one was looking, took to referring to themselves as "the intellectuals," as though there were no others. This new definition by the "men of letters" excluded scientists such as the astronomer Edwin Hubble, the mathematician John von Neumann, the cyberneticist Norbert Wiener, and the physicists Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr, and Werner Heisenberg.
How did the literary intellectuals get away with it? First, people in the sciences did not make an effective case for the implications of their work. Second, while many eminent scientists, notably Arthur Eddington and James Jeans, also wrote books for a general audience, their works were ignored by the self-proclaimed intellectuals, and the value and importance of the ideas presented remained invisible as an intellectual activity, because science was not a subject for the reigning journals and magazines.
In a second edition of The Two Cultures, published in 1963, Snow added a new essay, "The Two Cultures: A Second Look," in which he optimistically suggested that a new culture, a "third culture," would emerge and close the communications gap between the literary intellectuals and the scientists. In Snow's third culture, the literary intellectuals would be on speaking terms with the scientists. Although I borrow Snow's phrase, it does not describe the third culture he predicted. Literary intellectuals are not communicating with scientists. Scientists are communicating directly with the general public. Traditional intellectual media played a vertical game: journalists wrote up and professors wrote down. Today, third culture thinkers tend to avoid the middleman and endeavor to express their deepest thoughts in a manner accessible to the intelligent reading public.
The recent publishing successes of serious science books have surprised only the old-style intellectuals. Their view is that these books are anomalies — that they are bought but not read. I disagree. The emergence of this third-culture activity is evidence that many people have a great intellectual hunger for new and important ideas and are willing to make the effort to educate themselves.
The wide appeal of the third-culture thinkers is not due solely to their writing ability; what traditionally has been called "science" has today become "public culture." Stewart Brand writes that "Science is the only news. When you scan through a newspaper or magazine, all the human interest stuff is the same old he-said-she-said, the politics and economics the same sorry cyclic dramas, the fashions a pathetic illusion of newness, and even the technology is predictable if you know the science. Human nature doesn't change much; science does, and the change accrues, altering the world irreversibly." We now live in a world in which the rate of change is the biggest change. Science has thus become a big story.
Scientific topics receiving prominent play in newspapers and magazines over the past several years include molecular biology, artificial intelligence, artificial life, chaos theory, massive parallelism, neural nets, the inflationary universe, fractals, complex adaptive systems, superstrings, biodiversity, nanotechnology, the human genome, expert systems, punctuated equilibrium, cellular automata, fuzzy logic, space biospheres, the Gaia hypothesis, virtual reality, cyberspace, and teraflop machines. Among others. There is no canon or accredited list of acceptable ideas. The strength of the third culture is precisely that it can tolerate disagreements about which ideas are to be taken seriously. Unlike previous intellectual pursuits, the achievements of the third culture are not the marginal disputes of a quarrelsome mandarin class: they will affect the lives of everybody on the planet.
The role of the intellectual includes communicating. Intellectuals are not just people who know things but people who shape the thoughts of their generation. An intellectual is a synthesizer, a publicist, a communicator. In his 1987 book The Last Intellectuals, the cultural historian Russell Jacoby bemoaned the passing of a generation of public thinkers and their replacement by bloodless academicians. He was right, but also wrong. The third-culture thinkers are the new public intellectuals.
America now is the intellectual seedbed for Europe and Asia. This trend started with the prewar emigration of Albert Einstein and other European scientists and was further fueled by the post-Sputnik boom in scientific education in our universities. The emergence of the third culture introduces new modes of intellectual discourse and reaffirms the preeminence of America in the realm of important ideas. Throughout history, intellectual life has been marked by the fact that only a small number of people have done the serious thinking for everybody else. What we are witnessing is a passing of the torch from one group of thinkers, the traditional literary intellectuals, to a new group, the intellectuals of the emerging third culture.
—John Brockman
1991
https://www.edge.org/conversation/the-emerging
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
Rationally Speaking is a blog maintained by Prof. Massimo Pigliucci, a philosopher at the City University of New York. The blog reflects the Enlightenment figure Marquis de Condorcet's idea of what a public intellectual (yes, we know, that's such a bad word) ought to be: someone who devotes himself to "the tracking down of prejudices in the hiding places where priests, the schools, the government, and all long-established institutions had gathered and protected them." You're welcome. Please notice that the contents of this blog can be reprinted under the standard Creative Commons license.
Philosophy as Art?
To decide to become a philosopher seemed as foolish to me as to decide to become a poet. Since my schooldays, however, I was guided by philosophical questions. Philosophy seemed to me the supreme, even the sole, concern of man. — Karl Jaspers
Last week Christopher Hallquist at Patheos posted a brief criticism of contemporary philosophy that got me thinking. In short, he says that “nobody seems to know how to resolve any of the major disputes in philosophy,” and that the “lack of agreement on what good philosophy is makes it hard to filter the good philosophy and reward the philosophers who produce it.” And while I was in the middle of writing this post, Massimo published his piece on demarcation projects.
I’d like to offer my own observations and perspective on this, proceeding by first describing what the problem seems to be, and then presenting some thoughts on what a philosopher is and what practicing philosophy means to me.
I. The Problem
The problem seems to be that philosophy has been undergoing a kind of identity crisis. For how long? Who knows. But the most recent and obvious symptom is that many believe that philosophy has become science, or vice versa. Biologist Austin L. Hughes thinks that science has eclipsed, or has tried to eclipse, philosophy as the final arbiter of both the Good and the True — though, refreshingly, he feels that this usurpation is an overreaching.
But even as far back as 1991, John Brockman described the seeds of this state of affairs through what he called the Third Culture:
[Traditional intellectualism], which dismisses science, is often nonempirical. It uses its own jargon and washes its own laundry. It is chiefly characterized by comment on comments, the swelling spiral of commentary eventually reaching the point where the real world gets lost.
Though philosophy today certainly doesn’t dismiss science, his contrast with traditional Ivory Tower intellectualism is instructive:
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.
Is it true that science has become the final authority on what it means to be human? Isn’t that the province of philosophy?
II. What is Philosophy?
I was about to write, “Ask five different philosophers and you’ll get five different answers,” but generally speaking, the aim of philosophical inquiry can be said to be to gain purchase on ultimate or at least fundamental questions of human life via skeptical exploration and rational argument. Traditionally, it has been an effort to reach truth through human reason, and to be as clear as possible in its definitions.
Yes, scientists will give you the same description of their discipline; after all, their discipline emerged from philosophy. But whatever the differences in their respective tools, Brockman, who I mentioned above, presents the consensus of those working in the various sciences when he writes:
Unlike those disciplines in which there is no expectation of systematic progress and in which one reflects on and recycles the ideas of others, science, on its frontiers, poses more and better questions, better put. They are questions phrased to elicit answers; science finds the answers and moves on.
To be fair, he may not have had in mind philosophy per se; but to my lights, the essence of philosophy is precisely to “pose more and better questions, better put.” And if philosophy is about posing questions and proposing answers, we find that these answers can have either Public Value or Private Value (or both). It seems clear that, in our age, philosophy’s justification lies mostly if not totally in its perceived Public Value. Onora O’Neill calls this its “impact”:
Yet, like others, philosophers are under pressure to show that what they do matters, that they contribute to changing the world — to show, indeed, to use modish jargon, that work in philosophy has ‘impact.’ ‘Impact’ is a multiply ambiguous term, and a lot of impact has negative value, so presumably what is meant is that philosophers should show that their work has impact of a desirable sort. On a simplistic view, good impact is economic impact.
It seems to me that the successful track record of applied science is the primary driver behind the pressure on the humanities to deliver analogous results. But is the same true of the fruits of the research in the more theoretical sciences? I suppose the argument could be made that even in the domain of theoretical physics the value of its research into the nature of reality is determined by its economic impact. Consider a massive and expensive project like Iter, where the hope is to “produce commercial energy from fusion.” Or what about quantum encryption? A recent article describes an application of the technology that would prevent catastrophic economic impacts from the disruption of power grids. Even our exploration of space is largely and ultimately determined by economic concerns: can we find new ways to exploit celestial phenomena for our benefit? Can we terraform Mars in time for our increasingly likely global climate catastrophe, so that our species can continue to live in the manner in which it has become accustomed?
But we can still ask if it’s really true that, in our American culture at least, pressure from economic forces or market interests is causing philosophy’s identity crisis. What about in our educational system, for instance? I think it’s here that Public Value considerations seem even more evident, even if only indirectly. John Tierney recently discussed the effects of, and growing protest against, the reigning market-driven approach to the American public education system:
What, then, do the critics of the corporate reform agenda propose? Surely they can’t be defending the status quo, content with the current state of schools. No. Without being too unfair to the diversity of views on this, the key consensus is that the most important step we could take to deal with our education problems would be to address poverty in the United States... If I am correct that a new educational revolution is underway, it will need its own Thomas Paine, speaking “Common Sense” and urging action.
Tierney calls specifically for an activist-philosopher type when he references Paine, implying that work in the philosophy of education is probably just as important, if not as urgent, to considerations of Public Value as are the products of the hard sciences. After all, the children are our future, right?
Also, we can see that public education is another area where philosophy and science (albeit a “soft” science) converge and diverge, though in a less dramatic fashion. Philosophers may attend to qualitative concerns (the meaning and value of education), whereas social scientists focus more on practical, quantitative ones (the specific practices that produce the most economic “impact” O’Neill mentioned above).
III. Philosophers and the Practice of Philosophy
I mentioned above that the goal of philosophy is to reach truth through the exercise of human reason. Of course we then have to ask, with Pilate, “What is truth?” Though this certainly isn’t the proper place to completely open up that can of worms, we can at least peel back the lid a bit and ask: Is “truth” simply veridicality? In that case, perhaps thinkers in the sciences are better equipped to find it. But if the scientist’s process is viewed simplistically as
question => hypothesis => testing => result
then this still leaves the philosopher with a vital supporting role, assisting the scientist with the framing of the questions that both seek to answer.
We could also think of the philosopher as the CEO of a company. Ideally conceived, the CEO of a company is the true leader of the organization, in that she is responsible for its vision and its values, with as much independence as possible, indulging her imagination to the greatest extent allowable by generating as many goals and strategies as she can; of course, the Board of Directors is then responsible for pruning back her extravagance a bit, while all the middle managers work on implementing her now revised ideas. I suppose the scientists would then be the Board of Directors. Also, under this paradigm, philosophizing can not only be viewed as the impetus for science, the philosopher can be considered the interpreter of science. Though Brockman claims that it’s scientists who are “rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are,” O’Neill says:
Humanities research, including research in philosophy, is valuable for striking and profound reasons that go beyond economic value, and which we should not be shy of articulating. Research in the humanities has public value because it forms and transforms individuals and societies: it shapes and reshapes what people believe and do, and what they value.
To me, philosophy is at its best when endeavoring to determine the weights and measures of things; where the philosopher is the maintainer of a protean equilibrium in this realm of values, and not just a dispeller of delusions and illusions. I suppose I’m arguing for a definition of philosophy as a kind of humanism or existentialism, really: that is, to practice philosophy is to employ the tools of the philosopher with regard to determining Worth rather than just discovering the True. This view of inquiry is value-driven, whereas a scientific view of inquiry is fact-driven; or, in other words, the philosopher’s main concern is value-determination while the scientist’s is fact-accumulation. So, putting back the lid on the can of worms, I think there can be two types of “truth,” just as there are two types of “value”: in one case, there’s the truth of how the physical world hangs together, which has Public Value; and in the other case, the truth of what that means for us, which has Private Value.
Perhaps a better analogy is for the philosopher to be like an artist [1], as an individual who feels compelled to interpret and evaluate what she experiences, because an accumulation of facts is just an inventory, not gestalt. It’s philosophers, then, who are the true bees of the invisible, to borrow a phrase from the late poet Rainer Maria Rilke, where the realm of philosophy is like a fertile, flowery field of frenzied cross-pollination. As Marcel Proust says in Time Regained:
The grandeur of real art... is to rediscover, grasp again, and lay before us that reality from which we become more and more separated as the formal knowledge which we substitute for it grows in thickness and imperviousness — that reality which there is grave danger we might die without having known and yet which is simply our life.
Philosophy, to remain vitally relevant, should also be engaged with this rediscovering or grasping again of that reality which first gave rise to its concepts and categories. In this sense, I would argue that philosophy is more art than science; indeed, it is real art. The philosopher shouldn’t just be the gadfly of the virtues of her time, but of the entire underpinning of intellectual pursuit: a perpetual, potential dissolver of dogma, periodically dripping acid on the petrified bits of scientific canon in a spirit of appraisal.
The philosopher, then, should always be approaching reality as if for the first time, to see if new insights present themselves in light of her devotion to her craft, and in light of her imagination — just like the poet. But why is the poet-philosopher specially situated or constituted to determine value? Is the philosopher more adept at handling the dialectic between imagination and reason? Similarly, why does the poet dress up her experience in imaginative attire? It’s her imagination in the act of grasping her experience, of entertaining possibilities of value.
Like the scientist, the poet-philosopher gathers facts, too, and uses facts; her images and metaphors are built out of facts. By engaging in this imaginative activity, she creates the human, the realizable human. She can attest to William Blake’s maxim: you never know what is enough until you know what is more than enough. And it’s this dialectic between imagination and reason that produces what we call the “human spirit.” The imagination creates the image of the human being from the raw material of physical facts.
Now, I can certainly appreciate the desire to bring science into the forefront in an attempt to fortify (or even rebuild) that “wall of separation” with the impregnable bricks of scientific authority, especially here in America where Christianity still enjoys a certain hegemony; but I also believe we shouldn’t shy away from philosophy, or even philosophy as art, just because in some sense, and to some people, it might seem like we are thereby lending too much credence to the religious “philosophy” of Christianity. Yes, we all remember when George W. Bush was asked what “political philosopher or thinker” he identified with most, he said it was Jesus. And there’s a real danger we could end up with more people sharing the sentiments of Donald Miller in his memoir Blue Like Jazz:
My most recent faith struggle is not one of intellect. I don’t really do that anymore. Sooner or later you just figure out there are some guys who don’t believe in God and they can prove that He doesn’t exist, and some other guys who do believe in God and they can prove that He does exist, and the argument stopped being about God a long time ago and now it’s about who is smarter, and honestly I don’t care. I don’t believe I will ever walk away from God for intellectual reasons. Who knows anything anyway?
Who knows anything anyway? It’s worth noting that Miller gave the first night’s closing prayer at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, and currently serves on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on Fatherhood and Healthy Families!
But I suppose my biggest concern is that philosophers need to be better poets, Jaspers’ pejorative comparison notwithstanding, where poetry is not mere words arranged in pleasing cadences, and where a poet is not someone who tries to reach truth at the expense of reason, but as one who achieves a synthesis of reason and imagination (i.e., fact and value) and thereby realizes a legitimate sanction for life. As Wallace Stevens wrote in one of his notebooks: “To be at the end of reality is not to be at the beginning of imagination, but to be at the end of both.”
A philosopher is not a failed scientist. Let the scientist persist in collating his experiments. But let philosophy be the Virtuoso of Value, the Alpha and Omega of Inquiry; and let philosophers be the bees charged with turning the nectar of mere being into existential honey.
http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2013/05/philosophy-as-art.html
Philosophy as Art?
To decide to become a philosopher seemed as foolish to me as to decide to become a poet. Since my schooldays, however, I was guided by philosophical questions. Philosophy seemed to me the supreme, even the sole, concern of man. — Karl Jaspers
Last week Christopher Hallquist at Patheos posted a brief criticism of contemporary philosophy that got me thinking. In short, he says that “nobody seems to know how to resolve any of the major disputes in philosophy,” and that the “lack of agreement on what good philosophy is makes it hard to filter the good philosophy and reward the philosophers who produce it.” And while I was in the middle of writing this post, Massimo published his piece on demarcation projects.
I’d like to offer my own observations and perspective on this, proceeding by first describing what the problem seems to be, and then presenting some thoughts on what a philosopher is and what practicing philosophy means to me.
I. The Problem
The problem seems to be that philosophy has been undergoing a kind of identity crisis. For how long? Who knows. But the most recent and obvious symptom is that many believe that philosophy has become science, or vice versa. Biologist Austin L. Hughes thinks that science has eclipsed, or has tried to eclipse, philosophy as the final arbiter of both the Good and the True — though, refreshingly, he feels that this usurpation is an overreaching.
But even as far back as 1991, John Brockman described the seeds of this state of affairs through what he called the Third Culture:
[Traditional intellectualism], which dismisses science, is often nonempirical. It uses its own jargon and washes its own laundry. It is chiefly characterized by comment on comments, the swelling spiral of commentary eventually reaching the point where the real world gets lost.
Though philosophy today certainly doesn’t dismiss science, his contrast with traditional Ivory Tower intellectualism is instructive:
The third culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.
Is it true that science has become the final authority on what it means to be human? Isn’t that the province of philosophy?
II. What is Philosophy?
I was about to write, “Ask five different philosophers and you’ll get five different answers,” but generally speaking, the aim of philosophical inquiry can be said to be to gain purchase on ultimate or at least fundamental questions of human life via skeptical exploration and rational argument. Traditionally, it has been an effort to reach truth through human reason, and to be as clear as possible in its definitions.
Yes, scientists will give you the same description of their discipline; after all, their discipline emerged from philosophy. But whatever the differences in their respective tools, Brockman, who I mentioned above, presents the consensus of those working in the various sciences when he writes:
Unlike those disciplines in which there is no expectation of systematic progress and in which one reflects on and recycles the ideas of others, science, on its frontiers, poses more and better questions, better put. They are questions phrased to elicit answers; science finds the answers and moves on.
To be fair, he may not have had in mind philosophy per se; but to my lights, the essence of philosophy is precisely to “pose more and better questions, better put.” And if philosophy is about posing questions and proposing answers, we find that these answers can have either Public Value or Private Value (or both). It seems clear that, in our age, philosophy’s justification lies mostly if not totally in its perceived Public Value. Onora O’Neill calls this its “impact”:
Yet, like others, philosophers are under pressure to show that what they do matters, that they contribute to changing the world — to show, indeed, to use modish jargon, that work in philosophy has ‘impact.’ ‘Impact’ is a multiply ambiguous term, and a lot of impact has negative value, so presumably what is meant is that philosophers should show that their work has impact of a desirable sort. On a simplistic view, good impact is economic impact.
It seems to me that the successful track record of applied science is the primary driver behind the pressure on the humanities to deliver analogous results. But is the same true of the fruits of the research in the more theoretical sciences? I suppose the argument could be made that even in the domain of theoretical physics the value of its research into the nature of reality is determined by its economic impact. Consider a massive and expensive project like Iter, where the hope is to “produce commercial energy from fusion.” Or what about quantum encryption? A recent article describes an application of the technology that would prevent catastrophic economic impacts from the disruption of power grids. Even our exploration of space is largely and ultimately determined by economic concerns: can we find new ways to exploit celestial phenomena for our benefit? Can we terraform Mars in time for our increasingly likely global climate catastrophe, so that our species can continue to live in the manner in which it has become accustomed?
But we can still ask if it’s really true that, in our American culture at least, pressure from economic forces or market interests is causing philosophy’s identity crisis. What about in our educational system, for instance? I think it’s here that Public Value considerations seem even more evident, even if only indirectly. John Tierney recently discussed the effects of, and growing protest against, the reigning market-driven approach to the American public education system:
What, then, do the critics of the corporate reform agenda propose? Surely they can’t be defending the status quo, content with the current state of schools. No. Without being too unfair to the diversity of views on this, the key consensus is that the most important step we could take to deal with our education problems would be to address poverty in the United States... If I am correct that a new educational revolution is underway, it will need its own Thomas Paine, speaking “Common Sense” and urging action.
Tierney calls specifically for an activist-philosopher type when he references Paine, implying that work in the philosophy of education is probably just as important, if not as urgent, to considerations of Public Value as are the products of the hard sciences. After all, the children are our future, right?
Also, we can see that public education is another area where philosophy and science (albeit a “soft” science) converge and diverge, though in a less dramatic fashion. Philosophers may attend to qualitative concerns (the meaning and value of education), whereas social scientists focus more on practical, quantitative ones (the specific practices that produce the most economic “impact” O’Neill mentioned above).
III. Philosophers and the Practice of Philosophy
I mentioned above that the goal of philosophy is to reach truth through the exercise of human reason. Of course we then have to ask, with Pilate, “What is truth?” Though this certainly isn’t the proper place to completely open up that can of worms, we can at least peel back the lid a bit and ask: Is “truth” simply veridicality? In that case, perhaps thinkers in the sciences are better equipped to find it. But if the scientist’s process is viewed simplistically as
question => hypothesis => testing => result
then this still leaves the philosopher with a vital supporting role, assisting the scientist with the framing of the questions that both seek to answer.
We could also think of the philosopher as the CEO of a company. Ideally conceived, the CEO of a company is the true leader of the organization, in that she is responsible for its vision and its values, with as much independence as possible, indulging her imagination to the greatest extent allowable by generating as many goals and strategies as she can; of course, the Board of Directors is then responsible for pruning back her extravagance a bit, while all the middle managers work on implementing her now revised ideas. I suppose the scientists would then be the Board of Directors. Also, under this paradigm, philosophizing can not only be viewed as the impetus for science, the philosopher can be considered the interpreter of science. Though Brockman claims that it’s scientists who are “rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are,” O’Neill says:
Humanities research, including research in philosophy, is valuable for striking and profound reasons that go beyond economic value, and which we should not be shy of articulating. Research in the humanities has public value because it forms and transforms individuals and societies: it shapes and reshapes what people believe and do, and what they value.
To me, philosophy is at its best when endeavoring to determine the weights and measures of things; where the philosopher is the maintainer of a protean equilibrium in this realm of values, and not just a dispeller of delusions and illusions. I suppose I’m arguing for a definition of philosophy as a kind of humanism or existentialism, really: that is, to practice philosophy is to employ the tools of the philosopher with regard to determining Worth rather than just discovering the True. This view of inquiry is value-driven, whereas a scientific view of inquiry is fact-driven; or, in other words, the philosopher’s main concern is value-determination while the scientist’s is fact-accumulation. So, putting back the lid on the can of worms, I think there can be two types of “truth,” just as there are two types of “value”: in one case, there’s the truth of how the physical world hangs together, which has Public Value; and in the other case, the truth of what that means for us, which has Private Value.
Perhaps a better analogy is for the philosopher to be like an artist [1], as an individual who feels compelled to interpret and evaluate what she experiences, because an accumulation of facts is just an inventory, not gestalt. It’s philosophers, then, who are the true bees of the invisible, to borrow a phrase from the late poet Rainer Maria Rilke, where the realm of philosophy is like a fertile, flowery field of frenzied cross-pollination. As Marcel Proust says in Time Regained:
The grandeur of real art... is to rediscover, grasp again, and lay before us that reality from which we become more and more separated as the formal knowledge which we substitute for it grows in thickness and imperviousness — that reality which there is grave danger we might die without having known and yet which is simply our life.
Philosophy, to remain vitally relevant, should also be engaged with this rediscovering or grasping again of that reality which first gave rise to its concepts and categories. In this sense, I would argue that philosophy is more art than science; indeed, it is real art. The philosopher shouldn’t just be the gadfly of the virtues of her time, but of the entire underpinning of intellectual pursuit: a perpetual, potential dissolver of dogma, periodically dripping acid on the petrified bits of scientific canon in a spirit of appraisal.
The philosopher, then, should always be approaching reality as if for the first time, to see if new insights present themselves in light of her devotion to her craft, and in light of her imagination — just like the poet. But why is the poet-philosopher specially situated or constituted to determine value? Is the philosopher more adept at handling the dialectic between imagination and reason? Similarly, why does the poet dress up her experience in imaginative attire? It’s her imagination in the act of grasping her experience, of entertaining possibilities of value.
Like the scientist, the poet-philosopher gathers facts, too, and uses facts; her images and metaphors are built out of facts. By engaging in this imaginative activity, she creates the human, the realizable human. She can attest to William Blake’s maxim: you never know what is enough until you know what is more than enough. And it’s this dialectic between imagination and reason that produces what we call the “human spirit.” The imagination creates the image of the human being from the raw material of physical facts.
Now, I can certainly appreciate the desire to bring science into the forefront in an attempt to fortify (or even rebuild) that “wall of separation” with the impregnable bricks of scientific authority, especially here in America where Christianity still enjoys a certain hegemony; but I also believe we shouldn’t shy away from philosophy, or even philosophy as art, just because in some sense, and to some people, it might seem like we are thereby lending too much credence to the religious “philosophy” of Christianity. Yes, we all remember when George W. Bush was asked what “political philosopher or thinker” he identified with most, he said it was Jesus. And there’s a real danger we could end up with more people sharing the sentiments of Donald Miller in his memoir Blue Like Jazz:
My most recent faith struggle is not one of intellect. I don’t really do that anymore. Sooner or later you just figure out there are some guys who don’t believe in God and they can prove that He doesn’t exist, and some other guys who do believe in God and they can prove that He does exist, and the argument stopped being about God a long time ago and now it’s about who is smarter, and honestly I don’t care. I don’t believe I will ever walk away from God for intellectual reasons. Who knows anything anyway?
Who knows anything anyway? It’s worth noting that Miller gave the first night’s closing prayer at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, and currently serves on President Barack Obama’s Task Force on Fatherhood and Healthy Families!
But I suppose my biggest concern is that philosophers need to be better poets, Jaspers’ pejorative comparison notwithstanding, where poetry is not mere words arranged in pleasing cadences, and where a poet is not someone who tries to reach truth at the expense of reason, but as one who achieves a synthesis of reason and imagination (i.e., fact and value) and thereby realizes a legitimate sanction for life. As Wallace Stevens wrote in one of his notebooks: “To be at the end of reality is not to be at the beginning of imagination, but to be at the end of both.”
A philosopher is not a failed scientist. Let the scientist persist in collating his experiments. But let philosophy be the Virtuoso of Value, the Alpha and Omega of Inquiry; and let philosophers be the bees charged with turning the nectar of mere being into existential honey.
http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2013/05/philosophy-as-art.html
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:na televiziji, u emisiji treti element, neki srbin je dove hrpu žena i sa svi zajeno plaču kako je ženami teško u znanosti.
osin uobičajenih pizdarija, spomenulo se kako se ne cijeni ( naravski, nika ikad se ne će reći ki je to entintet ki ne cijeni jer je to polak odgovra ki bi raskrinko adjendu) žene, pa unda ni područja koja su domonantno ženska upravo zbog i od trenutka kad su postala ženska.
tako je edukacija nekad bila muško i cijenjeno zanimanje, uz policijota i svećenika, učitelj je čini sveto trojstvo u selu i svi su in se klanjali. kako su položaje pomalo popunjavale žene, tako se srozalo na današnje razine.
teza je izvrnuta, istina je da se položaj srozavao pa su ga muški počeli napušćati, a okupitati žene.
ne slažem se s tobom. ja sam imao genijalne profesore i profesorice. to su bili genijalci ali su bili strogi i zahtjevni za popizdit nije bilo cile-mile ili znaš ili neznaš ajmo da capo. nisu te učili gradivo toliko nego kako učiti. gradivo si učio sam. ali takvih više nema.
oli sun jo ka napiso da ti nisi imo genijalne profesore, pa da se ne moreš složiti ismanun?
odgovorio sam ti na ovo boldano gdje ti obezvjeđuješ i vrijeđaš žene da su nesposobne biti profesorice. iz mog iskustva opovrgavam tvoju tvrdnju da nije točna. argumentiraj i dokaži da se obrazovni sustav urušio i postao loš zato jer su žene popunile mjesta koja su nekad vladali samo muški. ili je neki drugi razlog? možda su političari u ministarstvu zakurac ?
ne, ne,
to je njihova teza, ne moja. to sun opiso ča su oni rekli, parafrazirati ću ih ponovo preciznije;
"ne cijeni se žene, ni ženska područja. obrazovanje je nekad bilo cijenjeno, ali kako je pomalo postajo žensko zanimanje, prestajalo se cijeniti ga, jer se ne cijeni žene."
a jo tvrdin da je to izvrnuta teza; ni da se edukacija ne cijeni jer njome vlodaju žene, nego njome vladaju žene jer se edukacija ne cijeni.
zar nije Varoufakis govorio o tome?
Re: Denkverbot
u onin intervjuu?sacrificial_anode wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:
ne slažem se s tobom. ja sam imao genijalne profesore i profesorice. to su bili genijalci ali su bili strogi i zahtjevni za popizdit nije bilo cile-mile ili znaš ili neznaš ajmo da capo. nisu te učili gradivo toliko nego kako učiti. gradivo si učio sam. ali takvih više nema.
oli sun jo ka napiso da ti nisi imo genijalne profesore, pa da se ne moreš složiti ismanun?
odgovorio sam ti na ovo boldano gdje ti obezvjeđuješ i vrijeđaš žene da su nesposobne biti profesorice. iz mog iskustva opovrgavam tvoju tvrdnju da nije točna. argumentiraj i dokaži da se obrazovni sustav urušio i postao loš zato jer su žene popunile mjesta koja su nekad vladali samo muški. ili je neki drugi razlog? možda su političari u ministarstvu zakurac ?
ne, ne,
to je njihova teza, ne moja. to sun opiso ča su oni rekli, parafrazirati ću ih ponovo preciznije;
"ne cijeni se žene, ni ženska područja. obrazovanje je nekad bilo cijenjeno, ali kako je pomalo postajo žensko zanimanje, prestajalo se cijeniti ga, jer se ne cijeni žene."
a jo tvrdin da je to izvrnuta teza; ni da se edukacija ne cijeni jer njome vlodaju žene, nego njome vladaju žene jer se edukacija ne cijeni.
zar nije Varoufakis govorio o tome?
reko je isto ovo ča i ovi u treton elementu?
interesantno ja kako hrpa inače pametnih ljudi potpuno izopačena kad se govori o ženskoj zastupljenosti. u jednon trenu svoga ljevičarskog ludila, jedna doktorica je ispričala kako je jednoga vrućeg radnog dona došla na poso u vešti pa joj je jedun kolega reko da je lipa ili nešto tako. srbin voditelj, jedini muški u studiju, omoh je ositi nelagodu radi toga odvratnog čina
_________________
Insofar as it is educational, it is not compulsory;
And insofar as it is compulsory, it is not educational
aben- Posts : 35492
2014-04-16
Re: Denkverbot
Varoufakis je u onom predavanju (Oxford Univ?) pričao o dislokaciji moći, i jedan primjer mu je bilo to s prosvjetom, kako je nekad bilo cijenjeno, i kad je izgubilo svoju neku snagu, počeo se mijenjati rodni/spolni sastav, tek tad..
Re: Denkverbot
sacrificial_anode wrote:
od svih verbota najgori je autodenkverbot..
objasni što je to autodenkverbot. denkverbot znamo šta je ali neznamo šta je autodenkverbot. barem ja neznam možda drugi znaju pa objasni meni. nešto mi je palo na pamet ali nisam siguran da li je to to pa kaži ti prvo pa ću ja.
The term " prohibition of thinking " refers to the suppression of opinions or their expression, insofar as these deviate from common interpretations or dogmas.
The cultural sociologist Detlef Grieswelle criticized that the political correctness aimed at "what you say in public, what you have to do or what you do not say publicly, must not do if you do not want to be morally condemned."
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
aben wrote:u onin intervjuu?sacrificial_anode wrote:aben wrote:Gnječ wrote:aben wrote:
oli sun jo ka napiso da ti nisi imo genijalne profesore, pa da se ne moreš složiti ismanun?
odgovorio sam ti na ovo boldano gdje ti obezvjeđuješ i vrijeđaš žene da su nesposobne biti profesorice. iz mog iskustva opovrgavam tvoju tvrdnju da nije točna. argumentiraj i dokaži da se obrazovni sustav urušio i postao loš zato jer su žene popunile mjesta koja su nekad vladali samo muški. ili je neki drugi razlog? možda su političari u ministarstvu zakurac ?
ne, ne,
to je njihova teza, ne moja. to sun opiso ča su oni rekli, parafrazirati ću ih ponovo preciznije;
"ne cijeni se žene, ni ženska područja. obrazovanje je nekad bilo cijenjeno, ali kako je pomalo postajo žensko zanimanje, prestajalo se cijeniti ga, jer se ne cijeni žene."
a jo tvrdin da je to izvrnuta teza; ni da se edukacija ne cijeni jer njome vlodaju žene, nego njome vladaju žene jer se edukacija ne cijeni.
zar nije Varoufakis govorio o tome?
reko je isto ovo ča i ovi u treton elementu?
interesantno ja kako hrpa inače pametnih ljudi potpuno izopačena kad se govori o ženskoj zastupljenosti. u jednon trenu svoga ljevičarskog ludila, jedna doktorica je ispričala kako je jednoga vrućeg radnog dona došla na poso u vešti pa joj je jedun kolega reko da je lipa ili nešto tako. srbin voditelj, jedini muški u studiju, omoh je ositi nelagodu radi toga odvratnog čina
ča je reka da njoj je lipa vešta?
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
ča on kurac zno kakova je spod vešte a još manje zno kakova je spod kože. znoči da mu je vešta bila lipa.
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
ćo, junac, ča ti dela laptop? čera si ga zali z vinon...se je otriznija čagod?
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
u rvata je obrazovni sustav super.
U JAVNOSTI se već nekoliko dana raspravlja o nadrealnom liječniku i medicinskoj sestri iz Obrovca, nakon što je emisija "Provjereno" objavila najavu za prilog koji će se emitirati večeras.
Tema priloga upravo je ordinacija obiteljske medicine liječnika Gorana Jusupa u Obrovcu.
Njegov nastup i uvredljiv rječnik u najavi "Provjerenog" šokirali su javnost, kao i mlada žena Veronika Pecolaj koja se u njegovoj ambulanti predstavlja kao medicinska sestra iako ni sama ne zna gdje je završila medicinsku školu.
Ona je, kako se može vidjeti u videu najave, novinaru nije znala odgovoriti na pitanje gdje se školovala za medicinsku sestru.
"U Zadru", odgovorila je.
"U kojoj školi", pitao je novinar.
"Ne sjećam se iskreno. Hvala Bogu pa sam zaboravila. Ne želim se ni sjećati jer sam imala loše iskustvo s tom školom“.", rekla je. "Koju? Pa medicinsku školu, rekla sam vam to već jednom. Što vi na ušima sjedite", pitala je novinara.
Nakon nekoliko trenutaka 25-godišnja "medicinska sestra" rekla je kako je medicinsku školu Vladimira Nazora u Zadru (koja nije medicinska, već gimnazija) završila 2006. ili 2007. godine. „Neka ljudi govore što hoće i neka lažu što hoće, ali ja sam ono što jesam“, odgovorila je.
Ni ostale informacije ne idu im u prilog, a stigla je i potvrda iz Hrvatske komore medicinskih sestara kako u njihovu registru nema osobe pod njezinim imenom.
Veronika Pecolaj tako, po svemu sudeći, uopće nije medicinska sestra, iako se "Provjerenom" predstavila upravo tako. Njezin Facebook profil, međutim, otkriva da je doktoru Jusupu, s kojim je navodno i u ljubavnoj vezi, u više navrata tražila (pretpostavljamo pravu) medicinsku sestru.
Uvjeti su bili da je iz Benkovca, da je marljiva i vrijedna te da sluša doktora.
0 komentara
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tko-je-zena-koja-glumi-medicinsku-sestru-u-obrovcu/2080965.aspx
U JAVNOSTI se već nekoliko dana raspravlja o nadrealnom liječniku i medicinskoj sestri iz Obrovca, nakon što je emisija "Provjereno" objavila najavu za prilog koji će se emitirati večeras.
Tema priloga upravo je ordinacija obiteljske medicine liječnika Gorana Jusupa u Obrovcu.
Njegov nastup i uvredljiv rječnik u najavi "Provjerenog" šokirali su javnost, kao i mlada žena Veronika Pecolaj koja se u njegovoj ambulanti predstavlja kao medicinska sestra iako ni sama ne zna gdje je završila medicinsku školu.
Ona je, kako se može vidjeti u videu najave, novinaru nije znala odgovoriti na pitanje gdje se školovala za medicinsku sestru.
"U Zadru", odgovorila je.
"U kojoj školi", pitao je novinar.
"Ne sjećam se iskreno. Hvala Bogu pa sam zaboravila. Ne želim se ni sjećati jer sam imala loše iskustvo s tom školom“.", rekla je. "Koju? Pa medicinsku školu, rekla sam vam to već jednom. Što vi na ušima sjedite", pitala je novinara.
Nakon nekoliko trenutaka 25-godišnja "medicinska sestra" rekla je kako je medicinsku školu Vladimira Nazora u Zadru (koja nije medicinska, već gimnazija) završila 2006. ili 2007. godine. „Neka ljudi govore što hoće i neka lažu što hoće, ali ja sam ono što jesam“, odgovorila je.
Ni ostale informacije ne idu im u prilog, a stigla je i potvrda iz Hrvatske komore medicinskih sestara kako u njihovu registru nema osobe pod njezinim imenom.
Veronika Pecolaj tako, po svemu sudeći, uopće nije medicinska sestra, iako se "Provjerenom" predstavila upravo tako. Njezin Facebook profil, međutim, otkriva da je doktoru Jusupu, s kojim je navodno i u ljubavnoj vezi, u više navrata tražila (pretpostavljamo pravu) medicinsku sestru.
Uvjeti su bili da je iz Benkovca, da je marljiva i vrijedna te da sluša doktora.
0 komentara
https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tko-je-zena-koja-glumi-medicinsku-sestru-u-obrovcu/2080965.aspx
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
ali zanimljivo odmah su joj objavili ime i prezime a onom kriminalcu psihopati balavcu koji je premlatio taksistu nisu objavili jer jebiga njegov je jebeni otac neka velika faca u HDZ-u i radi u nekom ministarstviu vječne i neovisne rvacke.
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
There’s a part of our brains specifically designed to detect different levels of pain. It’s called the anterior cingulate cortex, and it activates when someone receives the silent treatment.
You heard that right: When someone is ignored, their brain tells them they are in physical pain.
Symptoms could include anything from headaches to diarrhea or constipation to stomach pains, as well as insomnia, anxiety, and fatigue. Different states of emotional stress could lead to more serious health risks, such as eating disorders, diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, blood clots, urinary and bowel problems, erectile dysfunction, and cancer.
----
hvala lijepa ne treba mi vaš silent treatment.
You heard that right: When someone is ignored, their brain tells them they are in physical pain.
Symptoms could include anything from headaches to diarrhea or constipation to stomach pains, as well as insomnia, anxiety, and fatigue. Different states of emotional stress could lead to more serious health risks, such as eating disorders, diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, blood clots, urinary and bowel problems, erectile dysfunction, and cancer.
----
hvala lijepa ne treba mi vaš silent treatment.
Guest- Guest
Re: Denkverbot
sacrificial_anode wrote:
Varoufakis je u onom predavanju (Oxford Univ?) pričao o dislokaciji moći, i jedan primjer mu je bilo to s prosvjetom, kako je nekad bilo cijenjeno, i kad je izgubilo svoju neku snagu, počeo se mijenjati rodni/spolni sastav, tek tad..
pregljedo sun njegov is capitalism devouring democracy, i nis našo...ali čisto sumnjan da je kompletni ljevičar poput njega na mojoj stroni u ovon pitanju:)
_________________
Insofar as it is educational, it is not compulsory;
And insofar as it is compulsory, it is not educational
aben- Posts : 35492
2014-04-16
Page 21 of 50 • 1 ... 12 ... 20, 21, 22 ... 35 ... 50
Page 21 of 50
Permissions in this forum:
You cannot reply to topics in this forum