Pakleno oružje: Kalašnjikov u UAE-u prikazao svoj model bespilotne letjelice-kamikaze

• Dužina 1210 mm
  
• Visina 165 mm
  
• Širina 950 mm
  
• Brzina tijekom leta 80-130 km/h
  
• Trajanje leta do 30 minuta
  
• Maksimalna nosivost do 3 kg
  

Hektorović wrote:Nisko leti, jako malih dimenzija, znači klasični radari imaju velike probleme za detekciju a posebno PZO teško obara.

Šiba do 130 kilometara na sat, promatra metu do pola sata, i zabija se u idealnom trenutku...

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:

Hektorović wrote:Nisko leti, jako malih dimenzija, znači klasični radari imaju velike probleme za detekciju a posebno PZO teško obara.

Šiba do 130 kilometara na sat, promatra metu do pola sata, i zabija se u idealnom trenutku...

izrael sa time uništava rusko-sirijsku PZO u siriji

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:

Hektorović wrote:Nisko leti, jako malih dimenzija, znači klasični radari imaju velike probleme za detekciju a posebno PZO teško obara.

Šiba do 130 kilometara na sat, promatra metu do pola sata, i zabija se u idealnom trenutku...

izrael sa time uništava rusko-sirijsku PZO u siriji

Hektorović wrote:

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:

Hektorović wrote:Nisko leti, jako malih dimenzija, znači klasični radari imaju velike probleme za detekciju a posebno PZO teško obara.

Šiba do 130 kilometara na sat, promatra metu do pola sata, i zabija se u idealnom trenutku...

izrael sa time uništava rusko-sirijsku PZO u siriji

Zato su ovo i razvili, vidjeli su učinkovitost koncepta.


Loitering munition, ispališ ga u Karlovcu, i za 25 minuta pogodiš cilj u Cazinu.

omni wrote:Pored sve te razvijene tehnike danas bi Crveni baron sa svojim trokrilcem popickao neku vojnu bazu.

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:najjača stvar USA /a time i Izrael, izgleda ima tu tehnologiju od kraja 80tih , jer tada su vidjeli snagu Ruske PZO , itd,  a Izrael je dokazao moć toga u praksi zadnjih godinu dana.. gdje oni pusti Pantsiri i S-300 na kraju ništa nemogu bez obzira na sve... svaki ovakav dron par desetaka tisuća $, a Pantsir sustav 12milijuna.. ovaj ih obori nekoliko prije nego ga jedan pogodi.. ne pokrije niti 2-3% svoje vrijednosti.  Zapravo Rusima je odlično došlo to što se Pantsir /S-300"obruka" u Siriji, jer nedaj bože da nisu vidjeli nedostatke svoje PZO obrane, pa da je negdje izbio žešći fight vs NATOa pa da ih je NATO zasuo ovim dronovima.. . ovako su naučili lekciju.. naravno i Ameri/Židovi sa jedne strane uče, Rusi sa druge..

Hektorović wrote:

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:najjača stvar USA /a time i Izrael, izgleda ima tu tehnologiju od kraja 80tih , jer tada su vidjeli snagu Ruske PZO , itd,  a Izrael je dokazao moć toga u praksi zadnjih godinu dana.. gdje oni pusti Pantsiri i S-300 na kraju ništa nemogu bez obzira na sve... svaki ovakav dron par desetaka tisuća $, a Pantsir sustav 12milijuna.. ovaj ih obori nekoliko prije nego ga jedan pogodi.. ne pokrije niti 2-3% svoje vrijednosti.  Zapravo Rusima je odlično došlo to što se Pantsir /S-300"obruka" u Siriji, jer nedaj bože da nisu vidjeli nedostatke svoje PZO obrane, pa da je negdje izbio žešći fight vs NATOa pa da ih je NATO zasuo ovim dronovima.. . ovako su naučili lekciju.. naravno i Ameri/Židovi sa jedne strane uče, Rusi sa druge..

Interne Ruske procjene su da su u 2 godine rata u Siriji napradovali kao za 10 mirnih godina... Upravo zbog tog iskustva ne nabavljaju prije 2027 serijski Su-57, Kurganjece i Boomerange, nego je sav razvojni fokus na umreženim komandnim sustavima, dronovima, satelitima, krstarećim raketama i preciznom oružju. Do 2014 nisu imali nikakvog borbenog iskustva sa dronovima, danas su dronovima protkali čitavu vojsku i agresivno ih dalje razvijaju, kao i krstareće rakete.

AssadNaPodmornici wrote:uče i AMeri/Židovi nema ništa bolje nego vidjeti Rusko oružje u praksi kontra Američkog. I obrnuto.

Zamisli koliko tek Kinezi zaostaju sa Rusima i Amerima , a Kina nije vidjela rata od 1980 kada ih je Vijetnam isprašio , ono oni mislili "mi smo država od 1milijardu ljudi, idemo napasti mali siromašni vijetnam" - a ono mali siromašni vijetnam, ratuje već 20godina sa najvećim svjetskim silama.. dobili batina samo tako.. Kinezima bi dobro došlo isto ovako da kao Rusi negdje vojno ulete.. u neku gruziju, ukrainu, siriju, da malo vježbaju

Gaining operational experience

First, though, we should review the benefits at the operational and tactical levels. Vital combat experience is being gained by Russian forces on the ground in Syria. Whereas, prior to 2008, NATO militaries had been accumulating a vast wealth of such experience post-Cold War in the likes of Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and in any number of African countries, the Russian military had been doing very little apart from some involvement in an internal security role in the Chechen wars of 1999–2009. The Russian military’s lack of involvement in actual warfighting was shown up in its poor performance during its clash with Georgia in 2008.30

30 See A. Cohen and R. E. Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf(accessed 20 May 2018).View all notes

 It was, of course, the lessons learned from this campaign that sparked this military’s ongoing modernization process into truly effective life. This has led to the creation today of a Russian armed forces that are markedly more powerful and efficient than they were just 10 years ago.31

31 K. Giles, ‘Assessing Russia’s Reorganized and Rearmed Military’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 3 May 2017, carnegieendowment.org/2017/05/03/assessing-russia-s-reorganized-and-rearmed-military-pub-69853 (accessed 1 June 2018).View all notes

 And while this revamped military could conduct as many exercises as it liked within Russia, and engage in a low-level campaign of attrition in Ukraine from 2014 onwards, such activities could not substitute for experience of a fluid combat situation in a joint expeditionary environment involving the use of high-end military capabilities.32

32 See, for instance, I. Sutyagin and J. Bronk, Russia’s New Ground Forces: Capabilities, Limitations and Implications for International Security, Whitehall Papers, Royal United Services Institute, 2017, https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-papers/russias-new-ground-forces-capabilties-limitations-and-implications (accessed 4 April 2018).View all notes

 The mission conducted by Russian forces in Syria has ticked this particular box. It has provided a vital opportunity for, in particular, the marines, special forces, air force, and the navy to test not just their own capabilities but also their ability to work jointly. Logisticians are also being provided with severe tests and seemingly passing them comfortably.33

33 D. Sharkov, ‘Russian Military Used Syria War to Train Forces and Learn US Combat Moves, Says General’, Newsweek, 5 January 2018, http://www.newsweek.com/russian-military-used-syria-war-train-forces-and-learn-us-combat-moves-says-772027.View all notes

 As the head of the Russian military, General Valerii Gerasimov, put it in 2016, his military was ‘acquiring priceless combat experience in Syria’.34

34 V. Gerasimov, ‘Po opytu Sirii’ [From the Experience of Syria] Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer, 9–15 March 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_09_624.pdf.View all notes

 It is an operation that has, moreover, provided a significant proving-ground for testing new equipment and weapons systems. The head of the Russian Duma’s defense committee, Vladimir Shamanov, pointed out the scale of this testing: ‘As we helped the brotherly Syrian people, we tested over 200 new types of weapons’.35