Zašto Arapi gube ratove (članak)

Preuzimanje odgovornosti za politiku, rad, program za status ili obuke rijetko događa. Američki treneri mogu ga pronaći vrlo frustrirajuće kada se više puta susrećemo arapske časnika stavljanje krivnju za neuspješne operacije ili programa na američkom opreme ili neki drugi vanjski izvor. Visoka stopa ne-operativne američke opreme krivi na "nedostatak rezervnih dijelova" -pointing prst na nereagiranje američkog opskrbnog sustava, unatoč činjenici da su američki treneri mogu dokumentirati dovoljno zalihe stižu u zemlji i nestaju u neispravnim sustavom opskrbe. (Takva kritika nije bio oštar ili osobno i često tako neizravna i uljudno isporučena da je tek nakon sastanka koji kosi reference su shvaćene.) Ovo je imperativ radi čak i na najuzvišeniji razinama. Tijekom Kuvajt rata, iračke snage preuzeo gradu Khafji u sjeveroistočnom Saudijskoj Arabiji nakon Saudijci su evakuirani mjesto. Opće Khalid bin Sultan, saudijska zapovjednik kopnene snage, zatražio pismo od generala Norman Schwarzkopf, navodeći da je to američki general koji je naredio evakuaciju iz Saudijske town.And u svom račun Khafji bitke, general Bin Sultan predvidljivo optužuje Amerikance za iračke okupacije grada. U stvarnosti, problem je da svjetlosni Saudijske snage u području napustio bojno polje. Saudijci su u stvari takvoj situaciji i brojčano iračke jedinice približava Khafji ali Saudijska ponos zahtijeva da stranci mogu kriviti.

As for equipment, a vast cultural gap exists between the U.S. and Arab maintenance and logistics systems. The Arab difficulties with U.S. equipment are not, as sometimes simplistically believed, a matter of "Arabs don't do maintenance," but something much deeper. The American concept of a weapons system does not convey easily. A weapons system brings with it specific maintenance and logistics procedures, policies, and even a philosophy, all of them based on U.S. culture, with its expectations of a certain educational level, sense of small unit responsibility, tool allocation, and doctrine. Tools that would be allocated to a U.S. battalion (a unit of some 600-800 personnel) would most likely be found at a much higher level—probably two or three echelons higher—in an Arab army. The expertise, initiative and, most importantly, the trust indicated by delegation of responsibility to a lower level are rare. The U.S. equipment and its maintenance are predicated on a concept of repair at the lowest level and therefore require delegation of authority. Without the needed tools, spare parts, or expertise available to keep equipment running, and loathe to report bad news to his superiors, the unit commander looks for scapegoats. All this explains why I many times heard in Egypt that U.S. weaponry is "too delicate."

I have observed many in-country U.S. survey teams: invariably, hosts make the case for acquiring the most modern of military hardware and do everything to avoid issues of maintenance, logistics, and training. They obfuscate and mislead to such an extent that U.S. teams, no matter how earnest their sense of mission, find it nearly impossible to help. More generally, Arab reluctance to be candid about training deficiencies makes it extremely difficult for foreign advisors properly to support instruction or assess training needs.

Što se tiče opreme, velika kulturni jaz postoji između SAD-a i arapskih održavanja i logističkih sustava. Arapske poteškoće s nama opreme nisu, kao što ponekad pojednostavljeno vjeruje, stvar "Arapi ne učinite održavanje", ali nešto mnogo dublje. Američki koncept sustava oružja ne prenosi lako. Sustav oružja sa sobom donosi određene održavanja i logističke postupke, politiku, pa čak i filozofiju, sve od njih temelji se na američke kulture, sa svojim očekivanjima određenu razinu obrazovanja, osjećaj male jedinice odgovornosti, raspodjele alata i doktrine. Alati koji će biti dodijeljeni u SAD bataljuna (jedinica nekog 600-800 osoba) će najvjerojatnije naći na mnogo višoj razini-vjerojatno dvije ili tri ešaloni visokog-u arapskom vojskom. Stručnost, inicijative i, što je najvažnije, povjerenje ukazuje delegacije odgovornosti na niže razine su rijetki. Američki oprema i njegova održavanja se temelje na konceptu popravak na najnižoj razini i stoga zahtijevaju izaslanstvo vlasti. Bez potrebnih alata, rezervnih dijelova ili stručnost na raspolaganju kako bi opreme trčanje, a mrziti prijaviti lošu vijest svojim nadređenima, zapovjednik jedinice traži žrtvene jarce. Sve to objašnjava zašto sam mnogo puta čuo u Egiptu da je SAD oružje je "previše osjetljiva."

Ja sam primijetio mnoge u zemlji SAD ankete timova: uvijek, domaćini čine slučaj za stjecanje najmodernije vojne opreme i učiniti sve kako bi izbjegli probleme održavanja, logistiku i obuku. Oni pomutiti i zavesti u tolikoj mjeri koja nas timove, bez obzira koliko ozbiljno njihov osjećaj misije, smatraju ga gotovo nemoguće pomoći. Općenitije, arapsko nevoljkost da bude iskren o treningu nedostatke čini vrlo teško za inozemne savjetnici ispravno podržavati instrukcije ili procjenu potreba za obukom.

Golde Meir je kazala; "Ne zamjeram Arapima što ubijaju nas Židove, zamjeram im što su nas naučili da ubijamo njih!"

Sve ok samo nije o tome tekst.

Um cini ratnika a ne oružje.

Ovi Arapi su JNA škola plus su kastinski ustrojeni i cuvaju znaje da im nebi tko preoteo posao ......ucenje napamet , korištenje knjige tokom predavanja od instruktora znaci slabost jer se baziraju na pamcenju tj bubanju napamet ......zanimljiv tekst ......nikad ovi nece postat vojna sila a ISIL Ih može poraziti bez obzira koliko ovi tehnike imali.

Pa tu je objašnjenje. Nemoš pobjedit Božji narod.

Kakvi božji narod. Ne pricaj gluposti.

Combined Arms Operations

A lack of cooperation is most apparent in the failure of all Arab armies to succeed at combined arms operations. A regular Jordanian army infantry company, for example, is man-for-man as good as a comparable Israeli company; at battalion level, however, the coordination required for combined arms operations, with artillery, air, and logistics support, is simply absent. Indeed, the higher the echelon, the greater the disparity. This results from infrequent combined arms training; when it does take place, it is intended to impress visitors (which it does—the dog-and-pony show is usually done with uncommon gusto and theatrical talent) rather than provide real training.

This problem results from three main factors. First, the well-known lack of trust among Arabs for anyone outside their own family adversely affects offensive operations.26 Exceptions to this pattern are limited to elite units (which throughout the Arab world have the same duty—to protect the regime, rather than the country). In a culture in which almost every sphere of human endeavor, including business and social relationships, is based on a family structure, this orientation is also present in the military, particularly in the stress of battle. Offensive action, basically, consists of fire and maneuver. The maneuver element must be confident that supporting units or arms are providing covering fire. If there is a lack of trust in that support, getting troops moving forward against dug-in defenders is possible only by officers getting out front and leading, something that has not been a characteristic of Arab leadership.

Operacije Kombinirani oružje

Nedostatak suradnje je najvidljivije u neuspjehu svih arapskih vojski uspjeti u kombiniranim operacijama oružja. Redoviti Jordanski vojska satnije, primjerice, je čovjek za-čovjeka kao dobar kao usporedive izraelska tvrtka; na razini bojne, međutim, koordinacija potrebna za kombinirane operacije oružja, artiljerijom, zraka i logističke potpore, jednostavno nema. Doista, to je veći ešalon, to je veća razlika. To proizlazi iz neredovitog treninga kombinirani oružjem; kad se odvijaju, namjera je da impresionirati posjetitelje (koji to ne-pas-i-poni pokazati obično radi s guštom neuobičajeno i kazališni talent), nego dati pravi trening.

Ovaj problem proizlazi iz tri glavna faktora. Prvo, poznati nedostatak povjerenja među Arapima za svakoga izvan vlastite obitelji negativno utječe uvredljive operations.26 iznimke ovom obrascu su ograničeni na elitnim jedinicama (koje diljem arapskog svijeta imaju istu dužnost da štiti režim, a ne država). U kulturi u kojoj je gotovo svaka sfera ljudskog djelovanja, uključujući poslovne i društvenim odnosima, temelji se na obiteljskoj strukturi, ova orijentacija je također prisutan u vojsci, osobito u stres bitke. Uvredljiva akcija, zapravo, sastoji se od vatre i manevar. Manevar element mora biti uvjeren da su prateće jedinice ili ruke pruža pokriće vatru. Ako postoji nedostatak povjerenja u tu potporu, uzimajući vojnika kreće naprijed protiv ukopani-u branitelja moguć samo službenika uzimajući iz prednje i vodećih, nešto što nije karakteristika arapskog vodstva.

Second, the complex mosaic system of peoples creates additional problems for training, as rulers in the Middle East make use of the sectarian and tribal loyalties to maintain power. The ‘Alawi minority controls Syria, East Bankers control Jordan, Sunnis control Iraq, and Nejdis control Saudi Arabia. This has direct implications for the military, where sectarian considerations affect assignments and promotions. Some minorities (such the Circassians in Jordan or the Druze in Syria) tie their well-being to the ruling elite and perform critical protection roles; others (such as the Shi‘a of Iraq) are excluded from the officer corps. In any case, the assignment of officers based on sectarian considerations works against assignments based on merit.

The same lack of trust operates at the interstate level, where Arab armies exhibit very little trust of each other, and with good reason. The blatant lie Gamal Abdel Nasser told King Husayn in June 1967 to get him into the war against Israel—that the Egyptian air force was over Tel Aviv (when most of its planes had been destroyed)—was a classic example of deceit.27 Sadat's disingenuous approach to the Syrians to entice them to enter the war in October 1973 was another (he told them that the Egyptians were planning total war, a deception which included using a second set of operational plans intended only for Syrian eyes).28 With this sort of history, it is no wonder that there is very little cross or joint training among Arab armies and very few command exercises. During the 1967 war, for example, not a single Jordanian liaison officer was stationed in Egypt, nor were the Jordanians forthcoming with the Egyptian command.

Drugo, kompleks mozaik sustav naroda stvara dodatne probleme za obuku, kao vladari na Bliskom istoku iskoristiti sektaških i plemenskih lojalnosti zadržati vlast. The 'Alawi manjina kontrolira Siriju, East Bankers kontrole Jordan, suniti kontrolu Iraka i Nejdis kontrole Saudijsku Arabiju. To ima izravne implikacije vojskom, gdje sektaške razmatranja utjecati zadatke i promocije. Neki manjine (takvi su Circassians u Jordanu ili Druz u Siriji) vezati svoje blagostanje vladajućih elita i obavljaju ključne uloge zaštite; drugi (kao što su Shi'a Iraka) su isključeni iz časničkog zbora. U svakom slučaju, zadatak službenika temelji se na sektaškim razmatranja radi protiv zadataka na temelju zasluga.

Isti nedostatak povjerenja djeluje na međudržavnom nivou, gdje arapske vojske pokazuju vrlo malo povjerenja jedni druge, i to s dobrim razlogom. Neprikrivene laži Gamal Abdel Naser, rekao kralja Huseina, u lipnju 1967. godine kako bi ga dobili u ratu protiv Izraela-da egipatski avijacija je više od Tel Aviva (kada je većina njezinih zrakoplova uništeno je) -was klasični primjer deceit.27 Sadat je neiskren pristup aramejskom zavesti ih da uđu u rat u listopadu 1973. bio je još jedan (on im je rekao da su Egipćani planiraju totalni rat, obmana koja je uključivala korištenje drugi set operativnih planova namijenjenih samo za sirijske oči) .28 Time vrsta povijesti, to je ne čudi da je vrlo malo igrača i zajednička obuka među arapskim vojskama i vrlo malo naredba vježbe. Tijekom rata 1967. godine, na primjer, niti jedan jordanski časnik za vezu je bio stacioniran u Egiptu, niti su Jordanci nadolazećem s egipatskom naredbe.

Third, Middle Eastern rulers routinely rely on balance-of-power techniques to maintain their authority.30 They use competing organizations, duplicate agencies, and coercive structures dependent upon the ruler's whim. This makes building any form of personal power base difficult, if not impossible, and keeps the leadership apprehensive and off-balance, never secure in its careers or social position. The same applies within the military; a powerful chairman of the joint chiefs is inconceivable.

Joint commands are paper constructs that have little actual function. Leaders look at joint commands, joint exercises, combined arms, and integrated staffs very cautiously for all Arab armies are a double-edged sword. One edge points toward the external enemy and the other toward the capital. The land forces are at once a regime-maintenance force and threat at the same time. No Arab ruler will allow combined operations or training to become routine; the usual excuse is financial expense, but that is unconvincing given their frequent purchase of hardware whose maintenance costs they cannot afford. In fact, combined arms exercises and joint staffs create familiarity, soften rivalries, erase suspicions, and eliminate the fragmented, competing organizations that enable rulers to play off rivals against one another. This situation is most clearly seen in Saudi Arabia, where the land forces and aviation are under the minister of defense, Prince Sultan, while the National Guard is under Prince Abdullah, the deputy prime minister and crown prince. In Egypt, the Central Security Forces balance the army. In Iraq and Syria, the Republican Guard does the balancing.

Politicians actually create obstacles to maintain fragmentation. For example, obtaining aircraft from the air force for army airborne training, whether it is a joint exercise or a simple administrative request for support of training, must generally be coordinated by the heads of services at the ministry of defense; if a large number of aircraft are involved, this probably requires presidential approval. Military coups may be out of style, but the fear of them remains strong. Any large-scale exercise of land forces is a matter of concern to the government and is closely observed, particularly if live ammunition is being used. In Saudi Arabia a complex system of clearances required from area military commanders and provincial governors, all of whom have differing command channels to secure road convoy permission, obtaining ammunition, and conducting exercises, means that in order for a coup to work, it would require a massive amount of loyal conspirators. Arab regimes have learned how to be coup-proof.

Treće, Bliskog istoka vladari rutinski oslanjaju na stanje-of-moć tehnike za održavanje njihove authority.30 oni koriste konkurentske organizacije, duple agencije, i prisile strukture ovisi o vladara hira. To čini izgradnja bilo koji oblik osobne snage baze teško, ako ne i nemoguće, i drži vodstvo prestrašen i off-balance, nikada osigurati u svojim karijerama ili društvenog položaja. Isto vrijedi u vojsci; snažan predsjednik Združenog je nezamislivo.

Zajednički su naredbe papira konstrukti koji imaju malo stvarnog funkciju. Čelnici pogledajte zajedničkih naredbi, zajedničkim vježbama, u kombinaciji ruke i integriranih osoblje vrlo oprezno jer sve arapske vojske dvosjekli mač. Jedan rub usmjeren prema vanjskom neprijatelju, a druga prema glavnom gradu. Zemljišne sile su na jednom režima održavanja sile i prijetnje u isto vrijeme. Ne Arapska vladar će omogućiti kombinirani operacije ili trening da postane rutina; uobičajeni izgovor je financijski rashodi, ali to je neuvjerljiva s obzirom na njihovu česta kupnja hardvera čiji troškovi održavanja ne mogu priuštiti. U stvari, u kombinaciji vježbe oružja i zajedničke osoblje stvoriti prisnost, omekšati rivalstva, izbrisati sumnje, i eliminirati fragmentirane, natječu organizacije koje omogućuju vladare da igraju izvan suparnike jedan protiv drugoga. Ova situacija najjasnije vidi u Saudijskoj Arabiji, gdje su kopnene snage i zrakoplovstvo pod ministar obrane princ Sultan, dok je Nacionalna garda pod princ Abdullah, zamjenik premijera i krune princa. U Egiptu, središnja snage sigurnosti ravnotežu vojsku. U Iraku i Siriji, Republikanska garda radi balansiranje.

Političari zapravo stvoriti prepreke za održavanje fragmentaciju. Na primjer, dobivanje zrakoplova iz zračnih snaga za vojnu obuku u zraku, bilo da je zajednička vježba ili jednostavno upravni zahtjev za potporu obuke, moraju u pravilu biti koordinirana od strane šefova službi u Ministarstvu obrane; ako je veliki broj zrakoplova koji su uključeni, to je vjerojatno potrebno predsjedničke odobrenje. Vojni udari mogu biti iz mode, ali strah od njih i dalje jaka. Svaka velika vježba kopnenih snaga je stvar od interesa za vladu i pomno pratiti, osobito ako žive municije se koristi. U Saudijskoj Arabiji kompleksan sustav dozvola potrebnih iz područja vojnih zapovjednika i pokrajinskim guvernerima, od kojih su različite zapovjedne kanale kako bi osigurali ceste konvoj dozvolu, dobivanje streljivo i provode vježbe, znači da bi za potkopavanje za rad, to će zahtijevati masivan iznos vjernih urotnika. Arapski režimi su naučili kako biti coup-dokaz.

RayMabus wrote:Kakvi božji narod. Ne pricaj gluposti.

Židovi

Security and Paranoia

Arab regimes classify virtually everything vaguely military. Information the U.S. military routinely publishes (about promotions, transfers, names of unit commanders, and unit designations) is top secret in Arabic-speaking countries. To be sure, this does make it more difficult for the enemy to construct an accurate order of battle, but it also feeds the divisive and compartmentalized nature of the military forces. The obsession with security
can reach ludicrous lengths. Prior to the 1973 war, Sadat was surprised to find that within two weeks of the date he had ordered the armed forces be ready for war, his minister of war, General Muhammad Sadiq, had failed to inform his immediate staff of the order. Should a war, Sadat wondered, be kept secret from the very people expected to fight it?31 One can expect to have an Arab counterpart or key contact to be changed without warning and with no explanation as to his sudden absence. This might well be simply a transfer a few doors down the way, but the vagueness of it all leaves foreigners with dire scenarios—scenarios that might be true. And it is best not to inquire too much; advisors or trainers who seem overly inquisitive may find their access to host military information or facilities limited.

The presumed close U.S.-Israel relationship, thought to be operative at all levels, aggravates and complicates this penchant for secrecy. Arabs believe that the most mundane details about them are somehow transmitted to the Mossad via a secret hotline.This explains why a U.S. advisor with Arab forces is likely to be asked early and often about his opinion of the "Palestine problem," then subjected to monologues on the presumed Jewish domination of the United States.

Sigurnost i paranoje

Arapski režimi klasificirati gotovo sve nejasno vojsku. Informacije američka vojska rutinski objavljuje (o promocijama, transfere, imenima zapovjednika jedinica i jedinica oznake) je stroga tajna je u arapskim zemljama govornog područja. Da biste bili sigurni, to ne čine ga teže za neprijatelj konstruirati točan redoslijed borbi, ali i hrani razdora i compartmentalized prirodu vojnih snaga. Opsjednutost sigurnost
može doći do komičan duljine. Prije rata 1973., Sadat bio je iznenađen da otkrijete da u roku od dva tjedna od datuma je naredio oružane snage biti spremni za rat, njegov ministar rata, general Muhammed Sadik, nije uspio obavijestiti svoje neposredne osoblje naloga. Ukoliko rat, Sadat pitali, čuvati tajnu od samih ljudi očekuje se boriti? 31 Jedan može očekivati ​​da će imati arapski kolega ili ključ kontakt se mijenjati bez upozorenja i bez objašnjenja, kao njegove iznenadne odsutnosti. To je dobro može biti jednostavno prijenos nekoliko vrata dolje na putu, ali neodređenost svega toga ostavlja strance s teškim scenarija-scenarija koje bi mogle biti istinite. I to je najbolje da ne pitati previše; savjetnika ili trenera koji izgleda pretjerano radoznao mogu pronaći svoj pristup domaćin vojne informacije ili sadržaji ograničen.

Pretpostavljenog blizu SAD-Izrael odnos, smatra se da operativan na svim razinama, otežava i komplicira ovaj sklonost tajnovitosti. Arapi vjeruju da većina svjetski detalj o njima nekako se prenose Mossada putem tajnog hotline.This objašnjava zašto je američki savjetnik s arapskim snagama vjerojatno biti pitani rano i često o svom mišljenju "problem Palestine", a zatim podvrgnut monolozi o pretpostavljenoj židovske dominacije SAD.

Eva wrote:

RayMabus wrote:Kakvi božji narod. Ne pricaj gluposti.

Židovi

Vi ste u kujcu. Nepostoji nikavi božji narod. Bog voli sve ljude pojednako.

Anvar El Sadat, nakon 4 izgubljena rata, priznao je poraz i došao u Izrael priznavši ga. Vidio je da nemre Židove bacit u more, došlo mu iz dupeta u glavu.

Indifference to Safety

In terms of safety measures, there is a general laxness, a seeming carelessness and indifference to training accidents, many of which could have been prevented by minimal efforts. To the (perhaps overly) safety-conscious Americans, Arab societies appear indifferent to casualties and show a seemingly lackadaisical approach to training safety. There are a number of explanations for this. Some would point to the inherent fatalism within Islam,32 and certainly anyone who has spent considerable time in Arab taxis would lend credence to that theory, but perhaps the reason is less religiously based and more a result of political culture. As any military veteran knows, the ethos of a unit is set at the top; or, as the old saying has it, units do those things well that the boss cares about. When the top political leadership displays a complete lack of concern for the welfare of its soldiers, such attitudes percolate down through the ranks. Exhibit A was the betrayal of Syrian troops fighting Israel in the Golan in 1967: having withdrawn its elite units, the Syrian government knowingly broadcast the falsehood that Israeli troops had captured the town of Kuneitra, which would have put them behind the largely conscript Syrian army still in position. The leadership took this step to pressure the great powers to impose a truce, though it led to a panic by the Syrian troops and the loss of the Golan Heights.

Ravnodušnost na sigurnost

U pogledu sigurnosnih mjera, postoji opća laxness, prividnu nemar i nezainteresiranost za obuku nesreća, od kojih su mnogi mogli biti spriječeno minimalnim naporima. Na (možda i pretjerano) sigurnosni svjesno Amerikanci, arapske društva pojaviti ravnodušan prema žrtvama i pokazati naizgled neodlučan pristup sigurnosti treninga. Postoji nekoliko objašnjenja za to. Neki će ukazati na inherentne fatalizmu unutar islama, 32 i zasigurno svatko tko je proveo dosta vremena u arapskim taksiji će posuditi povjerovati u tu teoriju, ali možda razlog je manje vjerski temelji i rezultat političke kulture. Kao svaki vojni veteran zna, etos jedinice postavljena na vrhu; ili, kao što stara izreka kaže, jedinice raditi one stvari i da je šef stalo. Kad je vrh političko vodstvo prikazuje potpuni nedostatak brige za dobrobit svojih vojnika, takvi stavovi procijediti kroz redove. Pokazuju je izdaja sirijskih vojnika bore Izrael u Golana 1967.: što povući svoje elitne jedinice je sirijska vlada svjesno emitirati laž da su izraelski vojnici su zarobili grad Kuneitra, koji bi ih staviti iza velikoj mjeri vojnog sirijske vojske još uvijek u položaju. Vodstvo je taj korak prisiliti velike ovlasti da nametne primirje, iako je dovelo do panike od strane sirijskih vojnika i gubitka Golanskoj visoravni.

Conclusion

It would be difficult to exaggerate the cultural gulf separating American and Arab military cultures. In every significant area, American military advisors find students who enthusiastically take in their lessons and then resolutely fail to apply them. The culture they return to—the culture of their own armies in their own countries—defeats the intentions with which they took leave of their American instructors.

When they had an influence on certain Arab military establishments, the Soviets reinforced their clients' cultural traits far more than, in more recent years, Americans were able to. Like the Arabs', the Soviets' military culture was driven by political fears bordering on paranoia. The steps taken to control the sources (real or imagined) of these fears, such as a rigidly centralized command structure, were readily understood by Arab political and military elites. The Arabs, too, felt an affinity for the Soviet officer class's contempt for ordinary soldiers and the Soviet military hierarchy's distrust of a well-developed, well-appreciated, well-rewarded NCO corps.

Arab political culture is based on a high degree of social stratification, very much like that of the defunct Soviet Union and very much unlike the upwardly mobile, meritocratic, democratic United States. Arab officers do not see any value in sharing information among themselves, let alone with their men. In this they follow the example of their political leaders, who not only withhold information from their own allies, but routinely deceive them. Training in Arab armies reflects this: rather than prepare as much as possible for the multitude of improvised responsibilities that are thrown up in the chaos of battle, Arab soldiers, and their officers, are bound in the narrow functions assigned them by their hierarchy. That this renders them less effective on the battlefield, let alone places their lives at greater risk, is scarcely of concern, whereas, of course, these two issues are dominant in the American military culture, and are reflected in American military training.