Kosti prijepora

špekulanti heroji, yea, not in my book..

kic wrote:
špekulanti heroji, yea, not in my book..

"Kill the speculators!" is a cry made during every famine that has ever existed. Uttered by demagogues, who think that the speculator causes death through starvation by raising food prices, this cry is fervently supported by the masses of economic illiterates. This kind of thinking, or rather nonthinking, has allowed dictators to impose even the death penalty for traders in food who charge high prices during famines. And this is done without the feeblest of protests from those usually concerned with civil rights and liberties.

Yet the truth of the matter is that, far from causing starvation and famines, it is the speculator who prevents them. And far from safeguarding the lives of the people, it is the dictator who must bear the prime responsibility for causing the famine in the first place. Thus, the popular hatred for the speculator is as great a perversion of justice as can be imagined. We can best see this by realizing that the speculator is a person who buys and sells commodities in the hope of making a profit. He is the one who, in the time-honored phrase, tries to "buy low and sell high."

But, what does buying low, selling high, and making large profits have to do with saving people from starvation? Adam Smith explained it best with the doctrine of "the invisible hand." According to this doctrine, "every individual endeavors to employ his capital so that its produce may be of the greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. And he intends only his own security, his own gain. He is led in this as if by an invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it."1

The successful speculator, therefore, acting in his own selfish interest, neither knowing nor caring about the public good, promotes it.

First, the speculator lessens the effects of famine by storing food in times of plenty, through a motive of personal profit. He buys and stores food against the day when it might be scarce, enabling him to sell at a higher price. The consequences of his activity are far-reaching. They act as a signal to other people in the society, who are encouraged by the speculator's activity to do likewise. Consumers are encouraged to eat less and save more, importers to import more, farmers to improve their crop yields, builders to erect more storage facilities, and merchants to store more food. Thus, fulfilling the doctrine of the "invisible hand," the speculator, by his profit-seeking activity, causes more food to be stored during years of plenty than otherwise would have been the case, thereby lessening the effects of the lean years to come.

However, objections will be raised that these good consequences will follow only if the speculator is correct in his assessment of future conditions. What if he is wrong? What if he predicts years of plenty — and by selling, encourages others to do likewise — and lean years follow? In this case, wouldn't he be responsible for increasing the severity of the famine?

"Fulfilling the doctrine of the 'invisible hand,' the speculator, by his profit-seeking activity, causes more food to be stored during years of plenty than otherwise would have been the case, thereby lessening the effects of the lean years to come."
Yes. If the speculator is wrong, he would be responsible for a great deal of harm. But there are powerful forces at work that tend to eliminate incompetent speculators. Thus, the danger they represent and the harm they do are more theoretical than real. The speculator who guesses wrong will suffer severe financial losses. Buying high and selling low may misdirect the economy, but it surely creates havoc with the speculator's pocketbook.

A speculator cannot be expected to have a perfect record of prediction, but if the speculator guesses wrong more often than right, he will tend to lose his stock of capital. Thus he will not remain in a position where he can increase the severity of famines by his errors. The same activity that harms the public automatically harms the speculator, and so prevents him from continuing such activities. Thus at any given time, existing speculators are likely to be very efficient indeed, and therefore beneficial to the economy.

Contrast this with the activity of governmental agencies when they assume the speculator's task of stabilizing the food market. They too try to steer a fine line between storing up too little food and storing up too much. But if they are in error, there is no weeding-out process. The salary of a government employee does not rise and fall with the success of his speculative ventures. Since it is not his own money that will be gained or lost, the care with which bureaucrats can be expected to attend to their speculations leaves much to be desired. There is no automatic, ongoing daily improvement in the accuracy of bureaucrats, as there is for private speculators.

The oft-quoted objection remains that the speculator causes food prices to rise. If his activity is carefully studied, however, it will be seen that the total effect is rather the stabilization of prices.

In times of plenty, when food prices are unusually low, the speculator buys. He takes some of the food off the market, thus causing prices to rise. In the lean years that follow, this stored food goes on the market, thus causing prices to fall. Of course, food will be costly during a famine, and the speculator will sell it for more than his original purchase price. But food will not be as costly as it would have been without his activity. (It should be remembered that the speculator does not cause food shortages; they are usually the result of crop failures and other natural or man-made disasters.)


The effect of the speculator on food prices is to level them off. In times of plenty, when food prices are low, the speculator by buying up and storing food causes them to rise. In times of famine, when food prices are high, the speculator sells off and causes prices to fall. The effect on him is to earn profits. This is not villainous; on the contrary, the speculator performs a valuable service.

Yet instead of honoring the speculator, demagogues and their followers revile him. But prohibiting food speculation has the same effect on society as preventing squirrels from storing up nuts for winter — it leads to starvation.

hahah...tekst ti je vjerodostojan u pičku materinu


Llewellyn Harrison Rockwell Jr. is an American author, editor, and political consultant. A libertarian and a self-professed anarcho-capitalist, he founded and is the chairman of the Mises Institute

https://mises.org/library/defending-speculator

Gnječ wrote:hahah...tekst ti je vjerodostojan u pičku materinu


Llewellyn Harrison Rockwell Jr. is an American author, editor, and political consultant. A libertarian and a self-professed anarcho-capitalist, he founded and is the chairman of the Mises Institute

https://mises.org/library/defending-speculator

to ni rockwellov tekst, iako i rockwell rocks

aben wrote:

Gnječ wrote:hahah...tekst ti je vjerodostojan u pičku materinu


Llewellyn Harrison Rockwell Jr. is an American author, editor, and political consultant. A libertarian and a self-professed anarcho-capitalist, he founded and is the chairman of the Mises Institute

https://mises.org/library/defending-speculator

to ni rockwellov tekst, iako i rockwell rocks

Walter Block is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University, senior fellow of the Mises Institute, and regular columnist for LewRockwell.com.

Gnječ wrote:

aben wrote:

Gnječ wrote:hahah...tekst ti je vjerodostojan u pičku materinu


Llewellyn Harrison Rockwell Jr. is an American author, editor, and political consultant. A libertarian and a self-professed anarcho-capitalist, he founded and is the chairman of the Mises Institute

https://mises.org/library/defending-speculator

to ni rockwellov tekst, iako i rockwell rocks

Walter Block is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University, senior fellow of the Mises Institute, and regular columnist for LewRockwell.com.

sa si pogodi

aben wrote:

Gnječ wrote:

aben wrote:

Gnječ wrote:hahah...tekst ti je vjerodostojan u pičku materinu


Llewellyn Harrison Rockwell Jr. is an American author, editor, and political consultant. A libertarian and a self-professed anarcho-capitalist, he founded and is the chairman of the Mises Institute

https://mises.org/library/defending-speculator

to ni rockwellov tekst, iako i rockwell rocks

Walter Block is the Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair in Economics at Loyola University, senior fellow of the Mises Institute, and regular columnist for LewRockwell.com.

sa si pogodi

điđi! điđi miđi

night sky wrote:

ebenica wrote:

night sky wrote:



...... ????......

htio sam reć' ukratko da mi se ne sjedi opet na satu vjeronauka gdje smo rođeni u grijehu, svaki iebeni kurac je grijeh i umiremo u grijehu i da skratimo cijelu priču.

[size=39]krivnja? radi se o goloj cinjenici.... [/size]
[size=39]i nisam vjernik[/size]...
ali pardon ako je potaknulo neugodna razmisljanja....

Doista je prekrasna činjenica što si svoj osjećaj potrebe argumentiranja pretočila u rijeći, rečenice i otisnula ih ovdje, na ovom mjestu, na ovom beskrajnom mjestu mogućnosti.(internet)
Hvala!
Žao mi je, što ljudi ne streme ka pozitivnom, već većina naginje ka negativnom jer negativno ostavlja prostor - negativnom.
A negativno je polje puno mogućnosti za izražaj sveg onog što čovjek u sebi ne može suzbiti.
I zbog toga, hvala još jednom..

ma, zanimljiva moderna wannabe basna, o mravu i cvrčcima.. ali sam ipak dojma da se špekulanti igraju i utječu na sudbinu tvrtke koja pruža realne proizvode i usluge in real time, a samo zarad zarade svoje..

kic wrote:
ma, zanimljiva moderna wannabe basna, o mravu i cvrčcima.. ali sam ipak dojma da se špekulanti igraju i utječu na sudbinu tvrtke koja pruža realne proizvode i usluge in real time, a samo zarad zarade svoje..

naravski da utječu, ko ča utječe i sve ostalo. ali tvrtka uopće i ne moro biti na burzi, in the first place.

ako čovječanstvu oduzmeš moralnost gljedanja na svoju zaradu, ako mravu nametneš da je neprihvatljivo da celo vrime rodi za svoju sebičnu korist, držin da si in vezo mlin kolo vrota.

špekulanti riskirajući svoju imovinu, omogućuju sebi eventualnu zaradu, ali i pomoć jadnicima kad in je nojviše potribna. un ki argumentiro protiv špekulanata would rather have poor poorer, jer ako nemo špekulanata, nemo ni potribne robe.

imoš recentno iskustvo s potreson, s kvasom u koroni, imoš i odgovor države, pa računoj.

plus, evo još malo štiva za kontekst;
https://mises.org/library/katrina-and-never-ending-scandal-state-management

ok NZ well done, so what are you going to do now for the next 30years, close your borders and life?

i to je rekao još prije 8mj..

koji su kriteriji za dizanje mjera, nitko ne zna, ali se zna da se ne smiju dić

kic wrote:


ok NZ well done, so what are you going to do now for the next 30years, close your borders and life?

i to je rekao još prije 8mj..

koji su kriteriji za dizanje mjera, nitko ne zna, ali se zna da se ne smiju dić

Evidence based policies, 
People are not stupid, they will take care of themselves..

aben wrote:

kic wrote:
ma, zanimljiva moderna wannabe basna, o mravu i cvrčcima.. ali sam ipak dojma da se špekulanti igraju i utječu na sudbinu tvrtke koja pruža realne proizvode i usluge in real time, a samo zarad zarade svoje..

naravski da utječu, ko ča utječe i sve ostalo. ali tvrtka uopće i ne moro biti na burzi, in the first place.

ako čovječanstvu oduzmeš moralnost gljedanja na svoju zaradu, ako mravu nametneš da je neprihvatljivo da celo vrime rodi za svoju sebičnu korist, držin da si in vezo mlin kolo vrota.

špekulanti riskirajući svoju imovinu, omogućuju sebi eventualnu zaradu, ali i pomoć jadnicima kad in je nojviše potribna. un ki argumentiro protiv špekulanata would rather have poor poorer, jer ako nemo špekulanata, nemo ni potribne robe.

imoš recentno iskustvo s potreson, s kvasom u koroni, imoš i odgovor države, pa računoj.

plus, evo još malo štiva za kontekst;
https://mises.org/library/katrina-and-never-ending-scandal-state-management

lako je biti špekulant kad ti država čuva škinu pa kad zbog svog pohlepnog špekuliranja prokliziš tražiš bailout. i kad ulete mali ulagači špekulalnti u igru pa ti poremete špekulaciju odmah tražiš blokiranje burze i mijenjanje pravila igre...

Gnječ wrote:

aben wrote:

kic wrote:
ma, zanimljiva moderna wannabe basna, o mravu i cvrčcima.. ali sam ipak dojma da se špekulanti igraju i utječu na sudbinu tvrtke koja pruža realne proizvode i usluge in real time, a samo zarad zarade svoje..

naravski da utječu, ko ča utječe i sve ostalo. ali tvrtka uopće i ne moro biti na burzi, in the first place.

ako čovječanstvu oduzmeš moralnost gljedanja na svoju zaradu, ako mravu nametneš da je neprihvatljivo da celo vrime rodi za svoju sebičnu korist, držin da si in vezo mlin kolo vrota.

špekulanti riskirajući svoju imovinu, omogućuju sebi eventualnu zaradu, ali i pomoć jadnicima kad in je nojviše potribna. un ki argumentiro protiv špekulanata would rather have poor poorer, jer ako nemo špekulanata, nemo ni potribne robe.

imoš recentno iskustvo s potreson, s kvasom u koroni, imoš i odgovor države, pa računoj.

plus, evo još malo štiva za kontekst;
https://mises.org/library/katrina-and-never-ending-scandal-state-management

lako je biti špekulant kad ti država čuva škinu pa kad  zbog svog pohlepnog špekuliranja prokliziš tražiš bailout. i kad ulete mali ulagači špekulalnti u igru pa ti poremete špekulaciju odmah tražiš blokiranje burze i mijenjanje pravila igre...

amen to that.

ali, to ne gre špekulantima na teret, nego državi.
sve u ča se država umišo bude gore nego ča bi bilo da se ni umišala.

nika nis ču kako govori njegoš, ali ovomu je svaka ko u njega

Fallacies are not simply crazy ideas. They are usually both plausible and
logical— but with something missing. Their plausibility gains them
political support. Only after that political support is strong enough to cause
fallacious ideas to become government policies and programs are the
missing or ignored factors likely to lead to "unintended consequences," a
phrase often heard in the wake of economic or social policy disasters.
Another phrase often heard in the wake of these disasters is, "It seemed like
a good idea at the time." That is why it pays to look deeper into things that
look good on the surface at the moment.
Sometimes what is missing in a fallacy is simply a definition. Undefined words have a special power in politics, particularly when they invoke some
principle that engages people's emotions. "Fair" is one of those undefined
words which have attracted political support for policies ranging from Fair Trade laws to the Fair Labor Standards Act. While the fact that the word
is undefined is an intellectual handicap, it is a huge political advantage.
People with very different views on substantive issues can be unified andmobilized behind a word that papers over their differing, and sometimeseven mutually contradictory, ideas. Who, after all, is in favor of unfairness?
Similarly with "social justice," "equality," and other undefined terms that can mean wholly different things to different individuals and groups— all of whom can be mobilized in support of policies that use such appealing words.
Fallacies abound in economic policies affecting everything from housing to international trade. Where the unintended consequences of these policies
take years to unfold, the effects may not be traced back to their causes by many people. Even when the bad consequences follow closely after a given policy, many people may not connect the dots, and advocates of policies that backfire often attribute these bad consequences to something else.
Sometimes they claim that the bad situation would have been even worse if it had not been for the wonderful policies they advocated.
There are many reasons why fallacies have staying power, even in the face of hard evidence against them. Elected officiais, for example, cannot readily admit that some policy or program that they advocated, perhaps with great fanfare, has turned out badly, without risking their whole careers. Similarly for leaders of various causes and movements. Even intellectuals or
academics with tenure stand to lose prestige and suffer embarrassment when
their notions turn out to be counterproductive. Others who think of themselves as supporters of things that will help the less fortunate would find it painful to confront evidence that they have in fact made the less fortunate worse off than before. In other words, evidence is too
dangerous— politically, financially and psychologically— for some people to allow it to become a threat to their interests or to their own sense of themselves.
No one likes to admit being wrong. However, in many kinds of
endeavors, the costs of not admitting to being wrong are too high to ignore.
These costs force people to face reality, however painful that might be. A student who misunderstands mathematics has little choice but to correct that misunderstanding before the next examination and someone in business cannot continue losing money indefinitely by persisting in
mistaken beliefs about the market or about the way to run a business. In short, there are practical as well as intellectual imperatives to see through
fallacies. The difference between sound and fallacious economic policies by a government can affect the standard of living of millions. That is what makes the study of economics important— and the exposure of fallacies
more than an intellectual exercise.

Contrasts in housing prices are sharp between places that have numerous
or severe restrictions and places that do not. Houston, Texas, for example,
does not even have zoning laws, much less the array of severe housing
restrictions found in some other cities. A nationwide real estate firm
estimated that a typical middle-class home on a quarter-acre lot that costs
$152,000 in Houston would cost more than $300,000 in Pordand, Oregon,
$900,000 in Long Beach, California, and more than a million dollars in San
Francisco. 2 8
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, home prices in
Tampa and Tallahassee, Florida, were not very different from prices in
Houston but, after restrictive home building laws passed in the late
twentieth century began to take effect, "housing prices in most Florida
markets have at least doubled relative to Houston," according to a study just
a few years later. 2 9

wtf wrote:

night sky wrote:

ebenica wrote:

night sky wrote:



...... ????......

htio sam reć' ukratko da mi se ne sjedi opet na satu vjeronauka gdje smo rođeni u grijehu, svaki iebeni kurac je grijeh i umiremo u grijehu i da skratimo cijelu priču.

[size=84]krivnja? radi se o goloj cinjenici.... [/size]
[size=84]i nisam vjernik[/size]...
ali pardon ako je potaknulo neugodna razmisljanja....

Doista je prekrasna činjenica što si svoj osjećaj potrebe argumentiranja pretočila u rijeći, rečenice i otisnula ih ovdje, na ovom mjestu, na ovom beskrajnom mjestu mogućnosti.(internet)
Hvala!
Žao mi je, što ljudi ne streme ka pozitivnom, već većina naginje ka negativnom jer negativno ostavlja prostor - negativnom.
A negativno je polje puno mogućnosti za izražaj sveg onog što čovjek u sebi ne može suzbiti.
I zbog toga, hvala još jednom..

.... mativka :) ....
.....na ovakvim je mjestima vazno samo jedno, znati da ono sto se moze u svoja cetiri zida,valjda, ne moze i ovdje, na javnom mjestu. samo to....

aben wrote: ako mravu nametneš da je neprihvatljivo da celo vrime rodi za svoju sebičnu korist

interesantno je tvoje životinjsko carstvo điđi, stvarno interesantno.

ebenica wrote:

aben wrote: ako mravu nametneš da je neprihvatljivo da celo vrime rodi za svoju sebičnu korist

interesantno je tvoje životinjsko carstvo điđi, stvarno interesantno.

A ča?