Vojna revolucija (tema sa starog foruma, da se ne izgubi)

War by Contract, Credit and
Contribution: The Thirty Years War
Geoff Mortimer
 
...One essential precondition of army growth was the availability of sufficient
suitable recruits, and this can be linked to a process of military de-skilling
which occurred between the mid-fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries. In the
later Middle Ages, typified by the battle of Agincourt in 1415, the key forces
had been the knights comprising the heavy cavalry, and the archers. Both
were in short supply, because of the amount of training and practice needed
to achieve and maintain proficiency in the use of their respective weapons,
while the cost of a knight’s armour and equipment put it beyond the reach of
all except noblemen and a few of their personal retainers. This began to
change towards the end of the Middle Ages, with the growth in use of the
pike, first as a defensive weapon, and later, particularly in the hands of the
Swiss, for offensive purposes. A certain amount of skill and physical strength
was still needed to manage a twelve-foot pike, but these requirements were
further reduced with the advent of firearms. Despite the elaborate drill manuals
of the early seventeenth century, the rudiments of musketry can be learned
in a day (as the present author has done), and certainly in less than a week.
While further training in battlefield disciplines was obviously desirable, the
raw recruit began to be militarily employable once he could load and fire his
weapon in the general direction of the enemy, which was the basic requirement
at that time and for centuries afterwards. As for cavalry, the day of
the knight was over once anyone who could sit on a horse and fire a pistol atthe same time could bring him down. These developments, which were effectively
completed with the introduction into general use of the flintlock pistol
around the 1540s, made every able-bodied man between 16 and 45 into a
potential pikeman, musketeer or cavalryman, so that the limited number of
trained soldiers competent in the use of specialist weaponry was no longer a
constraint on the rapid recruitment of large forces.
This effectively explains why military contracting did not emerge until
around the end of the sixteenth century, as such activities only became possible
on a significant scale once men were readily available. The status-conscious
aristocratic knights and skilled men-at-arms of the late Middle Ages had tended
to be individualists, conscious of their worth, and not inclined to take service
with middlemen, but it was another matter when any farm-hand became
potentially employable as a soldier. A second factor affecting this timing was
the trend towards keeping armies, and hence regiments, together over one or
more winters, which, as noted above, also emerged in the late sixteenth century.
This was militarily and financially more effective for the prince, but it also
created a much more attractive business and professional proposition for the
would-be contractor. Raising a regiment for a single summer involved a lot of
effort and risk, but smaller opportunities to make money, whereas once it
became a longer-term proposition the concept of ownership by the entrepreneur
could develop, bringing with it the associated recurring sources of profit,
as well as an established post and salary as a colonel. Such prospects in turn
enhanced the contractor’s own creditworthiness, making it easier for him to
raise the funds necessary to finance initial recruitment, which was itself an
essential part of the growing ability to raise large forces quickly...
To sum up, it seems less likely that army growth as a Europe-wide phenomenon
was driven by either the introduction of trace italienne fortifications, or
the tactical innovations of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus, but
more probable that it was the logical consequence of the de-skilling of soldiering,
followed by the development of mechanisms which removed or greatly
reduced most of the other constraints on troop numbers. Given the availability
of a sufficient number of potential soldiers, a contracting system which
both alleviated the administrative problems and provided credit for initial
recruitment, and the ability of forces once raised to sustain themselves almost
indefinitely by occupying territory and extracting contributions, it was
inevitable that warring princes would set out to raise ever larger armies.
Wallenstein was the pioneer with his 100,000-man Imperial army of 1625, but
once he had shown how it could be done Gustavus Adolphus and others were
not only able but virtually obliged to follow suit, in an early modern version
of the arms races of the twentieth century...
 
Jedno od objašnjenja naglog brojčanog rasta europskih vojski od 16. stoljeća - deprofesionalizacija, uvjetovana uvođenjem vatrenog oružja i sve manjom ulogom elitnog roda, teške konjice. Time je omogućena i praksa regrutacije preko posrednika (poduzetnika) rasirena u 17. st. kojom je za naručitelja poduzetnik podizao i opremao vojsku (primjer Wallenstein za cara Ferdinanda II). Obično se ono objašnjava i finacijskim jačanjem apsolutnih europskih vladara, koji su, stvorivši učinkovit porezni sustav imali na raspolaganju i veća sredstva. Treće bi bilo ono o potrebi jačanja vojski zbog opsada, budući da su u to vrijeme uznapredovale nove tehnike gradnje jačih i čvršćih utvrda (po talijanskom modelu) koje su time i zahtijevale veće brojeve kako bi se uspješnije izvele.

22WednesdayDec 2010
Posted by Mitch Williamson in Uncategorized
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Military History

Serried ranks of heavily armored lance-wielding knights from Florence and Siena fought at the Battle of San Romano in 1432—a style of warfare soon to be rendered obsolete. During the 14th century mail armor was increasingly supplemented by plate armor, which was surprisingly flexible and provided its wearer with a good deal of mobility. By the middle of the 15th century, knights were equipped with complete suits of plate armor with mail relegated to covering exposed areas behind the armor joints. During the late 15th and early 16th centuries, plate armor reached its apogee. The Battle of San Romano, a Florentine victory over Sienna in 1432, was one of the combats that Florentine politician and thinker Niccolò Machiavelli denounced as piddling affairs, fought not between citizen armies but by proxy, with hired armies led by mercenary captains such as Niccolò da Tolentino, leader of the victorious Florentine force. Da Tolentino is at the heart of this painting, on his white horse, wearing his extraordinary patterned turban, under his banner of the Knot of Solomon.

The Battle of San Romano was fought in 1432 between the troops of Florence, commanded by Niccolò da Tolentino, and Siena, under Francesco Piccinino. The outcome is generally considered favourable to the Florentines, but in the Sienese chronicles it was considered a victory.
The Florentine deployed c. 4,000 horse and 2,000 infantry. The clash lasted for some 6/7 hours, consisting in a series of heavy cavalry fights. It was decided by the intervention of a second cavalry corps commanded by Micheletto Attendolo.
#

Niccolò da Tolentino portrayed in The Battle of San Romano by Paolo Uccello.
Niccolò Mauruzzi (or Mauruzi), best known as Niccolò da Tolentino (c. 1350 – March 20, 1435) was an Italian condottiero. He should not be confused with Saint Nicholas of Tolentino.
A member of the Mauruzi della Stacciola family of Tolentino, he fled from that city in 1370 after a dispute with his relatives. He therefore fought under several condottieri. In 1406-1407 he commanded the troops of Gabrino Fondulo, lord of Cremona, and subsequently was under Pandolfo III Malatesta, lord of Fano and Cesena.
After having obtained from Malatesta the title of count and the castle of Stacciola near the Metauro river, he was hired by numerous Italian lords, including Filippo Maria Visconti, Queen Joan II of Naples and the Republic of Florence (1425). In 1431 he was made seignior of Borgo San Sepolcro by Papal decree, but the following year he lost it as he passed under the Florentines, whose armies he led from June 1423 to May 1434, with intervals as Papal commander-in-chief in 1424 and 1428-1432, and commander of Milanese troops in 1432.
For Florence he seized Brescia and won the Battle of Maclodio (October 12, 1427). After these successes he was appointed capitano generale (commander-in-chief) of the Republic in 1431 and in 1432 he was sent as commander of coalition against Francesco I Sforza in Romagna, where he was victorious at the Battle of San Romano, and was commemorated in a painting of the battle by Paolo Uccello. A portrait of Niccolò was executed in Santa Maria Novella as memory of his deeds.
In 1434 he was captured by the Visconti and thrown into a ravine. He survived, but died of the wounds the following year at Borgo Val di Taro. He was buried in Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence, a celebrating fresco by Andrea del Castagno commissioned over his tombs by the Florentine commune.
His son Cristoforo da Tolentino was also a condottiero.
LINK

Changes in arms and fortifications

During the 15th Century the development of large siege guns forced changes in the construction of defensive works. In Italy fortifications with thick earthen or brick walls and angled bastions, often complemented by moats, ditches and entrapments, were developed to make artillery attack less effective. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the distinctive low thick walls and angled bastions of the trace italienne spread slowly to the rest of Europe.

 
 
 
 

	The improvement in fortifications made sieges longer and more expensive. The siege of Ostend, for example, lasted from July 1601 to September 1604. The castle had recently been rebuilt with ramparts and counterscarps and the surrounding area was flooded by the defending Dutch, and its capture cost the Spanish thousands of troops. (Compare the siege of Breda or of Candia). Vauban's engineering continued to stress the bastion, but he also strengthened salients with ravelins and designed walls to make enfilading fire easier. In the later 17th and early 18th century, sieges remained costly in time and lives - the Allies suffered 12,000 casualties in the capture of Lille from the French (1708).
	The besiegers themselves often had to construct elaborate fortifications to defend themselves from a garrison's guns, and both besieged and besiegers mined and counter-mined (i.e. dug tunnels under their opponents fortifications so that they could trigger explosive charges from beneath). The Dutch besiegers constructed 25 miles of trenches and fortifications in the siege before the capture of ‘s Hertogenbosch (1629).
	Siege warfare became a specialist area of science:  Prince Maurice founded a special engineering course at Leiden University, the Duytsche Mathematicque and employed the mathematician, Simon Stevin  to draw up its curriculum.
	The growing importance of fortresses made battles less frequent and less crucial: - defeat in the field was not decisive if a garrisoned strongpoint was still held.

Matchlock musket
 

The sixteenth century also saw a significant change in weapons and tactics. Mounted knights and archers had dominated the medieval battlefield, but were replaced by musketeers and pikemen.

Muskets had replaced the bow and arrow throughout Europe by the end of the sixteenth century, but the musket was a large, slow, unwieldy weapon. At the beginning of the 17th century, the average musket was about five feet long and fired 12-bore shot. It was so heavy (c. 15 pounds) that it had to be supported and stabilized by a forked "rest". It took at least two minutes to load and because the gunpowder was ignited by a burning "match", it was unreliable in wet and windy weather.     wheellock In the course of the 17th century, the musket became gradually shorter (down to about four feet on average) and lighter. The "matchlock" was superseded by the "wheellock" (which ignited the powder with a revolving toothed wheel). flintlock In the last two decades of the 17th century, armies were issued with the "flintlock" (which produced a spark by striking the flint against a piece of steel (frizzen) positioned just above the gunpowder pan).

 
 
 

An innovation in the later seventeenth century was the grenade. This was a cast-iron ball about the size of grapefruit, packed full of gunpowder and small lumps of metal, with a fuse attached. Especially strong and tall Grenadiers were trained to throw the grenades (which had a troubling tendency to explode prematurely). The weapon was particularly used in siege warfare to assault the soldiers who rushed together to a breach in the fortifications. [Frederick William of Prussia recruited a special battalion of Grenadiers called the "Potsdam Giants"; he paid well to attract men more than seven feet tall from all over Europe].

 
 
Developing tactics
 

	Successful tactics depended greatly on maneuvering the various elements of the early-modern army in close co-ordination. Pikemen could defend themselves from cavalry attack, but were very vulnerable to musket fire.
	The Spanish tercio was the first successful combination of pikes and muskets. The pikemen were formed in a central square and the musketeers positioned at each corner. Tercios were large - about 3,000 men - and difficult to maneuver. Spanish infantry tactics were based on the tercio until its defeat at the Battle of Rocroi  (1643). (The Hapsburg armies of the later seventeenth century were reorganized by Montecuccoli on a six-rank battallion model that owed more to Gustavus Adolphus than the earlier tercio tradition).
	Cavalry were useful for reconnaissance and surprise, but stood little chance against disciplined pikemen and were little used in Western European warfare. When France went to war in 1635, only just over twelve thousand of its 132,000 troops were cavalry.     On the vast steppes of Eastern Europe, cavalry remained very important. The "winged" horsemen (Husaria) of Poland, organized in divisions and supported by artillery, played a key role in warfare. The Poles bred horses for speed and endurance, developed a superb curved saber, and carried twenty feet lances that could pierce pikemen's defenses. At the battles of Kircholm (1605) and Gniew (1656), Polish cavalry showed they could beat the best Western infantry, and they played a key role in routing the Ottoman forces at the siege of Vienna (1683).

 
 

Musket fire needed to be concentrated in volleys to be destructive because the weapons were so inaccurate (effective range was only about 75-100 yards - a modern army rifle has a range of about 400 yards) and because misfires were so common. However, if all the guns were fired simultaneously, the unit was very vulnerable until the guns were reloaded. The Dutch were the first effectively to overcome this problem: - musketeers were drawn up in ranks (generally six) - the front rank fired and then moved back and began to reload, whilst the rank behind then fired and repeated the process. The troops had to work together and be thoroughly familiar with their weapons for this tactic to be successful. Maurice of Nassau insisted that the soldiers train regularly, and in 1597 standard terms of command were introduced throughout the Dutch army to guarantee uniformity.     In 1607, the Wapenhandlinghe of Jacob de Gheyn was published. This beautifully illustrated drill manual showed each stage of loading a musket and readying a pike. It was soon translated into Danish, German, French and English, and across Europe troops began to be systematically drilled. The title page of a copy of a German translation

 
 

Gustavus Adolphus trained his troops so well that he was able to reduce the number of ranks to three (one kneeling, the second crouching, the third standing) and yet still maintain a continuous fire of volleys. Gustavus Adolphus also reduced the size of tactical units, deploying them in battalions of about 500 men - this made tactical maneuver simpler and more flexible.

With the help of his skilful aide Torstensson , Gustavus Adolphus also innovated in his use of artillery. He made artillery lighter and more mobile - rapidly firing four-pounders were used effectively throughout the battle, moving forward with the troops rather than discharging from fixed positions before the main battle commenced. At the Battle of Breitenfeld  (1631), Gustavus Adolphus even managed to capture the enemy's artillery (by a bold cavalry raid) and turn it against them.

 
 
Bigger armies

The need for troops to garrison and besiege fortresses led armies to become larger. By 1713, Peter the Great had an army of over 300,000 men.     Number of troops   Spain France United Provinces Sweden 1470 20,000 40.000     1550s 150,000 50,000     1590s 200,000 80,000 20,000 15,000 1630s 300,000 150,000 50,000 45,000 1650s 300,000 100,000 100,000 70,000 1700s 50,000 400,000 100,000 100,000

[Adapted from B.M.Downing, The Military Revolution & political change]
 

	The size of armies increased absolutely, but problems of logistics and supply still made it very difficult to concentrate large numbers of troops at one point. The problems of moving thousands of tons of flour in addition to large quantities of gunpowder and shot meant that if an army could not "live off the land" it rapidly dispersed or died from hunger. Throughout the century, winter campaigning remained difficult - if not impossible - because of the absence of grass &c. for the horses and livestock. Turenne  was victorious in his Bavarian campaign because he secured his lines of supply, avoided conflict until conditions suited him and maneuvered his enemy into devastated territory. "Make few sieges and fight plenty of battles" he told Condé, "when you are master of the countryside the villages will give us the towns".
	Louis XIV was able to overcome these problems and deploy massive field armies because Michel Le Tellier and his son, the Marquis of Louvois established an efficient system of billeting and supply.       Drilling French troops
	Louis and Louvois also took a small step towards making officers into a professional meritocracy. For much of the seventeenth century, in many countries noblemen simply  assumed positions of command regardless of their competence (or even attendance) - the colonels of the Imperial armies of 1633, for example, consisted of 13 commoners and 94 noblemen. In 1675, Louis instituted the ordre du tableau (Table of Ranks) making power dependent on rank and seniority (not noble birth). The continued practice of selling colonelcies undermined promotion by talent.

Number of troops
	Spain	France	United Provinces	Sweden
1470	20,000	40.000
1550s	150,000	50,000
1590s	200,000	80,000	20,000	15,000
1630s	300,000	150,000	50,000	45,000
1650s	300,000	100,000	100,000	70,000
1700s	50,000	400,000	100,000	100,000

Ovo mi je posebno zanimljivo...npr. Francuska je u roku od 50 godina (1650 - 1700) učetverostručila svoju vojnu silu, a Španjolska je od 300 000 spala na 50 000 vojnika... u slucaju Francuske, vojni razlozi (ratovi koje je vodio Louis XIV), a Španjolske ekonomski, jasno... Zao mi je sto nema podataka za Prusku, to bi bilo zanimljivo vidjeti...

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY: PIKE, SHOT AND CAVALRY




In the mounted Caracole formation, each rank of a troop of horse goes forwards in turn to fire its pistols at the enemy then retires to the rear of the formation to reload, preferably stationary. This was a complicated action that demanded steadiness of both horse and rider under fire. It was not helped by contradictory advice in drill books on how to perform the manouevre.


 



A pistoleer practises firing techniques in this depiction of early period pistol combat. He practises firing at the enemy rider and his horse, while below two heavy horse lancers continue their fight with pistols after their lances have been broken.


 
It was the arrival of firearms that brought Medieval warfare to an end. Although the armourers responded with a better quality metal and the mounted knight sacrificed speed and impetus for heavier and thicker plate to resist bullets, the battle of Pavia in 1525 probably marked the end of the dominance of noble, heavy cavalry, as the flower of French aristocracy was brought crashing down by massed shot. The longbow and then the arquebus made the battlefield the province of the foot soldier, as the serried ranks of steady missile armed men proved concentrated firepower could stop a mounted charge in its tracks. Added to this commoners could kill nobles. Despite pikemen being needed for defence if the cavalry got through the shooting, this marked both a technological and philosophical revolution, beginning the swing from impact melee to firefight.
 
The rate of change was a slow one. This was not due to the inherent conservatism of the mounted elite but the slow emergence of Swiss pikemen as a battlefield phenomenon. The Swiss had used some pikes as early as 1339 at the Battle of Laupen, but the real impact of the pike, which had helped Alexander conquer his known world, came late in the fifteenth century when the Swiss defeated Charles the Bold of Burgundy in three battles whose impact echoed across Europe. The huge Swiss pike block, protected at first by crossbows and handguns and then by arquebuses, became the dominant instrument for waging war, and was widely copied. It was an offensive weapon, which steamrolled its way over its enemies on foot and brushed aside those on horseback, and it could defend itself against cavalry from any direction.
 
The Swiss met their match in prepared battlefield works at Marignano in 1515 and Bicocca in 1522, when their crushing advance faltered in the face of artillery and massed firearm infantry. They suffered high casualties and realized that they, like their mounted adversaries, had failed properly to adapt to the rapid expansion in the use of gunpowder weapons.
 
It was the Spaniards who successfully blended the pike and firearms in the creation of their famous tercios, which were the next to dominate the battlefield. But the adoption of the musket made the tercio more defensive through its increase in firepower range: the formation was slow, cumbersome and was prone to interference by cavalry. Cavalry could stop the tercio by surrounding it, but if it was to be destroyed the massive square had to be broken into. If enemy cavalry could get into it then they could impose the hand-to-hand melee in which they were so effective: the cavalry needed to breach the tercio.
 
Breaching a formed tercio could be done by a massed charge with the lance, especially if the cavalry formation was dense enough to prevent horses from shying away from the points of the pikes, and if the speed of the advance into contact was sufficient to carry it into the packed ranks despite the casualties. But cavalry commanders were reluctant to try it. Instead they decided to do it with shot themselves. Early attempts to equip mounted troops with firearms proved impractical and inefficient. The handgun or petronel braced against the flat of the chest, or sometimes with its barrel lodged in a cradle incorporated into the armour on a horse’s neck, seemed to do little for the rider’s ability to aim and hit his mark, or for the horse’s willingness to be controlled when the gun went off.
 
There were many experiments with arquebus, hackbut and dragon, but the handling of the lighted match and the complicated processes of firing and reloading were two-handed operations necessitating mounted troops to be both proficient musketeers and experienced horsemen capable of controlling their mounts with only their knees and heels. Another technique of firing was required.
 
The answer was the invention of the wheellock, which did away with match as the means of ignition. It depended upon winding up a clockwork, serrated-steel disc or wheel. A short length of chain connected the wheel’s spindle to a powerful mainspring, so when the spindle was wound by use of a spanner, this chain, under tension from the mainspring, wrapped around it. The action was then locked by a standard trigger mechanism. When he wished to fire the rider clicked the dogshead, which held a piece of pyrites in a set of screw-up jaws, down onto the wheel. On squeezing the trigger the spring was unlocked, the chain whipped back, unwrapped and caused the spindle to revolve. The rapidly rotating serrated wheel grated against the pyrites and produced sparks. These ignited the priming charge in the pistol’s pan, firing the main charge in turn through a touchhole in the barrel. Wheel-locks were highly robust but they did have certain drawbacks. For example, if they malfunctioned, a gunsmith with special tools had to repair them. Also the pyrites, a soft mineral, broke, chipped or wore away and needed frequent replacement. Small fragments often worked their way into the mechanism. Wheel-locks worked well and could usually be relied upon to fire first time, but reloading. in action was difficult, hence the tendency to carry a carbine on a sling and a pair of pistols slotted into holsters strapped over the pommel of the saddle, perhaps with another tucked into a boot. The rider could load and span all his weapons while awaiting the order to advance, and go into action with carbine and pistols ready to fire. He had only to point and pull the trigger.
 
Reiters to the Fore
Contemporary tests with wheel-locks recorded an 85 per cent success rate for hitting a man-sized target at 27 m (30 yards) and reasonable rates of penetration of 2-mm (.07-inch) steel plate, although we are not told what a ‘reasonable rate’ was, nor whether these were pistols or petronels. Tests performed by the author with an accurate reproduction wheel-lock petronel showed accurate shooting was possible at 9 metres (10 yards), and even up to 18 metres (20 yards) it was ‘reasonable’ , averaging about 80 per cent. Beyond that accuracy was haphazard, with a dramatic drop to around ten per cent.
 
A flintlock pistol fared somewhat better but was more prone to misfires. Perhaps it was a case of better marksmanship but the period advice about touching your enemy with the muzzle before pulling the trigger says more about the general efficiency of the weapon than any test. Even if the range was short, pistol-armed horsemen were instructed to close the distance with the tercio and deliver enough shot to make a breach in it, into which their supporting lance armed colleagues could charge and cut up the enemy at close quarters.
 
Wheel-lock and Caracole
Pistol-armed horse became the new innovation, fashionable and practical. The desire to charge was subsumed in the interest of winning back tactical supremacy, and by extending the use of these new weapons to the heavily armoured horse as well as the light cavalry, the dual function of shooting and close combat was achieved. Fully-armoured, cuirassier horse equipped with a brace of pistols who could shoot their way into a formation and then fall upon it with the sword became a common battlefield sight and these mounted pistoleers, called reiters, soon became feared throughout Europe.
 
But this new technique of fighting on horseback had serious implications for cavalry tactics and formations. At St Quentin the cavalry adopted a deep formation rather than their usual deployment in lines. Unlike the Swiss pikes or the later infantry column this was not done to increase the mass of a moving block in order to maximize the impact of a charge. It was based on a drill-manual based idea of increasing the rate of fire the reiters could deliver. The best-known advocate of mounted firepower was probably Cruso, whoseMilitarie Instructions for the Cavallrie was reprinted many times in different languages across Europe. His theories were put into practice by many of the great captains of his age. Military manuals for the cavalry of this period are full of complex techniques for performing tactical manoeuvres to bring maximum firepower to bear on various enemy formations and arms. The most favoured system was called the caracole.
 
The caracole was performed by first drawing up the riders in a column at least six ranks deep and anything from six to 20 files wide. This cumbersome formation would slowly trot towards the enemy. They would get to within 28 metres (30 yards) and fire first one pistol and then the second. Exactly how this was done depended on which drill book was being followed. Some advocated firing by ranks, others en masse, which would seem dangerous for those at the front. Some argued fire should be discharged forwards, either one pistol at a time or even both together; others advised turning the horse first right and firing the left-hand pistol sideways, and then turning left to shoot the right-hand pistol. Having fired, the cavalry retired to reload, and there were different opinions about how best to do this. Some preferred wheeling by ranks, some by facing to the side and riding Indian file to the rear of the block, while others argued that counter-marching each file was better. We have the advice, but unfortunately there is insufficient evidence as yet to say which method was most widely employed, though there is a reference to some rear ranks firing into the air when ordered to shoot en masse.
 
Although cumbersome and slow moving, seldom being performed faster than the trot, the major problem with the caracole was that although it delivered shot it could never deliver enough to do much harm. Cavalry battles became slow and noisy affairs and although they could, in theory, disrupt an enemy formation they apparently did not cause many casualties, unless the cavalry commander was able to bring overwhelming numbers of units into action.
 
Even with enough numbers it was difficult for cavalry to defeat foot. The arquebus and the musket could outrange their pistols and deliver heavier balls with greater force, and as foot could also bring to bear a better density of fire, the chance of the cavalry winning such a duel, even though they could ride off and reload in relative safety, was minimal. The attempt to turn the cavalry into mounted firepower succeeded only in rendering them tactically useless. Despite the outstanding performances of heavy lancers at Mook in 1574 and Gembloux in 1578, the majority of troopers were now armed with pistols and the lance began to disappear. The Dutch formally banished it 1597.The long thrusting cavalry sword, the medieval estoc and its descendants, also vanished, and riders relied upon shorter swords in the close quarter melee; or even their pistol butts. In the drive to increase firing efficiency, hand-to-hand combat skills went unpractised by individuals and commanders. Even if breaches had been made in enemy formations few units were any longer proficient in charging into contact, and heavy lancers were more or less ‘troops of show’ ,fit more for parades rather than the bloody business of the battlefield. Horsemanship went into decline. With the cavalry unable or unwilling to close for combat and ‘reduced to the pointless popping of petit pistols’, this great experiment is sometimes referred to as ‘the debilitation of the horse’.
 
Pistol-armed cavalry were so widely adopted that they even made a significant appearance in the Polish Army, which had always been fiercely proud of its cavalry-charging tradition. Unlike many of their European counterparts they did not wholly relinquish the lance and could and would still charge into action. At the Battle of Klusino in 1610 there was a telling incident when the Swedish and Russian reiters tried to retire after performing a grand caracole. The Poles went in with swords, at the gallop. They bowled over many in the huge block and broke it to pieces, scattering them and driving large numbers from the field. At least in one corner of Europe the cavalry had not been entirely debilitated, but in general the end of the sixteenth century saw fewer great battles. The slow movement of both the tercio and the reiters, and their reliance upon firepower, coupled with the rising popularity of artillery and fieldworks, put the emphasis firmly upon defence. The close quarter melee became a last-resort gamble.

The Dutch Reforms


In 1568 the Dutch began their long battle for independence from Spain and would remain at war intermittently for 80 years. The problems faced by the young Dutch republic played an important role in the military reforms that would take place there over several decades to come. Although many of these reforms centred on infantry organization, drill and tactics, the nature of warfare in the Netherlands would be one of many more sieges than battles.
 
The name most often associated with the Dutch reform movement is Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625). He was the son of William the Silent who had been one of the main leaders of the Dutch revolt. In 1584, at the age of only 17, he became Stadthalter of Holland and Zeeland. In 1590, he was made captain-general of all of the Dutch forces and was then in a position to undertake his reforms.
 
Like many of the military men of his age, Maurice hoped to emulate the military establishments of antiquity, in particular the Romans. Maurice read military manuals from antiquity, in particular those of Vegetius, Aelian, and the Taktika of the Byzantine emperor, Leo, as well as the works of contemporary commentators such as Justus Lipsius. What emerged for Maurice was an emphasis on regular standing forces and the importance of discipline and drill. But within the context of classical antiquity, Maurice also saw the importance of making more effective use of the constantly improving technology of gunpowder weapons.
 
One of the most important changes instituted by Maurice was the creation of a standing army. The army was still made up primarily of foreigners serving for pay. Some of these were mercenaries in the traditional sense, while others were foreign troops sent by their monarchs to serve under Dutch command and at Dutch expense (notably fron1 England). In 1603, for example, the Dutch army consisted of a total of 132 companies. Of that number there were 43 English, 32 French, 20 Scottish, 11 Walloon, 9 German and a mere 17 Dutch. The main reason for the preponderance of foreigners was the relatively small population of the Netherlands, combined with the need to keep an army in the field almost constantly for 80 years. Maurice recognized that keeping these companies in his service all year round, rather than discharging them in the off-season or at the end of a campaign, would make the Dutch army a more effective fighting force in the long run.
 
The maintenance of this standing army also allowed Maurice to initiate new standards of discipline and drill. In this, Maurice was aided by his cousins William Louis and John, counts of Nassau. Maurice and his cousins oversaw the standardization of drill, and equipment, so that all the troops in Dutch service would be using the same methods regardless of their origin. The length of the pike and the armour of the pikemen, as well as the length and calibre of firearms were all standardized. Perhaps more important was the codification of drill at this time in the ‘Dutch Discipline’. All words of command as well as the manual of arn1S for both the pike and arquebus and musket were regularized. In 1607 Jacob de Gheyn’s Wapenhandelinghe was published – a complete manual of arms for pike, arquebus and musket illustrated with 116 plates, accompanied by the appropriate commands and a commentary.
 
Maurice also modified the military organization and tactics of the Dutch infantry. Once again Maurice turned to antiquity for inspiration. He hoped to replicate the flexibility of the Roman legion by creating units based upon the cohort to replace the large unwieldy regiments and tercios of his own time. To that end, he reorganized each Dutch regiment into two or more battalions. In theory, each battalion was to be 550 men, the same size as a cohort in Vegetius’ antique legio, and was made up of 250 pikemen and 300 men armed with firearms, 60 of which were to form a line of skirmishers. The pikes were to form in the centre of the battalion with arquebusiers and musketeers on the wings.
 
Moreover, these units drew up in fewer ranks than the earlier regiments and tercios; figures vary but the pikes seem to have been between five and ten deep and the shot between eight and 12 ranks deep. The shot were trained to use countermarch fire, a tactic inspired by Aelian. In this formation the files of shot had intervals between them wide enough for a man to march.
 
The first soldiers in the file would fire a volley and then do an about face, marching back through the intervals and join the rear rank, all the while going through the drill to reload their weapons. This would be followed by the men of the second rank and then the third and so on. By the time men from the front rank returned to their original position, they would be reloaded and ready to fire another volley and start the drill all over again. This method of firing required great discipline but created a constant volume of fire from the unit. When threatened by cavalry, the arquebusiers and musketeers would retire behind 26 the pikes without disrupting the formation. In battle, the Dutch usually formed their battalions in three lines of battle. These lines could be staggered to resemble a chequerboard so that the battalions in the individual lines could support one another. This bears a striking resemblance to the Roman acies triplex of a legion drawn up in similar formation. Maurice laid the foundations for the early modern standing army based on constant drill and a high standard of discipline. He also developed a system of tactics that truly integrated pike and shot in a coherent fashion. Ironically, throughout the two decades of conflict with Spain, Maurice was only twice able to take his army into battle (both were victories), yet found himself participating in no fewer than 29 sieges.
 
Maurice of Nassau, veliko ime europske vojne povijesti.

Tercios
"Everyone fought, from the Duke of Alba, a Spanish grandee, to Pizarro, a swineherd. They all fought: noblemen and labourers, shepherds and burghers, scholars and magnates, clergymen and rogues, clerks and knights. Every region of Spain sent its sons to fight. Garcilaso, Ercilla, Cetina, Alcázar, Cervantes, Lope de Vega, Calderón fought. An entire people fought, without differences of
class, loyalty, duty, profession or wealth.
‘They fought over the Andes and in the Alpine foothills, on the plains of the Po and on the Mexican plateau; beside the Tiber against the Pope, and beside the Mapocho against Arauco; on the banks of the River Plate and the Danube, the Elbe and the Tagus, the Orinoco and the Escalda; at Pavia and Cuzco, in the Alpujarras and in the Amazon jungles, in Tunisia and in Amberes, in the Gulf of Lepanto and off the English coast, at Navarino and Terceira, in La Goleta and La Habana, in Algeria and in the Philippines, in Lombardy and in Naples; at all four points of the compass in France, from Provence to Brittany, from the banks of the Bidassoa to the banks of the Marne and from Rousillon to Normandy; in the Netherlands, in Portugal, in Africa and in Ireland…"
(Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, España, un enigma histórico)
Traditionally, the Ordinance issued in Genoa by Emperor Charles V in 1536 has been considered the document by which the tercios were
created. However, the reference to Tercios in the Ordinance states: ‘The Spanish infantry of the Tercio of Naples and Sicily in our army have been paid until the end of September this year, and those of the Tercio of Lombardy until mid-October this year, and the soldiers of the Tercio of Malaga who stayed in Nice, and the company from Jaen that serves in our army, until 25 October’. Therefore, this ordinance did not mark the birth of the Tercios, but simply recognized – under a term which had become official over time – units that had already been formed.
‘Tercio’ as the title of a military unit may have been used first in 1509 for the Tercio of Zamudio (its commander´s name), which became the Tercio of Naples in 1513. Similarly, the Tercio of Sicily was created in1534 with forces employed in the North African campaign against the Berbers and Turks; and two years later the Tercio of Lombardy was formed in the recently acquired Italian territory of the Duchy of Milan. Eventually these three units became known as the Tercios Viejos (‘Old Tercios’) of the Spanish infantry; they were the original formations, and had permanent standing. On the other hand, the Tercio of Malaga (or of Nice, as it was named after it had garrisoned that city) did not have permanent standing, and subsequently received several names.
Several years before this successful conclusion of the Reconquista, contingents of Swiss soldiers had arrived in Castile to serve not only as mercenaries, but also as instructors in a new form of fighting that was particularly effective against heavy cavalry. Renowned throughout the continent, the Swiss infantry fought in dense formations of pikes, not only on the defensive but also manoeuvring in the attack, supported by small numbers of crossbowmen and handgunners. The successful employment of these tactics required strict discipline and training, to harness the individual fighting men into a co-ordinated group.
One of the chief promoters of reform was Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, ‘the Great Captain’. The Catholic Monarchs gave this veteran
the command of the Spanish expeditionary corps that travelled to Italy to fight against a French invasion, in support of King Ferrante of Naples.
From then on, free from interference, Córdoba assumed command of operations, and began to lay the foundations of future Spanish
military doctrine. The central characteristic of what would be known as ‘war in the Spanish mode’ was watchfulness and realism; Córdoba would fight only when it was in his interest to do so, never when it would favour the enemy, so his troops gained experience and confidence. He also employed mixed troops and tactics in ways long familiar to Spanish commanders: ‘He agreed to… set up ambushes for the French cavalry in the way used in Spain against the Moors, a true novelty for the people there’. A main tenet of his doctrine was: ‘Never bring your warriors to battle unless you are sure of their hearts and know that they are fearless and orderly; never test them if you do not see that they expect to win’
(Inspección de Infantería, La infantería…).

BATTLE OF MÜHLBERG, 1547
1: Coselete
2: Pica seca
3: Arquebusier

BATTLE OF MÜHLBERG, 1547
1: Coselete
2: Pica seca
3: Arquebusier

SIEGE OF MALTA, 1565
1: Musketeer, Tercio Viejo de Sicilia
2: Officer
3: Maestre del campo

podržavam, treba spasiti neke teme ako vam se da.

kic wrote:podržavam, treba spasiti neke teme ako vam se da.

Ok, ima još jedna koju sam iskopao...otvorim.